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

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The

Mystery of the Danube.


STOCKH
EDINBURGH
COPENHA
DUBLIN
Hamburg
LONDON
AMSTERDAM
BERLI
Dres
R. Rhine
To New York
3080 miles
PARIS
Munich
To India & China via Panama
17200 miles 14800 miles
Berne
R. Rhone
Trieste
Venice
ADRIA
Marseilles
ROME
CORSICA
MADRID
Naples
SARDINIA
M E D I T
LISBON
SICILY
New York to India
3860 miles
Str. of Gibraltar
Gibraltar
Algiers
Tunis
Malta
Tripoli
From England to Herat viâ Calcutta 14,000 Miles
Do. Do. viâ the Indus 12,300 Miles

The

Mystery of the Danube.

Showing how through

Secret Diplomacy,

that River has been closed,

Exportation from Turkey arrested,

and the re-opening of the Isthmus of Suez prevented.

By David Urquhart.

"Peter had long meditated the project of the occupation of the Caspian, thus to draw the commerce of Asia and a part of India within his dominions."—VOLTAIRE.

London:
Bradbury & Evans, 11, Bouverie Street.
1851.

246. a. 217.

London:
Bradbury and Evans, Printers, Whitefriars.

To the Citizens of the United States.

FROM the aberrations of the hour, the appeal lies to posterity, because unaffected by the passions that obscure our sight, and the fallacies that pervert our judgment. Severed by an ocean, you are to us a future age; as such I appeal from my countrymen to you, not for judgment only, but for remedy. We have a common interest, you may retrieve what the infatuation of England has sacrificed; but to judge, you must know—read, and you will understand.

Explanation of the Map.

THE map shows the advance of Russia to the occupation of the countries through which the line of Indian traffic lies, which it has long been her object to restore and possess. When this plan was formed she had no sea port and no coast, except on the Frozen Sea. Since then she has, in the north, reached the Baltic, and has all but attained directly to the Atlantic; whilst in the south she has obtained possession of, or supreme sway over the seas, water-courses, and districts required as the basis of the projected undertaking—having reached and overstepped the Danube and the Araxes.

The Caspian is marked as an acquisition because the Persian flag is excluded. The exclusion of foreign men-of-war, by the Porte from the Euxine, when the whole sea belonged to herself, has served as a pretext to free Russia in that sea from all observation and control—the Porte from all protection. The reason for including, now for the first time, the Sea of Aral and the adjoining portion of the steppes of the Kirgliez-Cossack, in the territory, will be found in the subjoined intelligence: —

"ST. PETERSBURG, *Nov. 13th.*

"The Sea of Aral was, in 1839, separated from the Russian frontier by hostile tribes, but the Steppes of the Kirgliez are now traversed by Cossacks, and divided by a chain of Russian forts. Owing to the report of a naval commission, three steamers are being built at Motala, in Sweden, for that sea; they will be conveyed as far as possible by water, and then taken to pieces and carried by land. Sailing vessels and transports have already been built on the shores of the sea. Troops are to be sent from Orenburg across the Kirgliez Steppes, to be embarked at Fort Raim, now Fort Aral. The expedition has two objects—to sail up the Syr-Daria to the great marts of Terchkend and Chokend, which are situated either on it, or on rivers near it; and second—to sail down the Syr-Amru, through the heart of Toorkestan to Khiva, and thence to Bokhara, which is situated on a river at no great distance from the Syr-Amru."

The map also shows the relative distances by Suez and Panama, from England and the United States to China and India.

England to Calcutta *viâ*	Cape of Good Hope	. .	11,700	miles.
Do. Do.	Isthmus of Suez	. . .	7,920	„
Do. Do.	Do. Panama	. .	17,280	„
Do. Hong Kong *viâ*	Cape of Good Hope	.	13,140	„
Do. Do.	Isthmus of Suez	. . .	9,660	„
Do. Do.	Do. Panama	. .	14,340	„
New York to Calcutta *viâ*	Cape of Good Hope	.	12,360	„
Do. Do.	Isthmus of Suez	. .	9,800	„
Do. Do.	Do. Panama	.	14,340	„
Do. Hong Kong *viâ*	Cape of Good Hope	.	13,740	„
Do. Do.	Isthmus of Suez	. .	11,460	„
Do. Do.	Do. Panama	.	12,640	„

The

Mystery of the Danube.

Part I.

The Danube in Connection with the Commerce of Europe and Asia.

WHILE so many travellers are risking their lives to discover the sources of the Niger and its course through Africa, and such anxiety prompts the learned of Europe to ascertain the currents and channels in the neighbourhood of the Poles, it is strange that there is no thought of the discoveries to be made of the course of the Danube through the centre of Europe. Regarding it and its obstructions infinitely less is known than of the African stream and the Arctic ice. Its place is, indeed, accurately laid down upon the maps; the volume of its waters and the rapidity of their course minutely determined; but mystery, more profound than Colchian darkness, envelopes every proceeding with which it is connected, and not a suspicion is entertained either of what it is or of what it may become.

Every one is ready to admit the paramount importance of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The Danube does not yield to these celebrated straits, and upon it in a great measure depends their value in connection with future commercial enterprise. The Black Sea is the connecting link between the two, and opens the course of future transit from the Danube to the East. The Bosphorus, the Danube (joined by railway to the Rhine), the Black Sea, afford the elements of a system of communication,

through which it is the purpose of Russia, when she has got possession of them, to divert the trade of Asia and India, and awaiting that time she carefully conceals their value and prevents their use.

The scheme is vast, and its accomplishment may seem, if not impracticable, remote; but as far as regards the chief means of resistance that could have been contemplated, she has succeeded, and that without awaking so much as suspicion in those whom she had to use or to circumvent. The resistance which has arisen in her course has proceeded from a quarter never taken into account in any calculation of the difficulties which she was likely to encounter.

At the time that this project was first formed the frontiers of Russia on the west were restrained behind the Dnieper, and on the east fell far short of the Caucasus. She had no port whatever, or outlet, upon the Black Sea, and touched the Caspian only by uninhabited wastes. Yet the first basis of operations required that she should be in possession of the Danubian provinces and of the control of that river; that she should be in possession of the trans-Caucasian provinces, and have the control of the Araxes; that the Caspian and the Euxine should be in her exclusive possession.

"When Peter mounted the throne of Russia, in 1689, she had no commercial sea-port excepting Archangel. His own genius, aided by an intercourse with Europeans, led him early to appreciate the vast importance of commerce; and as the trade with India had ever been regarded as a certain source of wealth to the nations which in different ages had enjoyed it, his first military enterprise was an attempt, in 1695, to possess himself of a port on the sea of Azoph, for the avowed purpose of drawing back into one of its ancient channels* what, in the deficiency of more precise knowledge, was in general terms designated the commerce of the East. Taganrog was destined to become the emporium of a traffic which was to enrich his empire; and two small vessels

* The Greeks, while their empire flourished—the Kings of Pontus, before—and the Genoese, after that era, made the Crimea an emporium for the commerce of India, which was partly carried by the Persian Gulf through Persia to Georgia and Imeretia, and partly through Herat to the Caspian, and up the river Kur to Georgia, whence it was in like manner transported to the Phasis and the Crimea.

built at Voronege, and floated down the Don to the sea, constituted the first naval effort of the Czar.

"His journey into Europe opened to him other views; and teaching him the value of European as well as Oriental commerce, led him to desire an establishment on the Baltic. His successes against the Swedes put him in possession of a port on that northern sea; and when the victory of Pultava had relieved him from all apprehension of the military power of Charles the Twelfth, and established the reputation of his own army, he turned towards Turkey, whose power was even then supposed to be tottering, whose Christian subjects were believed to be ripe for revolt, and on whose ruins it was not doubted that the conqueror of Charles could exalt his own power.

"The disastrous campaign of 1711 dispelled for a time the delusion as to the weakness and speedy dissolution of the Ottoman empire, as well as the belief in the discontent of her Christian subjects; and the treaty of *Falksen*,* which stipulated the surrender of Taganrog and Azoph, annihilated the commercial projects of Peter on that sea. But stability of purpose was one of the elements of his power, and the intention to establish an Oriental commerce never deserted him. Neither his successes in the north, nor his defeat in Turkey, diverted or deterred him from pursuing the scheme. Having failed to turn one extremity of the Caucasus, he directed his attention to the other, and abandoned the sea of Azoph to occupy himself more intently on the Caspian."

His next attempt was on Khiva, in 1717, when he sent an embassy under an escort of several thousand men, with orders to seize the gold mines which the country was supposed to contain. The Khivans penetrating the purpose, but too weak to oppose and avenge it openly, dispersed the troops under the show of submission and for the convenience of obtaining subsistences, and massacred them on a preconcerted day, in the villages where they were quartered.

Peter then tried negotiation. He sent an embassy to Persia, with the view of opening through that country a communication with India; not that this was any new design on the part of

* A village on the Pruth, where the treaty was signed in July, 1711, that saved the Emperor, the Empress, and the Russian army, which was surrounded, enfeebled, and starving.

the Russians; an envoy had already been sent to the court of Arungzebe, and Russian merchants had been settled in India twenty years before. This attempt failed, but the Czar obtained the monopoly for Russia of all the silk exported from Persia. But these peaceful communications only paved the way for invasion. The disorders of Persia had reached their term; the last Shah of the Sophy dynasty feebly grasped an imaginary sceptre, and Peter at once found himself armed with a pretext for demanding redress, because Russian subjects had suffered from the anarchy of the country, where they were received as guests, and invited to acquire a kingdom which the weakness and blindness of the Shah called upon him to protect.

"In the course of July 1722 he set out on his expedition to Persia, accompanied by the Empress and an army of above fifty thousand men. Twenty-two thousand infantry, and three thousand sailors, trained to act on shore, crossed the Caspian in four hundred and forty-two vessels: the cavalry proceeded by land. The enterprise was not without some appearance of danger; the passes were narrow and easily defensible, 'mais dans l'anarchie ou était la Perse on pouvait tout tenter.' An attack from a detached tribe of the Lesguees was easily repulsed, and the echoes of the Caucasian straits resounded for the first time the thunder of Russian cannon and the victorious shouts of her armies. Derbend was occupied without opposition, and the silver keys of the town and citadel delivered to the Czar, who returned to Astrachan in October, having first established the siege of Bakoo. On his arrival in the Volga, he sent a force to occupy the province of Gheelan, which produces the chief part of the silk of Persia: there his troops entrenched themselves, and successfully resisted all the attempts of the Persians to expel them. 'Pierre ne put alors,' says his historian, 'pousser plus loin ses conquetes.' * In January, 1723, he entered Moscow in triumph, and gave, as was his wont, to the Vice-Czar an account of his expedition, and of the provinces he had conquered from his 'dear friend the Shah.'"

But Nadir Shah arose, and the prospects of Russia were

* In examining the views and objects of Peter I., the authority of M. de Voltaire has been preferred to any other, for two reasons;—1st, because his history was avowedly prepared from documents furnished by the court of St. Petersburgh; and 2ndly, because he cannot be accused of any unfavourable bias.

overcast. Within seventeen years from the invasion of Peter, who seemed to have attained at once to the end of his ambition and by occupation or influence to rule Asia up to the Indus, Persia had resumed all her ancient possessions, beaten back both Turkey and Russia, and forced the latter to bind herself *to maintain no navy on the sea of Azoph!* "The projects of Russia were thus for a time abandoned to be renewed at a later period with better success."* The events of that later period I now propose to trace in respect to the Danube and the coast of Circassia, referring the curious reader to the remarkable work from which I have so largely quoted for the various histories of her advances in Georgia and Persia, and her establishment on the southern banks of the Phasis, the Cyrus, and the Araxes.

In 1812 Turkey had the opportunity of recovering all the ground she had lost; but England, who only thought of the war with France, induced her to sign the treaty of Bucharest: by it Russia got possession of nearly a half of Moldavia and reached the Pruth.

To the eastward her advance had alarmed England, who formed a defensive treaty with Persia. Nevertheless, under the mediation of England, she obtained in 1814 the *exclusive* navigation of the Euxine, and secured, despite her own and England's pledge, territory beyond the Araxes.† Her usurpation of another district in advance brought the war of 1827, when England broke her engagement, left Persia single-handed, and abrogated the very useless defensive treaty.‡ Her frontier was again advanced, and

* "Progress of Russia in the East," pp. 2 - 20.

† "General Ritescheff—then Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in Georgia, and Plenipotentiary—solemnly pledged himself, if the Persian Ambassador would accept it (the basis of *uti possidetis*), to procure from his Court the restitution of Talish, and deliberately held out the hope that other provinces also would be restored. The British Ambassador felt himself justified in confirming the confidence of the Persians, and undertaking that the good offices of his Government should be exerted at the Court of St. Petersburgh to procure an adjustment of the stipulation respecting the territory, which might fulfil not only the positive promises of General Ritescheff, but the larger hopes he had held out.

"The Persians, accustomed to place the most implicit reliance on the honour of Europeans, and not ignorant of the liberal assistance that England had extended to Russia in the hour of her humiliation and distress, never for a moment doubted, &c." — *Progress of Russia*, p. 64.

‡ It applied only in case of Russia being the aggressor, and that case is made

the *suppression* of the Persian flag on the Caspian was again stipulated.

In 1829, in defiance of an engagement to England, and by her aid, she secured the mouths of the Danube. In 1831 she established a nominal quarantine on the Caucasian coast, not in her possession, which England at once (in secret) accepted as valid. In 1833, in recompense for service to the Sultan, into which England introduced her, she obtained the exclusion from the Euxine, in time of war, of the men-of-war of her enemies. In the same year she obtained a new accession of territory in Asia, which brought her within nine miles of the route by which English commerce with Persia is carried on. In 1836 she established a quarantine to intercept vessels entering the Danube, and arrogating the right of sending them to Odessa. She allows all the while the mouths of the Danube to be sanded up, preventing the entrance of sea-going vessels. She exacts in the ports of England heavy tolls on all vessels bound for the Danube on penalty of sending them to Odessa to perform quarantine. In 1838 she frustrated a treaty between England and Turkey, which would have diminished the export and transit duties. The same year she frustrated a treaty between England, Turkey and Austria, to secure and open its navigation, and then signed one with Austria the very reverse. In 1841, by a treaty signed at London, she got all nations to exclude their own men-of-war from the Black Sea in any case, in peace or war, and deprived the Porte of the faculty of inviting them. In 1844 she frustrated by bribes a proposal of Austria to open by canal the old mouth of the Danube. In 1849 she made Turkey sign a treaty for the occupation of the Provinces during seven years by her troops. In 1851 England frustrated for her the revived project of the Canal by a counter-project of an impracticable Railroad. She is now endeavouring

out in the "Progress of Russia in the East." The authorities there used are official: the author at the time of its publication was the designated Envoy to the Shah; the pamphlet was as official as any mere publication could be. Yet on the 1st March, 1848, Lord Palmerston said:—"Now, what had happened to Persia? In 1827 she had, very foolishly, and thoughtlessly, *against advice*, rushed into a conflict with Russia, and seen herself reduced to make a treaty, not only surrendering important provinces, but giving Russia *the advantage of hoisting her flag on the Caspian;* she had gone to war with a powerful antagonist, and had been compelled to submit to humiliating concessions."

to impose on the Provinces an export duty that must extinguish their exportation, by the extension to them, of the English Commercial Treaty.

These steps have all been in opposition to the avowed interests and declared policy of England. Several of them have been infractions of general law; several of positive treaty engagements. England did nothing to oppose her: no step she has taken, could have been made, had England opposed: they have been practicable only because she assisted. The English government at no time has been indifferent, ignorant, or misinformed: her subordinate agents have been unremitting in their efforts, detailed in their expositions, and have been advanced or rewarded for zeal in urging a course, the reverse of that which the government has undeviatingly followed.

But Russia has been forced to withdraw from the Principalities, and is consequently less near to the consummation of her purposes than she was two years ago. It is not, however, that England has ceased to aid her, but that Turkey has commenced to oppose her. The restoration of the Turkish army (an obstacle never anticipated) alone prevents the closing of the Danube and the Black Sea, and her ultimate possession of the whole tract of land and sea that lies between Germany and central Asia.

In one character alone do the systems of England and Russia correspond, and that is in extent. There is no point where the one has an interest that the other has not an object, and defeat or triumph upon any one field affects the relative balance between the two upon every other. In the unit, England is vigorous and intelligent; in the mass, passive and inert. Russia, individually, is sluggish and incapable; but as a state, active and powerful. England pursues the profits of speculation, and looks no further than trade: to Russia, trade is only an instrument and a means.

The feelings with which they regard every other country are exactly the converse the one to the other. England rejoices in the prosperity of all countries which supply raw produce. On all such countries Russia looks with hatred, because with fear: they are her rivals, though they know it not: she is their enemy, though they suspect it not: she is busy every minute destroying

them, and if she had no other object this would alone supply inducements for the creation of the body of diplomatists she has formed. Wherever, then, there is a land which does produce, or is fitted to produce, grain, timber, oil, tallow, hides, or hemp, the interest of the two stands in direct opposition. Thither England sends her merchants to buy; Russia her emissaries to convulse. The contest between them will therefore be determined according to their respective character, not according to their respective interests or power.

Europe contains two great basins, watered by two great streams, which present in their natures a contrast similar to what exists between the two systems. From the mountains of Switzerland to the mouths of the Scheldt extends a mechanical reticulation identical with that of the manufacturing Counties of Great Britain. From the reverse of the mountains which supply the Rhine flow the waters which afterwards, through the mouths of the Danube, are discharged into the Black Sea; and throughout this vast region there is a total absence of mechanical power and the most unbounded exuberance of agricultural resources. This region stands to Russia as the basin of the Rhine does to England, competing with her in the production of the sources of her wealth, and threatening in their prosperity her annihilation. It would naturally be in the interests of England to thwart the enterprise of the one and to call forth the energies of the other; it is not in her character to do so: but it is in Russia's character to do that which her interests require, and therefore she has taken means to call into activity the qualities of the one and to strike down and almost to exterminate the producing power of the other.

The banks of the Rhine being inhabited by a free people of Germans, and these divided into distinct governments, may seem to be very little available for any design of Russia; yet have they united into one system—professing indeed to be organised with the view of giving unity and strength to Germany against all foreign aggression, but still united by a government described by a Russian diplomatist as "seeking to strengthen with Russia the already existing bonds of blood, by those of policy." It must be evident to any one who has so much as thought of diplomatic

action that it depends upon secrecy, and consequently that the most cunning nation must come to rule the rest. If, then, a "Customs Union" has come into existence it has only been because Russia has not thought proper to prevent it, which is equivalent to saying that she desired to bring it about. Thus connected the feeling arises of a German as distinct from Saxon or Prussian trade. It finds itself hampered on every side—cut off from England and stopped by Russia; its competition is with England, and therefore against her its animosities are directed. It must turn then to Russia, seeking to propitiate her—it will be encouraged to hope. The abolition of her restrictions will be hinted at, and it will be led to see that Russia's interests coincide with its own, that Russia, being unable to supply the demand of Asia, and desirous to exclude England, may come to an arrangement. Then will Germany desire the progress of Russia eastward and will associate itself with her against England—then will it see an essential German interest in the establishment of Russia on the Bosphorus. All this was urged, at the time the Zollverein was preparing, on the English government,* when a word from England would have sufficed to have frustrated it: to this scheme the English government lent not merely the support of inaction—it positively abrogated a treaty in order to allow it to take effect.†

Since that period a semi-official work has appeared at a German court under Russian dependence, which so undisguisedly reveals the whole scheme that I hesitate not in quoting it:—

"The Asiatic commerce of Russia stands both directly and indirectly in competition with the intercourse which the western countries, including North America, entertain in various ways with that quarter of the globe, which surpasses all the rest in size and density of population. The Levantine, East Indian, and Chinese trade of the English, North Americans, French, and Dutch has not yet so deeply felt the effects of the competition

* See "The Prussian League," in the first number of the "British and Foreign Review;" being the substance of a report to the Foreign Office.

† The treaty with Frankfort. The Ministers who opposed the Turkish treaty were most favourable to the Zollverein. Mr. Poulett Thomson quoted false figures in support of it in the House of Commons, and both he and Lord Palmerston declared that it had no political end: that it was purely domestic, internal, and commercial.

of the Russian land trade, extending far into Asia from the frontier walls of the Chinese Empire to the Caspian and Black Seas, which they ultimately will feel from the vastly increasing means of this colossal empire.

"By means of acquisitions in the interior of Asia, which added in the year 1829 a district of 10,000 square miles, inhabited by nomadic tribes, to the Russian empire, its connexion with the interior of Asia, and particularly with Bukharia, is much promoted. But many branches of British East Indian trade have not yet been decreased by an animated competition, although, according to the opinion of many, the British dominion in that quarter is threatened even by the position of Russia.

"We do not believe in the probability of the speedy destruction of the British dominion there, and shall contemplate this as a contingency arising out of internal disturbance, not a result of a conflict of the two powers; but we hope that their active emulation in peaceful undertakings shall promote the advance of the East, and that in their emulative exertions for the extension and multiplication of commercial connexions, the balance shall preponderate in favour of Russia.

"England, which on every side makes Asia profitable to its manufactures and trade, supplied by means of Smyrna and Trebizond and from the Persian Gulf the markets of Asiatic Turkey and Persia, as well as all the neighbouring markets, now seeks to extend its China trade, even to the northern coasts of that empire.

"A shorter and safer way to the Indian Sea has been sought by her through the Euphrates from Bir to its mouths in the Persian Gulf; and even should this not succeed, there will be little doubt of the execution of a railroad across the Isthmus of Suez.

"*In opposition to this,* Russia will not fail to take advantage *of every means presented by her position.* But to develope the germs more speedily, and effect their ripening, the extension of her dominion in Asia affords the means.

"It will contribute much more to Russian interests to open the passage to German commerce, that they may conjunctively acquire a more extended control over the markets of the East, than to leave the harvest to British commerce, which contributes nothing

to the Russian transit and carrying trade, and it can have the less hesitation to turn this harvest over to German commerce, as thereby its own transit and carrying trade would be much benefitted, and since a direct road is already opened to Trebizond for the active competition of German commerce by means of the navigation of the Danube.

"It is clear that from the existing deficiency of an active intercourse between Russia and the West, and from the greater distance of the Asiatic market, the exchange of wares between this market and central Europe by land cannot be nearly so vigorously carried on as it could be by the decrease of mutual duties between Prussia and Russia. For these concessions, Russia will find equivalents in the produce of its trans-Caucasian provinces, particularly silk and cotton; and in the increasing demand for the produce of those countries it will find the surest means for a more rapid development of its production and its power.

"The Russian land trade, and especially its caravan trade, will the more successfully rival the sea trade, which supplies Europe with the produce of the interior and the east of Asia, the cheaper it can offer European goods to the Asiatic market, and the more active the intercourse is upon the whole line of transport which connects the west of Europe with Asia, and the more rapidly and cheaply it effects its exchanges in this direction.

"The time is come which invites to this conjunctive competition. A series of favourable events transpire to produce the state, which promises these rapid results. These are the extension and the strengthening of the Russian dominion on the Black Sea, and the acquisition of the eastern ports of the same sea, the possession of which was confirmed by the peace of 1829; the decided dependency of the Persian empire upon the contiguous Russian power; the exclusive navigation of the Caspian; the recently-effected complete subjection of the Caucasian tribes; the extent of the Russian dominions, which has within these few years spread its frontiers eastward from the Caspian about 280 leagues nearer to the British possessions in the East Indies, and has thus secured its connexion with the interior of Asia.

"The complete re-establishment of one of the most ancient channels of commerce which the cessation of the free navigation of the Black Sea (even before the discovery of the Cape) destroyed,

and its connexion with the Danube would give to Europe the important advantage in its intercourse with Asia, of having entire independence of the Naval Powers. Should ever the time again return in which Great Britain will rule the ocean, and should she enact a maritime law, dictated by her own exclusive advantage, the Black Sea, at least, will be closed to her, and commerce with that division of the world will not only remain undisturbed, but furnish us in great abundance with all the produce she can offer us, and which, derived from other countries by maritime means, a sea-blockade would shut out from the continent, or would only admit upon the payment of an exorbitant tribute.

"The remembrance of the years 1808—1812, particularly with respect to cotton, renders this combination highly desirable.

"Scarcely eight years have passed since a Frenchman, M. Gaidba, who was perfectly well acquainted with the relations of the southern provinces of the Russian empire, both Asiatic and European, as well as of the neighbouring Asiatic countries, placed in a clear light the great value of a more facile and active connection of the East with Western Europe, to be effected in the way above indicated. At that time there was not the least sign of the execution of the idea. Since the recent view of opening a connection between the Rhine and the Danube, the difficulties of navigation which were thought insurmountable have been successfully overcome."

It was said by one of the plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Reichenbach that the Black Sea was more important to England than all Asia: this is no paradox; in the words of Sir John M'Neill, "the policy of Russia is based upon the certainty of spoiling England of her Indian dominion:" this spoliation can be prevented only by the Black Sea. Were the space filled by that water dry land, or, like the Caspian, were it girt round with coasts, England would probably have had nothing in Asia to possess, or at all events be now without the means of defending what she has. And if you stop up the passage by parchment bonds or any other artificial process, is it not the same thing as if in the Euxine were left no water to float your vessels, and in the Bosphorus no soundings for them to pass?

To close the entrance against you is for Russia to open the passage to the Indus. To her the vital point is that foreign men-

of-war shall not pass the Bosphorus, and to that end it is that the fabulous darkness of the ancient Pontus has been diplomatically extended over the modern Euxine. Partially, indeed, the veil has been raised as regards one of its shores, Circassia; but it still overhangs the banks of the Danube and the vast and fertile plains through which it flows. During the great European war, in which her very existence seemed at stake, Russia would not concede one point in reference to those provinces. In 1812 she would neither conciliate nor relieve herself from the Ottoman empire, as a foe, by the slightest surrender. The pertinacity with which she clung to what appeared useless—unintelligible clauses bearing upon wilds and deserts, so far from awakening the curiosity or suspicions of European statesmen, had only the effect of raising a smile of pity at her expense.

Up to the year 1833 no direct trade had been carried on between England and the Euxine. It, however, did obtain a large quantity of her goods from Constantinople and Germany, and in the fair of Leipsic alone the demand amounted to 300,000*l.* But in the following year two British vessels entered the Danube, in the next year fifteen, and in the course of 1836 twice that number were expected, while at the same time the native traffic in small vessels amounted to between 700 and 800 cargoes. This development of their traffic roused Russia to the necessity of adopting decisive measures, and these were as minute as they were daring, as intricate as comprehensive, now discrediting a firm, now firing on a vessel, now fingering kegs of butter and skins of tallow, now grasping an estuary, till the "crowning work," of seizing the Danube by care for Europe's health.

The exports are raw and heavy produce, and for this water carriage is required. The return of manufactured articles, which might bear land carriage, is obtained in so far only as there is facility for exportation. Now, not only is the Danube the only water communication, but it is the only road. The exports would have been ores of metals; its mines were the richest of the Roman empire; rocksalt, of which it contains mountains; timber, with which the sides of its mountains are clothed; hides, wool, tallow, sheep and goatskins, for flocks and herds might be multiplied to any extent; grain, the facility for the culture of which may be estimated by the years 1833 and 1834, when Russia, suffering from famine,

drew from them her supply, although recently relieved from occupation, they were suffering from the effect of the war, which had drawn from them five millions sterling and destroyed one quarter of the cattle. The hemp of the Danube is of the finest quality, and it had begun to be imported into England and received with favour, and stood, in the year 1835, competition with that of St. Petersburgh notwithstanding the quadruple charge of transport. At the same time staves were in like manner imported into the Thames. The Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia were anxious to rival the Pacha of Egypt in the production of cotton, for which these Provinces afford the amplest field; it is needless to dwell upon the importance to England of multiplying the sources from which that raw material may be obtained, and of augmenting its amount. There is also a vast region available for the culture of the mulberry; and this was one of the objects to which, in the large expectation of that period, attention had been directed.

This traffic would have been of peculiar advantage to the shipping interests; when the freight to the Baltic is 15*s.*, and to Canada 30*s.*, to the Danube it is 60*s.* Thus the hemp, tallow, grain, or timber, coming from the Provinces, would have given, as compared with Canada, an increased employment of shipping of one-half, and as compared with the Baltic of three-fourths.

The natural difficulties of the navigation were indeed great, but capable of being easily removed; and notwithstanding their existence this commerce, till arrested by extraneous means, was rapidly increasing, and might by this time have exceeded that which we carry on with France.

If it has not been entirely crushed, it is owing to the enormous resources of the country; its exuberant fertility, the lowness of price, and the laboriousness and industry of the people.

As the basin of the Danube produces, as we have seen, exactly the same articles as Russia, every ton, therefore, that would be exported from the Danube, was a ton less exported from Odessa or St. Petersburgh, and every shilling reduced on the cwt. of tallow or the quarter of grain was a loss to Russia in private gain or public taxes of from 50,000*l.* to 100,000*l.* But I will take her case as put by herself, in a document published at Odessa, under the authority of Count Woronzow: it is true that it was so published

at a time when no danger was anticipated, and no plan had been devised which in any degree interfered with her projects, and there did not exist in Europe the remotest perception either of what she was doing or what she was aiming at.

"Although the three principal mouths of the Danube are in the power of Russia, it is only a small number of her products that are exported by the two ports of Bessarabia, Ismail, and Reni. The towns of Galatz and Ibrail, the only 'débouches' of Moldavia and Wallachia, pour the superfluity of these rich provinces into the commerce of the Black Sea. The protecting sceptre of Russia has created these formidable rivals of her self."

"If the obstacles which have hitherto impeded the navigation of the Danube come to be entirely removed, this will much facilitate the vent of Austrian articles of merchandise in the provinces, and will *open up for some of them a way to arrive at other countries.*"

* * * * *

"The advantages of this navigation for the trade of the Principalities, which consists principally in exchanges for the products of Austria, are incalculable. Galatz especially will gain by it greatly as an entrepôt for Austrian goods, which will be sent thence to the Levant and to the ports of the Black Sea. *Austria may even export by the Danube the wheat of the Banat, which can be bought on the spot at eleven roubles the tchelwert,* and is said to be of a superior quality. The hemp of Hungary, of which the English have already made great purchases and formed depôts at Apathin and at Eszek (whence it is sent by water to Siszeck and Carlstadt, and from these places by land to Trieste), might here find perhaps an easier route than by Trieste, as well as timber, which is at present sent with difficulty to Fumie."

* * * * *

"Galatz and Ibrail are about to cultivate virgin countries and of great extent. Ismail and Reni (the Russian ports) must of necessity attach themselves to these giants who threaten to overwhelm them. *So long as those who are engaged in the trade of Ibrail and Galatz shall be free from every impost,* it would be necessary at least to reserve to the merchants of Bessarabia the same immunity, to prevent their leaving the country, as many of them have already done."

In this report the trade of the two shores of the Euxine is treated as inseparable.

"Trebizond has always been of importance as the port nearest to Erzerum, and its commerce may be estimated at twenty million roubles per annum. By this route, England and Germany supply Persia and Anatolia with cloths, ladies' cloths, calicoes, cotton yarn, paper, sugar, coffee, glass ware, porcelain, iron, tin, and steel goods. France takes but little share in this trade; but England will soon have crushed her rivals by the great establishment which she has formed at this point. A single caravan, despatched for Tabriz in 1834, was composed of 650 camel loads, 450 of which were pillaged by the Kurds on the road from Erzerum to Tabriz."

"What means can Russia adopt for rivalling the English in this locality?"

These last words indicate the purpose of all Russia's commercial efforts. She is no rival of England, as far as manufactures or commerce go—her rivalry is political. The question is, by what means can an end be put to English commerce, and what other commerce is to be substituted in its place? This, like the statement I have before quoted, is addressed to Germany, and Russia is open to an offer.

Having now shown the objects of Russia, I shall explain the process she has employed, in getting possession of the Mouths of the Danube; in establishing her Quarantine; in frustrating the two Commercial Treaties with Turkey and Austria; and, lastly, in preventing the execution of the project for the opening of the old mouth of the Danube, within the Turkish territory. No history has recorded, no fable has devised things more marvellous than the events connected with this river. Here will be seen how Russia bends every will, Procrusteses every measure to suit and fit her purposes. I shall have to record my own failures; but, in this case, failure of necessity is parent of success. It was not her sight but our blindness that was terrible. There is a time when evil measures prevail, but that time comes, too, when they are brought to light. The series of facts now completed—disconnected in their course by time and distance, here brought and linked together, may furnish that light, and enable eyes to see that have long been closed.

Part II.

Russian Quarantine on the Delta of the Danube.

THIS Quarantine was not for vessels bound to Russian but to Turkish ports, Galatz and Ibrail, where a quarantine was already established. It was a lawless aggression on the commerce of the world, and a robbery from Europe of its most important river.

Such an outrage Spain under Phillip II., or France under Louis XIV., never dared. It was perpetrated with no disguise, and followed by no retribution. Peace reigned in Europe; England and France were then cordially united; Austria on the best terms with both. All were jealous of Russian encroachment, regarding which the press of Europe was ringing. The British navy had just been augmented, amidst the acclamations of Parliament and the nation, as a reply to the haughty pretensions put forth by the Emperor at Warsaw.* To that menace the Ukase for the Quarantine was Russia's answer.

The marshy islands forming the Delta of the Danube are uninhabited, and in themselves utterly valueless. They were desirable only as a station commanding the river in war, and useful for that purpose only in so far as they were fortified. The

* It was insinuated, indeed, at the time, in Parliament, that the augmentation was against France, but an explanation was offered to the French government, and with the recommendation, so at least I have been informed by M. Thiers, *to augment its navy*—with what purpose the following passage may suggest. On the 1st of March, 1848, Lord Palmerston said:—

"Of course, also, though I do not recollect the circumstance as having happened in 1835, or 1836, the immense amount of the naval preparation *in France*, must always form an element in taking into account the means which England must possess, &c."

treaty by which they were ceded prohibited all establishments excepting Quarantines. These excited no jealousy, for it had not entered into calculation that this control could be exercised in peace and on trade, under the pretext of Sanitary Regulations. This was, however, what entered into Russia's calculations, and hence the efforts she made for their acquisition. Though the measures here referred to were taken only in 1836, it appears from the express statement of the third Article of the Treaty that the plan, when it was signed, was already matured.

This surrender was made by a Treaty which closed a long series of negotiations, engagements, and warlike operations, in which not the power of Russia alone, but also that of England and France, was brought to bear on Turkey. Reciprocal engagements existed between the allies as to the terms of future settlement. These facts are of too painful a notoriety for children to be ignorant of them, and they suggest doubts as to the legality of the possession, and the loyalty of the means by which it was obtained.

I am prepared to show that these doubts are not without foundation, and that the occupation of this territory in the first instance, and its use in the second, rest on the aid afforded by England to Russia. Such an assertion will not be credited without conclusive proof: that proof will be found in the following pages.

In 1821 an armed body crossed the Pruth from the Russian territory, headed by a Russian general, in support of the vast conspiracy known as the Hetairia, openly organised throughout Turkey by the agents of Russia; she then required the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the Provinces which she had driven into insurrection, offering her own forces in their stead: she then had recourse to every means to bring about a rupture, because Turkey persevered in her attempts to suppress the rebellion which she had offered her aid to put down. On the withdrawal of her ambassador from Constantinople, Russia intrusted her interests at the Porte—to the ambassador of England!

After five years, an adjustment took place at Ackermann, in consequence of a pledge given by Russia, that henceforward she would not interfere in the affairs of Greece. She had just signed a secret Protocol with England to interfere!

The Greeks had applied for protection, not to Russia, but to England; but the protection was against Russia herself, not

against Turkey.* On this, Mr. Canning sends the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburgh to concert matters with Russia, and thus impose upon the litigants an unsought mediation of the very power whom both parties detested, and whom they charged with having produced and fomented their dissensions for purposes of her own. The record of this infatuation is contained in the preamble of the Protocol of the 4th of April, 1826 :—

"His Britannic Majesty having been *requested by the Greeks* to interpose his good offices in order to obtain their reconciliation with the OttomanPorte, having in consequence *offered* his Mediation to that power, and being desirous of concerting the measure of his government upon this subject, with His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias; and his Imperial Majesty, on the other hand, *being* equally *animated* by the desire of putting an end to the contest, of which Greece and the Archipelago are the theatre, by an arrangement which shall be consistent with the principles of religion, justice, and humanity—"

Russia could now send her Ultimatum, and the Protocol being kept secret from the parties concerned, she could obtain credence for her pledges of non-interference. By being imposed upon the Greeks and Turks, she was thus enabled to direct the arrangements of the Alliance, and employ its forces against the very state with a view to support which, the negotiations had commenced.

England did, however, take such precautions as she thought sufficient to prevent any misapplication of the power which she felt she gave to Russia. The proof of her good faith and her incapacity is to be found in the following stipulation of the Protocol of St. Petersburgh :—

"His Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty will not seek in this arrangement for any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence nor advantages in commerce for their subjects which shall not be equally attainable by all other nations."

The powers were thus bound not to acquire territory, *nor to*

* M. Rodios to Mr. Canning, August 12th, 1824.—"The Government (of Greece) would have persevered in its system of silence were it not forced to break it by a note proceeding from the north of Europe. This note decides on the fate of Greece, by a will that is foreign to it. The Greek nation prefer a glorious death to the disgraceful lot intended to be imposed upon them."

Mr. Canning replies :—"The opinion of the British Government is that any plan proceeding from the cabinet of St. Petersburgh can be drawn up only with friendly intentions towards Greece."

suffer it to be acquired. Russia now proposed a treaty with France to carry out these purposes, stipulating measures of coercion. Mr. Canning recoiled from such a purpose or responsibility. However, by the threat of exposing to his colleagues the manner in which he had been overreached in regard to the previous Protocol (the details are given in one of the published despatches), he was induced to sign that Treaty, and died of a broken heart.

On the 6th of July, 1827, the Treaty for the "Pacification of the East" is signed, and within a few weeks the Turkish navy is annihilated. The Porte demands satisfaction—refuses to admit the attempted interference in her affairs, and declines, while they persist, to hold intercourse with their Ambassadors. "These functionaries retire, and the Porte believes itself already at war with England, France, and Russia." Turkey's retort is seized upon by Russia as an offence against *her*, and she declares war "for motives independent of the treaty of July." Then the Powers "solemnly take upon themselves the obligation that the successes their superiority seems to promise them *in this struggle*, shall not lead them to seek any exclusive advantage whatever in the shape of commercial privileges, or of territorial aggrandisement."—*12th December*, 1827.

The mysteries of Russian policy have been laid bare to the light of day: we have no longer to reason—we know her real motives:* we have them in her very words, from her very archives:—"The experience," says Pozzo de Borgo, "we have just made, must now reconcile all opinions in favour of the resolution which has been taken. The Emperor has put the Turkish system to the proof, and his Majesty has found it to possess a commencement of physical and moral organisation which it hitherto had not. If the Sultan has been enabled to offer us a determined and regular resistance, whilst he had scarcely drawn together the elements of his new plan of reform and ameliorations, how formidable should

* Lord Palmerston says in 1848:—

"I say that Turkey had violated her treaties with Russia, and I thought then, as I think now, that Russia had just cause of war."

"What was the state of Turkey? She had engaged in a war with Russia, in which, after two campaigns, her arms were *repulsed* and *driven back into her own empire*, so that she was compelled at the treaty of Adrianople to accept conditions of peace—hard in their nature, and demanding a sacrifice of an important part of her territory, but to which she was advised in friendly council by the British Ambassador to submit."

we have found him had he had time to give to it more solidity, and to render that barrier impenetrable which we find so much difficulty in surmounting, though so little has hitherto been done by art to assist nature."

We there also learn the view she took of her engagements, and the opinion she entertained of her allies:—

"When the Emperor commenced this war, *Europe was informed* that his Majesty would abstain from conquest, and would only require to be indemnified for his expenses, and be assured of a moral guarantee for the freedom of his commerce." *

The two Russian Ambassadors in London wrote, on the 13th of June:—

"The news which Count Pozzo de Borgo has sent us, on the position of the French Ministry, which is every day more and more uncertain, has also led us not to alienate from us completely the Cabinet of London, before the epoch when the answers from Constantinople would relieve us from anxiety."

Lord Aberdeen is therefore assured:—"That, in case of success, the Emperor would be under an obligation to consult his allies, and that a definitive state of things would *not* be established without their *assent and concurrence*." In consequence of the acceptance of this declaration, the Russian Ambassadors require a public manifestation which shall discourage the resistance of the Porte (to "abstain from measures which encourage its resistance"). Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Wellington strive in vain to extract some knowledge of the proposed conditions of the peace (to which they were to be parties), but the Russian diplomatists deem it useless to enter into any developments, and confine themselves to generalities; as every "substantive communication on so delicate a subject would draw down upon us real dangers." "It is in the midst of our camp that peace must be signed (verified to the letter): Europe must learn its conditions only when it is concluded. Remonstrances will then be too late, and it will patiently

* "With respect to the free navigation of the Bosphorus," says the Russian Ambassador to Lord Aberdeen, in June, 1829, "it constitutes one of our necessities, for to it the prosperity of a part of the domains of the Emperor is united by an indissoluble link. We cannot permit the caprice of a vizir or a favourite sultana to arrest at will the whole movement of commerce, the whole progress of public and private industry in many of our provinces." This to the British Minister is not a revelation but an argument.

suffer what it can no longer prevent. . . . It would be dangerous to overlook, that the event easy to lead in 1829, risks to become uncertain or impossible in 1830."

Such was the cotemporary language, among themselves, of the servants of the Czar. I now revert to the ostensible communications made to the Powers, and by which they were induced to continue lending her their aid, in reliance on her disinterestedness.

On the 6th of January, 1828, Count Nesselrode says:—"If, *notwithstanding our intentions and our efforts*, the decrees of Divine Providence should have predestined us to be witnesses of the last days of the Ottoman Empire, the sentiments of his Majesty with regard to the aggrandisement of Russia would be still the same. The Emperor would not enlarge the limits of his territory. He *would only ask of his allies the same* absence of ambition, *and of exclusive designs*, of which he would give the first example."

The declaration of war, 26th April, 1828, asserts that the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827, has "confirmed, in the face of the world, the disinterested principles proclaimed by the Protocol of the 4th April."

"Russia," it continues, "is far from cherishing ambitious projects; sufficient people and countries acknowledge her sway; already sufficient anxieties are connected with the extent of her dominion."

"Notwithstanding her being at war with the Porte for motives independent of the treaty of July the 6th, Russia has not departed, and will not depart, from the stipulations of that act. Her allies will always find her ready to concert with them her measures relative to its execution—always anxious to co-operate in a work which is recommended to her lively solicitude by religion and all the feelings which do honour to humanity—always inclined to make use of her present position only for the more speedy fulfilment of the stipulations of the Treaty of the 6th of July, and not to make any change in their nature, or their effects."

On the 6th of June, 1828, Lord Aberdeen states, that England's consent to the steps that had been taken, and her continuing to take part in the conferences, are contingent on the condition, "that, even under the altered circumstances of his present position, the stipulations of the treaty will ever be sacred in his Imperial Majesty's eyes."

In the manifesto at the close of the war (1st of October, 1829) Russia declares, "that she has remained constantly a stranger to every desire of conquest, and to every view of aggrandisement." On the 14th of the previous month the Treaty of Adrianople had been signed! She announces, as the consequence of her triumph, that the Dardanelles are free "to the commerce of all nations," and that the scourge of humanity, the plague, is arrested by the "occupation of the left bank of the Danube!"

Upon this the English government addressed a protesting despatch to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, by which "His Majesty reserved to himself the right to judge of the extent of the sacrifices which the Porte may be called upon to make."

A doubt has been raised, whether this stipulation, forbidding acquisition, did apply to Turkey, insomuch as she had not accepted the Treaty of July 6th (she had objected only, on the ground that *Russia was a party to it*); but on the 9th September, 1829, that is, before the signature of the Treaty of Adrianople, her formal adhesion was given in these terms:—

"The Sublime Porte declares, that having already adhered to the treaty of London, it now further promises and pledges to subscribe entirely to *all the decisions which the conference of London shall adopt* with respect to its execution."

I trust that few persons will peruse this passage without emotion. The diplomatic conduct of Turkey throughout this war will, when the passions engendered in its course have passed away, be regarded as a remarkable union of dignity, caution, and firmness, and such as to entitle the people to the esteem of every brave and generous heart.

I desire to say one word as to the manifesto put forth by a minister for whom I entertain feelings of no ordinary esteem, and whom his countrymen are now pleased to censure with misjudging bitterness. I refer to the letter of Pertef Pasha to the Pashas of the Empire, and which Russia chose to select as the pretext of the rupture.*

* "That power (Turkey), was influenced by unfortunate and evil advisers. There had been a question between England, France, and Russia on the one hand, wishing, as they did, to establish the independence of Greece—and Turkey upon the other, who wished to prevent it. Well, as I said before, the evil counsellors prevailed, and Turkey was induced to commit acts of aggression against Russia."—*Lord Palmerston*, 23*rd Feb.* 1848.

The Russian documents now published can leave no doubt, if any one not willingly blind could have doubted before, that the war proceeded from no act of the Porte, and could have been averted by no sacrifice she could make,—no humiliation she could undergo. The war was made because the Duke of Wellington had gone to St. Petersburgh—because Mr. Canning had gone to Paris—because the allied squadron had entered the harbour of Navarino—because their ambassadors had quitted Constantinople. It was made because you had destroyed Turkey's means of defence in the Black Sea; because, in a word, you were at war with her. And it was necessary to the future hopes, and the present consideration and power of Russia, to strike a blow under such favourable circumstances, at the new military and administrative system, which she felt to be about to rescue this magnificent prize from her outstretched arms.

But what shall be said of England? Russia can be understood. She pursued an end, criminal indeed, but intelligible. Her combinations were able, her acts bold. But England—it sickens one to see cowardice and perfidy in a nation composed individually of brave and upright men. But what character can remain when secrecy is endured in great affairs—concealment observed with Parliament in solemn measures of the nature of judicial acts, and counsel taken with Foreign Cabinets!

All this had come out of a Mediation. Mediation is Arbitration, and can be undertaken only at the request, and with the consent, of both litigants. A *forced* Mediation is a contradiction in terms; it means nothing, but implies—*War in disguise*: such a War can never be honest as to intentions, or legal as to character.

England had no need of war to be Mediator; both parties, at one time or other, did seek with anxiety, or would have accepted with gratitude, her good offices to adjust their differences; but both alike, with or without reason, refused to admit Russia as mediator.

England at last determines to mediate, but instead of communicating with the parties, she communicates with the government obnoxious to both, and which actually was on the point of rupture with one of them. This communication is *secret!* Having concerted measures, they apply not even then to the parties, but to another foreign power. This is a Conspiracy, not a Mediation!

The three then draw up a Treaty, to enforce by arms, if necessary, the decisions of their ministers, assembled in Conclave: they thereby erect an Extra-national Government, of which their respective countries know nothing; which must be guided by the superior knowledge of Russia, and is to wield the united power of the three greatest nations in the world, to carry its plans into effect. They commence, indeed, by placing one limit to their omnipotence—they shall spare the sovereignty of the Sultan. Their first act is to destroy his fleet. Their next to make Greece independent of the Sultan. The Porte, with a heroism that found no appreciation, prepared to perish, and accepted the war, which it believed to be intended—for its estimate of Europe had not sunk so low as to apprehend that its "Cabinets and statesmen were but tools in Russia's hand." On this she makes her separate War, but the Conferences continue, nevertheless! The Porte, though not again attacked by the Powers, except through Greece, lies under the effect of a suspended invasion, and thus, at last, does England constrain her to submit to the decisions of a mediation with ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF WHICH SHE WAS ACTUALLY AT WAR!

To the inhumanity of her acts England was blinded by the philanthropy of her intentions; to the guilt of her conduct by the integrity of her purposes; to the consequences of her policy by her trust in her ally. She had proceeded on the belief that Russia was sincere, and she imagined she had taken precautions against her insincerity. She had proceeded upon the faith pledged, that the stipulations of the Treaty of the 6th of July should ever be sacred in the eyes of that government. When she made, at last, the discovery that these stipulations had in its eyes no value whatever, when she found herself shamefully betrayed at the close, and duped from the-beginning; that her easy belief had been used to wound and maim, and almost to murder the power she entered on the negotiations with the view of supporting, and that at the peace to which she was to have been a consenting party, a tract of land, most important, not as affecting the Ottoman empire only, but all Europe, had been wrenched from the common victim:—then in what fashion does she vent her high indignation? What the reparation to Turkey? What the retribution to Russia? What the atonement to her own compromised honour? Nothing. No. She "reserves" her judgment: therefore, at least, she will

judge the circumstances. That hereafter never comes. On this, too, Russia had reckoned; she knew that England was as destitute of courage to avenge, as of foresight to prevent,—of knowledge to restore, as of ability to conduct,—and being free from all fear of consequences could shower upon her pledges without reserve. But if it was impossible then to prevent, and afterwards to restore, it is not necessary now to misjudge; at least let us learn this one lesson from our experience, that to attempt to curb Russia by associating ourselves with her, is sheer insanity.

The islands at the mouth of the Danube are transferred by the following article of the Treaty of Adrianople:—

"The bank shall continue to form the limit of the two Empires from the point where it touches the territory of Moldavia to its junction with the Danube. Thence the frontier line will follow the course of the Danube to the mouth of St. George, leaving all the islands formed by the different branches in the possession of Russia. The right bank will remain as formerly, in the possession of the Ottoman Porte. It is, however, agreed, that that right bank, from the point where the arm of St. George departs from that of Souline, *shall remain uninhabited* to a distance of *two hours* (six miles) from the river, and that no kind of structure shall be raised there; and in *like manner*, on the islands, which will remain in the possession of the court of Russia. With *the exception of quarantines* which *will be there established*, it will not be permitted to make any *other* establishment *or* fortification. *The merchant vessels of the two Powers* will have the faculty of navigating the Danube *in its whole course*. Those bearing the Ottoman flag *may freely enter* the mouths of Kili and Souline—that of St. George being common to the vessels of war and merchantmen of the two Powers. But the Russian vessels of war shall not ascend beyond the junction of the Danube with the Pruth."

Of what toil have we not here the fruit—of what purposes the germ! Observe the limitation to the navigation of the Danube assumed in the form of a concession: there is the announcement of the intended quarantine so long after established, and which, of course, at the time, passed as extravagant or incomprehensible; and while she is to have a quarantine for uninhabited marshes, Turkey is positively prohibited from having one on her own territory.

From this hour the attitude and language of Russia undergo a change. Now she has no longer to draw us on by cultivating our confidence: she has only to prevent us from escaping or taking any steps to retrieve ourselves. In our conduct a similar alteration appears; the cold fit succeeds to the hot, and we are now all apathy and endurance, as hitherto we had been all heat and energy. She waits, however, nearly two years, before making a step in advance; it is, of course, Quarantine, but not on the Danube.

She makes her first cautious essay in the fabulous regions beyond the Euxine: there England is to be made to recognise the Treaty of Adrianople, Europe to accept her care for the health of "foreign countries" as a valid reason for the interruption of its trade and the infringement of its rights.

On the 8th of August, 1831, the Russian Cabinet addressed a despatch to its representative at Constantinople, informing him of the "constant care devoted by our government in order to preserve the *neighbouring foreign countries* from the contagious disease arising from Turkey," and consequently of its intention to subject to sanitary regulations "the communications which freely exist between the inhabitants of the *Caucasus and the neighbouring Turkish provinces.*" This admission of the Caucasus being a "foreign country" cannot have been made unconsciously or accidentally, but in view to establishing a case applicable to the Danubian provinces. The Russian ambassador is informed that "it becomes indispensable that you should communicate the *above-mentioned regulations* to the foreign missions at Constantinople, as well as to the Ottoman government itself."

Now was the time come for the exercise of the right reserved by his Majesty to judge of the amount of sacrifices to be imposed by the Treaty of Adrianople; if the English government was silent now, it never could open its mouth. But it did not by silence escape from a decision: it was brought up to the wall, and had to go either right or left, and it was placed in the dilemma of repelling or sanctioning: there were the alternatives of protesting against the aggression, or publishing the Notification in the "Gazette." If doubt exists as to the gravity of the case, I would refer to the subsequent assertion of Dr. Lushington in March, 1837, that if England had taken the first course—or as he puts it, refused to ratify—

it would have involved war with Russia; this was vociferously cheered from the ministerial benches: and again to that of Lord Palmerston in March, 1848, when he said that the questioning of Russia's right, amounted to "neither more nor less than war." All such Notifications of Quarantine are published in the "Gazette," there is no case of a similar suppression, and the minister is personally liable in the courts of law from damage accruing from such suppression. But mere silence sufficed so far as Russia was concerned, for thereafter no step could be taken against the Treaty, and, therefore, while the protest was not made, neither was the Notification published. To avoid this last difficulty, the communication was not made direct, but through the minister at Constantinople, and while suppressed in England, it was exhibited by the consul at Constantinople to all masters of vessels, who were thereby warned off the coast.

The curious part of the arrangement remains behind. These Regulations had no existence. They are referred to as enclosed first by the Russian minister, then by the Russian ambassador, and lastly by the British minister at Constantinople. They are not enclosed in any one of the three despatches. All this is, of course, kept secret at the time, and is only brought to light after a vessel has been confiscated six years after on unnotified, unpublished Regulations not issued, but only spoken of.

I said the Regulations had no existence. So neither had the Quarantine, as I can testify of personal knowledge, having visited the whole coast in 1834. From Nicolai, the frontier Turkish port, which of course was in quarantine, I sailed for the Russian station of Gelengick. The Russian officers, after a few words *about* quarantine, came *on board*. I was immediately received on board the Russian brig of war, which captured the *Vixen*, and thence went on shore. Accompanied by the commandant of the fort, I went to the place of intercourse with the Circassians, which had indeed the form of a *Parlatorio*, but where no measures of quarantine whatever were observed. I then sailed for Soujouk Su, where I landed, and remained among the Circassians while the yacht went on to Anapa, and thence returning picked me up. We then made for Sevastopol, and were put in quarantine because we had come *from the coast of Circassia*. The Admiral came alongside, and was informed of our intercourse with the Russian authorities

on the coast, and of our landing there; no exception was taken to their conduct.

It may be said that the Russian despatch of August, 1831, did not say that regulations existed for the coast, but only for Anapa and Redout Kale, where the quarantines were said to be, and that as to the rest, the prohibition to approach was the whole Regulation. Then why does she approach? A sanitary Regulation that is not good to stop a Russian, is surely equally bad for the other inhabitants of the earth.

I subsequently visited Silestria, then occupied by the Russians. There travellers had to perform fifteen days' quarantine, but Russians were held liable to infection by a scale: ten days for a private, five for a captain; a field officer had three, a superior officer none. Foreign despatches underwent a prolonged and elaborate process of fumigation, Russian despatches were utterly neglected, and passed unnoticed and unopened; whence it is to be inferred that Russia has no dread of the plague for herself, whatever her alarm for others.

All this time nothing was done as to the foreshadowed Quarantine of the Treaty of Adrianople, but her attention was recalled to that point by the sudden development of the trade of the Principalities; in the famine which affected southern Russia in 1834, they supplied her with 500,000 tchwerts of grain. That same year the first vessel from the Thames entered the Danube; next year fifteen; and in the spring of 1836 thirty were expected, and the return cargoes ready. Then appeared the Ukase of the 7th of February, to intercept vessels "proceeding on their voyage up the Danube," and send them to Odessa to perform any quarantine she chose to order, subject to any regulations she thought fit to impose. Being in Quarantine, or in Pratique, made no difference; and, as in the "Regulation" for Circassia, custom-house and Quarantine are jumbled together, so here it is said, "This quarantine, *in so far as regards the customs*, must be regulated by the same laws as the present quarantine of Bazertcheck."

She had previously stopped and visited vessels by force, imposed a *visà* on their papers, and exacted a fee. She had interfered with the tracking path, and allowed the sand to accumulate at the entrance of the river.*

* "Notwithstanding the proverbial improvidence of the Turkish government, the mouth of the river, when in its possession, was kept free from the accumulation

Each of these acts was an infraction of the public law of Europe. The treaty of Vienna (Art. 109) declares that the navigation of rivers "along their whole course, from the point where each of them becomes navigable to its mouth, shall be entirely free." By Art. 111, "the amount of the duties shall, in no case, exceed those now (1815) paid," and "no increase shall take place except with the common consent of the states bordering on the rivers." By Art. 113, "each state shall be at the expense of keeping in good repair the towing paths," and "shall maintain the necessary works in order that no obstruction shall be experienced by the navigation."

The fact of the exaction of tolls, &c., was brought to the knowledge of the Foreign Minister in December, 1835, two months before the date of the Ukase.*

These acts vehemently excited the British nation, and indeed all Europe, and an indignation was aroused, such as has never on any occasion been manifested since the war with France. The papers were unanimous in their denunciations; their correspondence from the East was full, particular, and vehement, and there was no dissenting view of the case; the leading commercial cities sent up petitions to Parliament praying for "protection," and calling upon it to resist the encroachments of Russia. Addresses in the same sense were laid at the feet of the Crown. The King, himself a sailor, was known to share to the fullest extent in the emotion of his people, and rather to lead than to yield to their impulse; and it was generally understood that a majority of the commons was ready to vote an address, embodying the appeal of the

of sand by straitening its bed with pallisades, and cleansing it occasionally with drags. Since the occupation by Russia these means have been abandoned. The consequence has naturally been that the depth of its channel, which under the Ottoman domination averaged twelve feet, is already reduced to eight. An impenetrable bar will thus be formed at the mouth of this river. Russia will add to her important possessions that of an iron gate between the Danube and the Euxine."—*Times Cor.*, March 2nd, 1836.

* Extract of a letter from Mr. Bell, 7 Dec. 1835.—"I saw Mr. Strangways to-day, and told him that I had information to-day from two captains of vessels I have had arrived from the Danube, that they were both required to show their papers to the Russian commandant at the mouth of that river, settled with about 100 troops on the Turkish side, and they were told that there were three and four dollars to be paid when their papers were returned to them *signed*. They were also required almost by force to desist from tracking their vessels on the Russian side of the river, although Greek and Turkish vessels were allowed to do so. Mr. S. desired me to furnish the details for Lord Palmerston, which I hope to be able to do to-night."

merchants, and further praying for the adoption of measures for the entrance of a British squadron into the Black Sea.

But in what position stood the Minister? He had (although the fact was then unknown and unsuspected, not by the nation only, but by his own colleagues,) deprived himself of all power of action against Russia, by submission to the equally flagrant measures on the Circassian coast. Could he more than Mr. Canning stand the effects of such a disclosure? Russia could no longer be resisted on any one particular point, and he could escape only by a great effort which should burst the whole meshes of the web at once. That effort was not made. The trouble of his position was revealed, and is recorded in a trifling circumstance.

I have said that the press was unanimous: there was one exception. One solitary journal, if it did not absolutely espouse the Russian side, ranged close up to it; laboriously falsified the case of England, and perverted every statement respecting the Provinces. This journal was the organ of the Foreign Office! Another organ of the office, "The Portfolio," took exactly the opposite line. The subjoined extracts are from an article settled and revised at the Foreign Office. *

The Address was to be moved by Mr. Patrick Stewart, in the Commons, on the 20th of April, and as the Government had reserved every expression of its views, the greatest curiosity as well as excitement prevailed. Late on the night of the 19th, I was informed that the motion was to be put off. I hastened to Mr. P. Stewart, and found him in bed; but insisting on seeing

* "The various labours now in progress on the course of the Danube, the projects settled or in contemplation for uniting it by canals and railroads with the rivers of Prussia, central Germany and Bavaria, of connecting it with the Elbe to the north, and the Rhine to the west, establishing thus an internal navigation which will unite the North Sea, the Baltic, and the Euxine, and almost the Adriatic, give to the Danube an importance to which there is scarcely any parallel in the history of internal navigation. Russia reckons upon the navigation of that river (when reduced to a channel of her own) for establishing an intercourse between middle Europe and Asia, independent of the oceanic system of Great Britain, and as the means of rendering the markets of middle Europe dependent on her for their outlet."

"The formation of English establishments in those provinces, and the exportation of raw produce, which are the staples of Russia, by means of British capital and enterprise, naturally inspire her with great and not unfounded alarm. She therefore proceeded quietly to establish point by point, control over the river. * * * Against this outrage it was *understood that remonstrance had been made*

him: he informed me that he had consented to put off his motion in consequence of a conversation with a member of the Government, who had represented the Cabinet as "all right and firm," but likely to be embarrassed by a public discussion. I urged him instantly to write to withdraw his assent to the postponement, as it stood to reason, that if the Government was firm, what it must most desire, was such an exposition of the case as he would make, and such an expression of the unanimous sense of Parliament as he was sure to get. He acted accordingly, and moved according to notice on the following night.

Mr. Patrick Stewart's exposition of the case was complete. He justified the demand for "protection," by proving the violation of natural rights, treaty, stipulations, and solemn pledges; he showed the infraction of the Treaty of Vienna, exposed the perfidious character of Russia's policy, and the alarming nature of her projects.

The Minister concurred in the statement, and resisted the Address. He added, that "His Majesty's government had no desire or disposition to submit to *aggression* from any power." Mr. Stewart, conceiving that by such declaration in Parliament he was as much committed as he could be by any act (I quote his own words), withdrew his motion, and it entered into no man's mind to doubt, that the quarantine and tolls on the Danube would be removed. Thus the matter was laid asleep. In Parliament the matter was never revived, and there is no trace of a communication with the Russian Cabinet on the subject. The quarantine still stands on the Island of Forgetfulness (Leti). . . .

An incident of significance and importance occurred. Fifteen days after the debate, the following letter was written to Messrs. Bell:—

"*Foreign Office, May 5th*, 1836.

"GENTLEMEN,

"In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, upon the subject of the obstructions offered by the Russian authorities to the free navigation of the Danube, I am directed by Viscount Palmerston, to acquaint you that his Lordship *has called upon the law adviser of the Crown for his opinion as to the*

by Great Britain, and we suppose that according to custom the Ukase referred to in the St. Petersburgh paragraph is the answer of the Autocrat to this remonstrance! What can England be supposed to say, save *Pour on, I will endure!*"

regulations promulgated by the Russian ukase of the 7th of February, 1836; but in the meantime, Lord Palmerston directs me to acquaint you with respect to the latter part of your letter, that it is the opinion of his Majesty's government, that no toll is justly demanded by the Russian authorities at the mouth of the Danube, and that you have acted properly in *directing your agents to refuse to pay it.*

"I am, Gentlemen, &c., &c.,

(Signed) "J. BACKHOUSE."

The Minister puts a merchant in possession of a fact reserved from Parliament. The reference to the law officers surely should have been stated; such reference showed that the Government had not made up its mind, which was incompatible with the declaration of concurrence in the statement and motion of Mr. P. Stewart. Mr. Bell is further encouraged to resist the aggressions of the officers of a foreign state, which might be taken as the last pitch of decision in a government. But the distinction drawn between similar acts, respecting one of which the Government had only asked an opinion, and had not got it—the facts having been in its possession five months—was not likely to produce on the persons to whom it was addressed the encouraging effect which it had upon others. The bold decision in the Minister arrested the proceedings of the merchant, no resistance took place, and no opinion of the law officers respecting the quarantine appeared. Russia having carried both points, and having stopped the shipments, except in small craft, made the quarantine, when not performed, the means of enacting a toll *in London and Liverpool,* on every English vessel leaving these ports for the Turkish ports on the Danube! The subjoined letter will establish and explain the startling fact:

Liverpool, March, 1848.

"A forwarding agent remarked, that in shipping goods to the Danube, there were fees to be paid to the Russian consul amounting to near 100*l.* per cargo. I ascertained the next day from Mr. —— who had been employed in the Russian consulate, that on each bale or article, even though of metal, two roubles silver are charged

(6*s*. 4*d*. to 6*s*. 8*d*.). There are other expenses for seals which are affixed to each article or bale, tin cases to preserve those seals, and extra coverings which are imposed by the Russian regulations. Vessels cannot otherwise unload in the Danube, and would be sent to Odessa, and subjected to forty days quarantine; interest of money thereby lost, perhaps a market for their sale, with a fair probability of the goods sustaining damage, being submitted to rough usage, and fumigated.

"The agent complained bitterly of the extortion, and asked 'If there were no redress?' I informed him that the demand was illegal, that Lord Palmerston had declared the clause for the free navigation of rivers in the Treaty of Vienna, to apply to the Danube, and that he had a case to go before a court of law.

"On this he wrote to his London correspondent, who advised him on no account to agitate in the matter; that the chief house at Bucharest had tried and had failed, and their vessel was confiscated, without compensation.

"I have been told that from the Americans this impost is not enacted, but I have not been able to ascertain whether this statement be correct. These dues have been exacted during ten years."

Whilst we were under the impression that vigorous measures were being taken in respect to the Danube, I bethought myself of doing something to support that action on the east, and to open communication with Circassia, by sending thither a trading-vessel. This matter was discussed with Mr. Strangways, Mr. Backhouse, and Sir John M'Neill, and by letter with Lord Ponsonby.* It was

* The following extract from a letter of Lord Ponsonby, quoted in the House of Commons on the 23rd Feb., 1848, will show his entire concurrence; as also the estimate he formed of the conduct of affairs at home:

"I had been led to believe that you had changed your mind respecting Circassia. No! I did not believe it, but I heard it. I am delighted with the manner in which you have treated this subject. It is admirable. *I hope you have approved of what I have done in my despatches respecting it.* I considered it from the beginning to be next in importance to the possession of Constantinople itself; but it is only lately, comparatively speaking, that I have known the facts of the total freedom of that country from every legitimate connection or tie, and therefore the total illegality of any title assumed to it by Nicholas. If we had any man in England worth a straw we should soon settle these matters; but our statesmen, high or low, are pedlers, but without the sagacity that distinguishes the Israelite who carries about his small wares for sale to housemaids and scullions."

submitted to the King, who so warmly entered into it, that a letter was written to me by his private secretary, stating the great service to his country which any merchant would so render, to be shown to Mr. Bell, of Bucharest, who was anxious to make the attempt, if secure against failure, *i.e.*, interference by Russia.

I owe it to Mr. Bell, who is now dead, to state that in all the suffering which he incurred through the sending of that vessel, the ruin of his affairs, and the vituperation of his character by official persons, he never once either quoted or alluded to that letter, on which alone the step was taken; and yet he had authority to do so.

At that time a Blockade had alone been heard of. The Russian cruisers had detained and warned off neutral vessels, declaring the coast blockaded; I had myself been called on to furnish information to the Foreign Office respecting the "Blockade of the coast of Circassia;" and if there was Blockade there was war, and if there was war there could neither be Quarantine nor Custom-house Regulations. But it was not judged prudent by Mr. Bell to send his vessel without a specific declaration from the Foreign Minister, and it was settled that he was to write, and that he should receive an explicit answer. I conveyed this to him myself. His letter, however, instead of inquiring if the English Government recognised the Blockade, asked if there were "*any restrictions* on trade recognised by Her Majesty's Government." Lord Palmerston answers, "You ask me whether it would be for your advantage to engage in a speculation in salt in the province of Wallachia," and points out how it is for commercial firms to judge for themselves in determining "whether they shall enter into or decline commercial speculations." Mr. Bell, advised from the Foreign Office as to framing the next letter, now specifies: he asks, "whether or not Her Majesty's Government recognise THE *Russian Blockade* on the coast of the Black Sea to the south of the River Kouban?" Upon this he is referred to the "Gazette, in which all Notifications, *such as those alluded to by you,* are made for the information of the parties interested." There being in the "Gazette" no notification of "Blockade," *nor* of any "Restrictions" whatever, Mr. Bell conceives himself now assured that no impediments of any kind extended to his trading

with Circassia. At Constantinople, he is informed by the Ambassador of the "Restrictions," to which he pays no attention, as he conceived the communications with Lord Palmerston covered the whole ground, and as, further, the Ambassador informed him, "that Russia had *no right whatever to prescribe regulations for that trade.*"* The vessel was seized for breaking a Blockade.† Satisfaction is demanded, April 19, 1837 (the vessel having been confiscated on the 25th of November, 1836), but every specification of *the place*, which constituted the whole question, was carefully excluded: it is said, "in the Black Sea." The Russian government is "*requested* to state the reasons on account of which it has thought itself warranted to seize and confiscate in *time of peace*, a merchant vessel belonging to British subjects." On the 23rd of May, that confiscation, says Lord Palmerston, appears to have been justified on two grounds: "First, the receiving on board a cargo not allowed to be imported at all. Second, an attempt to trade *at a Russian port* where there is no Custom house."

Lord Palmerston, in 1836, could not avow that he had already sanctioned these Regulations; nor, Mr. Bell being so encouraged,

* Lord Palmerston (*see* appended, note No. 2,) on the 1st of March, 1848, said—"In those circumstances a certain Mr. Bell imagined that he would take a shipful of salt to Circassia, and 'try the question.' The Russian Government *had issued an edict prohibiting the importation of salt*, or I believe *rather generally establishing a blockade against the coast;* and Mr. Bell determined to take a shipful of salt, of which the Circassians were greatly in need, and to see what Russia would do; intending, if the ship were seized, to demand restitution from the Government, and that being refused by Russia, that Great Britain should send a fleet to the Baltic, endeavour to destroy the Russian arsenals—in short, that there should be a regular 'set-to' between this country and Russia. I have been accused frequently of being too warlike; but I own that my courage did no rise to that point. I did not fancy it. Not liking the matter, I gave to Mr. Bell the answers which were published—which I knew very well would be published next day in the papers—which were charged with being evasive, and like some answers which one gives in this House, when one's official duties prevent him gratifying the curiosity of an hon. Member. However, the *result was that Mr. Bell was so discouraged that he gave up all intentions of going to the Circassian coast.* He had gone to Constantinople; but he was warned by Lord Ponsonby, our Ambassador, to take care not to violate the Russian blockade. He did then give up his intention of going to Circassia. All of a sudden, however, he took it up again. His ship was seized by a Russian cruiser."

† "Such documents as will prove that the schooner *Vixen* was employed on a *blockaded coast.*"—*Admiral Lazareff to Mr. Childs*, Dec. 24th, 1836.

could he have recourse to indirect dissuasion. He therefore fenced in his correspondence with that Firm to get them to restrict to "Blockade" their question, so that his reply would leave open the confiscation under "Restrictions." The vessel is seized on the first ground, to be soon abandoned, meanwhile he writes the threatening despatch; he at once mollifies before the second pretext, the Regulations of 1831.

The voyage of the *Vixen* is therefore one of the happiest incidents in the career of Russia. By antecedent surrender it was *impossible* for the minister of England to resist its confiscation. These circumstances were a profound secret, not to the cabinet only, but to all the official persons, from the King to the minister's confidential Under-secretary of State, Mr. Strangways, who, in June, 1836, knew no more of the Notification of 1831, which the consul of Constantinople daily made known to masters of vessels, than Mr. Bell or myself. Had we not been thus in the dark the vessel could never have been sent; had the minister not been so compromised it could not have been confiscated.* By the confiscation, he affixes on England an indelible stigma; he obtains the sanction of the parallel Regulations at the mouth of the Danube, and *the recognition of the Treaty of Adrianople.* That Treaty, protested against by England in its binding power, is now recognised in its effects, and is admitted to have effects such as no legal Treaty could carry—the concession of possession *de jure* where none existed *de facto.* The despatch of the 23rd May, 1837, already referred to, contains the following passage:—

"His Majesty's government, considering in the first place that Soujouk Kale, which *was acknowledged by Russia* in the Treaty of 1783 as a Turkish possession, now belongs to Russia, *as stated by Count Nesselrode,* by virtue of the Treaty of Adrianople * * *see no sufficient reason to question* the right of Russia to seize and confiscate the *Vixen.*"

A singular, perhaps a not unintentional, oversight enables us to trace to its real source the composition of this despatch. Had it been drafted in Downing Street, it would have said the treaty of 1782. 1783 is the Russian date.

* See "Exposition of the case of the *Vixen.*" Hatchard. Drawn up at the request of Sir Stratford Canning by a gentleman who had been his private secretary.

It will be further observed, from an extract I have already given, that the Foreign Office was then in possession of the amplest and strongest proof of the absence of any power on the part of the Turkish Government to cede Circassia in 1782—furnished by the British Ambassador at Constantinople. Lord Ponsonby says, referring to the despatches he had written, that he was "in possession of facts that prove the total freedom of the country from any legitimate subjection to the Sultan, and therefore the total illegality of any title assumed to it by Nicholas." I may add, that Circassian slaves have ever been sold in Turkey, which could not be if there were so much as a claim to the sovereignty of the country.*

What a display have we here—what lions' skins to tear off! Is this, then, all that remains to you, after the smoke has blown away? Your public opinion—your enlightened age—your mighty engine the Press — your great parties — your constitutional mechanism—your balance of powers—your Royal prerogative—your responsibility of Ministers—and, above all, your OMNIPOTENCE of Parliament? What do they all become? Nay, what, with such frauds standing in the place of truth, avails you your physical strength?

One, himself of no ordinary powers, who had had occasion of making this discovery, observed:—"What shocks me, is to think that whilst of us a very few can by any chance be let into the knowledge of such things, and these few can only raise their hands in astonishment, or drop them in despair—a barbarous race knew it all along, and deals with our vices and illusions as with property of its own."

We have passed through three phases, under three administrations, who, whatever their differences in speculative matters, coincide in the manner of exercising the highest prerogative of the Crown.

The first was the constitution of an Extra-national Government, in a Conclave of three Representatives of three distinct Powers: this was the work of Mr. Canning. The second was the putting Russia in possession of territory she was bound not to take, and you were bound to prevent her from taking: this was the

* See appended Note on the "assumed ground for the confiscation of the *Vixen*."

achievement of the great Tory party, under the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen. The third was the enabling her, on these illegally-acquired territories, to seize and confiscate without form of law, British vessels, and to intercept the vessels of all nations, on an illegal pretext—by, at one and the same time, declaring her acts illegal, and submitting to them, and enabling her to carry them, by the declaration that they were illegal: this was accomplished by the great reform and free-trade administration of Lord Grey.

In the first period we see the English Minister binding Russia to abnegation. In the second, placing conditions to his co-operation, and reserving his judgment on her acts. In the third, dependent on her forbearance, forced to yield, and—to disguise. Of the grave events which marked the first period, Parliament took no notice. It allowed the surrender of the power of the Crown into the hands of a foreign Conspiracy without one word of approval or disapproval. The second period, that of Russia's "separate war," called forth only an incidental notice, in a debate on Portugal, on the 1st of June, 1829, when the Government was attacked for not being sufficiently Russian. During three years, the parliamentary history runs in a wholly separate channel from the diplomatic and real history of the country. In the third period, when the consequences came, Parliament awoke from its listlessness—with what effect we have seen.

On the 17th of March, 1837, Lord Palmerston declared that Russia's acquisitions on the Danube and in Circassia were in violation of her pledges. Seven years and seven months had then elapsed since they had been made; five years and four months since the notification in respect to Circassia had been accepted; one year and four months sinee the tolls on the Danube had been enforced; one year and seven months since the Ukase for the quarantine had been submitted to. Fifteen years have elapsed subsequently to this declaration being made without any steps being taken in conformity therewith.

On the 6th of July, 1840, Lord Palmerston declared that the Treaty of Vienna did apply to the navigation of the Danube. Four years and five months had then elapsed since the Ukase had been communicated. Four years and two months since he declared, in reference to it, that her Majesty's government was not prepared to

submit to any aggression; four years and one month since he commissioned a private firm to resist the Russian authorities. Since that declaration was made, above eleven years have elapsed without any steps having been taken in accordance with this or any other declaration of British rights, or ministerial intentions.

The debate of the 6th of July, 1840, arose out of an attempt to give effect to a tripartite Treaty proposed by Austria, between herself, England and Turkey, with a view of overbearing the interference of Russia in the Danube, and which had been frustrated, as shall presently be detailed. It is to meet this attempt that the minister brings in the Treaty of Vienna. What more do you want, says he? Have you not got the Treaty of Vienna? That treaty forbids tolls, forbids quarantines, and renders impossible all usurpations. Who could answer that question? Mr. Patrick Stewart was dead,—who recollected the Ukase of the 7th of February! Messrs. Bell & Co. had gone into the Gazette,—who recollected the letter of marque of the 5th of May! *

The Treaty of Adrianople is one day a bad treaty, and another day a good treaty. Is is bad when, by merely *saying so*, a river may be shut up. It is good when a pretext is wanted to enable a coast to be shut up. This facility of construction belongs to a state of things in which a Parliament can one day be disposed of, by telling them that a matter is under discussion, and the next by telling them that it has been discussed. The first object of England being to escape from embarrassments, she triumphs whenever an end of Russia has been attained.†

These acquisitions have been made, notwithstanding the declaration of Lord Aberdeen (6th of June, 1828), that he held his Imperial Majesty to the fulfilment of the treaty of July, 1827:

Notwithstanding the protest of the King, that after the war he reserved the right to judge of the sacrifices imposed on Turkey:‡

* On the same occasion the minister assigned as the reason for submitting to the infraction of the Treaty of Vienna at Cracow, the inland position of the place, which did not admit of the employment of England's maritime strength.

† On the 17th of March, in one breath the *Vixen* papers were refused because the matter was under discussion, and the Adrianople papers because no longer under negotiation.

‡ "The Hon. and Learned Gentleman said, that the Earl of Aberdeen protested against the Treaty of Adrianople; but when he says that they did not acknowledge it as a part of the law of Europe, he states that which is not borne

Notwithstanding the declaration of Lord Palmerston, (17th of March, 1837,) that the acquisitions of Russia were a violation of English rights:

Notwithstanding the declaration of Lord Palmerston, (6th of July, 1840,) that the Treaty of Vienna applied to the Danube, and forbade any interference with it by any one power:

Notwithstanding the address to the Crown to protect British merchants in the Euxine against such usurpation, (20th of April, 1836,) withdrawn because her Majesty's Government "concurred in the object, and was determined to give it effect:"

Notwithstanding the official sanction transmitted to a private firm (5th of May, 1836), in resisting the Russian authorities on that river.

The navigation of the Danube is interfered with by three distinct causes—all violations of law and treaty.

I.—*The Quarantine for the Provinces instituted by the Treaty of Adrianople in* 1829.

Being under the direct management of the Russian consul, Russia acquires political influence and commercial advantages not enjoyed by "all other nations," nor by the powers who signed the treaty of the 6th July, 1827. This influence is directed against them, as well as against all other nations trading with the Provinces, or thereby prevented from trading with them. It is, therefore, an usurpation which the English government has a right to resist, and is *under the obligation of resisting.*

II.—*The Réglement Organique in* 1833.

Before the entrance of the Russian troops, the Diet of the Provinces was engaged in adjusting its internal administration, which by treaty is independent even of the Porte. The Russian general took the work out of their hands, and completed the volume known by this name. On the evacuation of the Provinces by Russia, it remained a dead letter; but after the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi,

out by historical facts. *They protested against it.* But *does that amount to denying that the treaty is valid,* and that the rights conveyed by it are rights which the *contracting parties* are justified in enforcing and maintaining? &c."—*Lord Palmerston, Feb. 23rd,* 1848.

and, as a consequence thereof, it was established for the Provinces by a separate Convention. The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was established by the notes that subsequently passed between the Porte and the British ambassador to be an offensive Treaty against England, and as such protested against. This constitution, in as far as it does, or may, infringe the rights of navigation and commerce, as conceded to England by the Porte, is therefore without force and void, and an usurpation which the English government is justified in resisting, and bound to resist.

III.—*The Quarantine at Leti in* 1836.

If any government, lawfully in possession of their banks, were to interfere with the navigation of the Elbe, or the Rhine, Europe would be aroused from one extremity to another. But what is the commerce of all the rivers of Europe compared to that which might flow through the Danube?

This is the simple fact, and no one will make it less. Russia owed her success in this war to the co-operation of her allies, which she obtained by convincing them that she would not be interested. She bound herself to consult them in the conditions she should exact at its close. She then concluded the treaty without their knowledge, and obtained a surrender, from the benefit of which she excluded them, and which was only of service to her by the injury which through it she was able to inflict on them.

It may appear doubtful whether it was human ingenuity, or human credulity, which had slept up to that period.

Note 1.

Ukase for the Quarantine on the Danube.

"His Imperial Majesty, in consequence of a representation from the Minister of the Interior, made from a Report of the Governor-General of New Russia and Bessarabia, and conformably to a decision of the Committee of Ministers, has been pleased augustly to order,—1st, To construct a quarantine at the Soulnich mouth of the river Danube, in two divisions; the one, for pratique, at the extreme end of the island Leti, to which the quarantine cordon has at present been advanced; and the other, for suspicious vessels, on the Island of Georgi, with this provision, that this second division of the quarantine, not purifying any kind of merchandise, but sending them either to the quarantines of Odessa or Ismail, should serve merely as a port for vessels prevented from proceeding on their voyage up the Danube, through contrary winds or the strength of the current; or wishing to receive a supply of provisions, or refit. Sometimes, also, it may receive from ships, merchants, their clerks, or other passengers, who, meeting with delay in their journey by water, should wish to save time, to hold quarantine on the spot, and afterwards proceed to Ismail by land, over the island of Leti. It may also receive the crews of vessels which have been shipwrecked on those islands. The division for pratique will overlook vessels proceeding from healthy ports; and the second division will overlook vessels which are in quarantine. Both these divisions to be under one director, in order that vessels in pratique should have no communication with those in quarantine. This quarantine, in so far as regards the Customs, must be regulated by the same laws as the present quarantine of Bazertcheck.—2nd. This last port, established by the Ukase of the 26th of October, 1832, and situated at the Kilian mouth, as it will be found now quite superfluous, is to be evacuated. This, the will of his Imperial Majesty, has been published in an Ukase of the Senate, dated the 7th of February, 1836."

Note 2.

Alleged Ground for the Confiscation of the *Vixen.*

The wonderful betrayal of this heroic people by all the nations in whose behalf they combined, by resisting and triumphing over the common foe, may possibly reach some term. Some people or Government may be shamed into disregard of the insolent prohibitions of Russia to communicate with them. The first point is to dispel the assumption of any legal value attaching to her Regulations of 1831, and the exposure of the collusion through which the sacrifice of the *Vixen* was consummated in 1837: and this I may

be able best to effect by giving the subjoined passages from my correspondence with Lord Palmerston, in reference to the subject:—

MR. URQUHART TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

(Extract.) *September*, 20, 1837.

I now come to a question of far graver importance—the charge which your Lordship has made against me in reference to the voyage of the *Vixen*. You consider my intercourse with Mr. Bell as the cause of that voyage. You consider that voyage as having placed the Government of England and of Russia in such a position that neither could honourably retire without war. Your Lordship lays, therefore, the responsibility on me of endangering the peace of this country and of Europe; you have treated me, consequently, as if guilty of treason to the country, and expressed in so unqualified a manner your reprobation as to tell me that there was no gibbet in England high enough to hang the person guilty of the very conduct which your Lordship immediately before imputed to me.

Having up to the period of the communication in question considered the voyage of the *Vixen* as a Government measure, and as one which your Lordship looked upon with peculiar interest and with great expectations of national benefit, I naturally was surprised beyond expression at the views now expressed and the doctrines laid down by your Lordship; but I will not be tempted into dealing with your Lordship's present opinions, either as to the relative strength of England and Russia, the legality of the voyage, or the capture of the *Vixen*, or the disproof of the assumed grounds of that capture, as stated in the papers presented to Parliament. My opinions, my Lord, are unchanged—such as they were when I had the satisfaction of thinking they coincided with those of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; so they are now. Your Lordship reproached me with exulting in the voyage of the *Vixen;* I did, in common with many others, exult in that event, because I was wholly ignorant of the change of your Lordship's views; at present no one can more bitterly lament it than I do.

But, my Lord, admitting all the responsibility to apply to the voyage of the *Vixen*, which your Lordship is pleased to attach to it, I think I can show in the most conclusive manner that that responsibility lies with Lord Ponsonby in the first instance, and, secondly, with your Lordship, both by the previous encouragement given to the undertaking, and by the subsequent approbation of Lord Ponsonby's conduct, as also by a communication from your Lordship to myself through your confidential Under Secretary of State, coupled with an offer of testimony from the latter to shield me from any misrepresentation connected with the voyage of the *Vixen*.

His Majesty's representative at the Porte received Mr. Bell for the special purpose of discussing with him his projected voyage to open commercial communications with the independent tribes of Circassia. The commercial or legal questions connected with a mercantile voyage belonged to the Consul-General, and not to the Ambassador; but when the Ambassador examined into the enterprise, and gave his assent to the voyage, it assumed a political and diplomatic character, and indicated views on the part of the Government of a very decided character. Lord Ponsonby further received in writing Mr. Bell's report of his interview, and communicated to Mr. Bell his own dispatch to the Foreign-Office. But for these communications, and the satisfactory nature of them, the *Vixen* never would have sailed; in consequence of them she did sail: and Mr. Bell, in

giving an account of his proceedings, refers to Lord Ponsonby's approbation, and to his alone, and at the time he sent me a communication, which I subjoin :—

"*Pera, Nov.* 2, 1836.

"SIR,—In consequence of your having referred me to Lord Ponsonby for information respecting any legal impediment that might exist to prevent my projected trading voyage to Circassia, I proceeded to Therapia on Thursday last and obtained an interview with his Lordship.

"I now send you, according to your request, the enclosed copy of the memorandum I took of the conversation that passed between his Lordship and myself, a copy of which I have transmitted to his Lordship also for his approval.

"I remain, Sir, your obedient humble servant,

"D. Urquhart, Esq. JAMES S. BELL."

"MEMORANDUM.

"On Thursday, the 27th of October, 1836, I proceeded to Therapia and having obtained an interview with Lord Ponsonby, I begged of his Lordship to inform me if he were aware of any legal impediment existing to prevent my making a mercantile voyage to the coast of Circassia.

"His lordship in reply observed, that he had lately received a renewal of the previous intimation given by the Russian Government as to trade with that coast being interdicted, except upon certain conditions. But that as he considered that the Russian Government had no right whatever to prescribe rules for that trade, he had not complied with the request of the Chargé d'Affaires to have such notice intimated to our Consul at Constantinople, but had sent a copy of the intimation to the Foreign-Office in London, from which he had not received any communication on the subject.

"I then informed his Lordship that it was my intention to proceed in a vessel I expected daily, to a certain point on the coast of Circassia, which I had fixed upon as most eligible for the trade I had in view; and that as I had ascertained before leaving London that our Government did not then acknowledge any right on the part of Russia to impede trade with the country in question; and as nothing seemed to have since occurred to change the position of affairs; I should endeavour to attain the object I had in view, and should not be diverted from it unless force were employed on the part of the Russian Government, and hoped to obtain his Lordship's aid in so doing.

"In reply to this his Lordship stated, that he perfectly coincided in the propriety of the plan I had adopted, to which he had no objection whatever to offer, as he considered it an indisputable point that Russia had no right to interfere with or prescribe rules for British trade with Circassia; and that, if I adhered to the straightforward course I had detailed to him, he had no doubt of my being enabled to establish a claim for support from the British Government, in which he would be glad to render me all the assistance in his power, requesting me at the same time to transmit him information as to what success attended my enterprise.

"JAMES S. BELL."

This memorandum, thus submitted to Lord Ponsonby, renders it needless for me to add one word; but as your Lordship had this document in your possession at the period of the interview when you attempted to lay upon my shoulders the responsibility of the voyage of the *Vixen*, and therefore refused to allow me to read it to you, I must infer that the views then expressed by Lord Ponsonby were expressed under your Lordship's sanction; for if an irresponsible and subordinate agent was recalled for good wishes, and strictly private encouragement

given to an enterprise fraught with such danger, what must not have been your Lordship's condemnation of the responsible representative of the Crown who stepped aside to approve and sanction that very enterprise, unless authorised to do so? But, at all events, this document expresses the grounds on which the voyage of the *Vixen* was undertaken—namely, the sanction of his Majesty's representative at Constantinople, and this document brings to your Lordship's knowledge the fact of that sanction and mutual understanding between Lord Ponsonby and Mr. Bell; and therefore I conceive that the responsibility, whatever it may be, involved in the voyage of the *Vixen*, cannot possibly be made to rest on any shoulders save those of the competent and responsible authorities, whose approbation was alone sought, and whose sanction was in the most unequivocal manner obtained.

Your Lordship in the letter of recall addressed to me on the 10th of March, says—

"The present communication is founded upon your letter of the 7th of December last, to Mr. Strangways, which I have lately had under my consideration. It appears by that letter, you took steps with respect to Mr. Bell's voyage in the *Vixen*, which, I regret to say, were in my opinion, wholly incompatible with your public duty as a diplomatic servant of the Crown; and I should not think myself properly performing my own duty, if, after a knowledge of such a circumstance, I were to continue you in the situation which you now hold."

My letter here referred to left Constantinople by messenger on the 8th of December; it consequently reached England at the end of that month. Your Lordship's letter is therefore dated two months and a half after the receipt of mine; but my letter was replied to by Mr. Strangways on the 8th of January, in a tone of exultation as regards the consequences of the new position assumed in Circassia. This letter was written from the country, and containing only the personal opinions of Mr. Strangways. The next messenger brought me, however, another letter from Mr. Strangways, without date, but which was still in answer to my letter of the 7th of December; this letter contains a communication your Lordship alluded to in conversation as coming from yourself.

Mr. Strangways, in his second answer to my letter of the 7th of December, says, "I cannot omit alluding to the capture of the *Vixen* without telling you that it has had all the effect on the public that you could have anticipated, and even more than I expected, knowing the temper of the people here. It is now under legal and Government discussion, so I need say no more. Bell's statements and his brother's documents tell very well for him.

"As the public here are very obtuse on foreign matters, *et il faut faire fleche de tout bois*, I wish when the coast is cleared, which I hope it will be by this business, you could send some artist, or better, a gentleman who can draw and write travels, &c., to make a tour in Circassia; it would do admirably for London and be well got up here.

"I should warn you, that in giving any accounts of the *Vixen* transaction, you may be liable to misrepresentation, as it would not be thought proper, if, being Secretary of Embassy, you had incited Mr. J. Bell to make the voyage as a diplomatic experiment; I can answer for its having been the intention of Mr. G. Bell long before in London. This hint comes from high authority."

Your Lordship, therefore, had my letter of the 7th of December under consideration sometime between the 8th of January and the 8th of February, the day of departure of the messenger which brought the letter of which the above is an extract, and so far from being led by that letter at that period to recall me,

your Lordship directed Mr. Strangways to warn me against misrepresentation, and this too after the catastrophe had taken place, and after the whole series of circumstances connected with the voyage and capture of the *Vixen* had been completed. It is after your Lordship's judgment has been so formed, after the communication of friendly caution, after the volunteering on the part of Mr. Strangways of testimony in my favour, should accusations be made by others, and after an interval of more than two months from the period of the reception of my letter of the 7th of December, that your Lordship, in your letter of the 10th of March, makes that letter of mine the ground of your high censure and of my removal from Constantinople; and now in England, it is after the perusal of the memorandum of Mr. Bell's interview with Lord Ponsonby, that your Lordship reproaches and stigmatises me as a traitor to the interests of my country, because I sought to contribute to the success of an expedition approved and sanctioned by the King's Ambassador; that approval and sanction being of course according to instructions, which had, to my own knowledge, been brought to the knowledge of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The question of the independence of Circassia, in which solely is involved the legality or the illegality of the voyage of the *Vixen*, had been strenuously and uncompromisingly advocated for several months under your Lordship's sanction. My reports, detailing my entrance into the country two years before, in violation of any supposed municipal right of Russia, had been received, and not disapproved of. The Circassian declaration of independence had been published after mature deliberation, and several weeks' correspondence with different branches of the Government, in a periodical connected with the Foreign Department; Circassia was marked as an independent country on a map revised by your Lordship. In consequence of these views of your Lordship's becoming known, Mr. Bell conceived the project of a commercial voyage to Circassia. He consulted me thereon. I entered into discussion on the subject with Mr. Strangways; and, in consequence of these communications, and others of most unequivocal character, which I need not quote, but which resulted from communications with your Lordship on the subject, the idea of such an expedition became a settled object, and Mr. Bell then formally addressed your Lordship, stating it to be his intention to open commercial connexion with the independent tribes in the Caucasus, and asked if there were any legal impediments to such a voyage recognised by the British Government. Your Lordship referred him to the *Gazette* as on a question between belligerent states—the publication or non-publication in the *Gazette* being, in the eye of all mercantile men, the test of their right to carry on commerce with any given coast in cases of war; and the reference of your Lordship to the "Gazette" proves that this was a question which involved the belligerent rights—not the municipal regulations of Russia, and consequently setting wholly aside the communication made by the Russian Envoy at Constantinople to the British Minister in 1831, on the custom-house and quarantine regulations to be observed by the vessels of foreign powers trading to the coast of Circassia. When, therefore, your Lordship says that you were averse from the voyage, and that your correspondence with Mr. Bell shows that you were so, I can only confess that I laboured under the most perfect delusion up to my first interview with your Lordship after my return to England.

If, therefore, the voyage of the *Vixen* has placed the Government of Great Britain in so embarrassing and humiliating a position before that of Russia, the responsibility can only lie with those to whom the power belongs, and that responsibility must have reference, not to the voyage, but to the admission of a false assertion as justification for the seizure of an English vessel.

Whatever my opinions or acts might have been, they never could have induced an English merchant to undertake such an enterprise. It was undertaken because those concerned did believe that your Lordship considered it perfectly legal in itself, and an object of special interest from its political bearings, and this impression was maintained by an uninterrupted chain of official interest and favour from the period of the first conversation on the subject, till Mr. G. Bell's departure, charged with your Lordship's despatches to Lord Ponsonby at Constantinople. The same interest and favour were shown by Lord Ponsonby, in deviation from all previous example, by myself with my chief's sanction and approval; and so far was this interest carried, that the official members of Lord Ponsonby's establishment repaired to the mouth of the Bosphorus to witness the departure of the *Vixen* for Circassia.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON TO MR. URQUHART.

(Extract.) *June* 20, 1838.

"You say in your letter that having up to the moment of your conversation with me considered the voyage of the *Vixen* as a Government measure, and as one which I looked upon with peculiar interest and with great expectation of national benefit, you are naturally surprised beyond expression at the views which I then expressed to you upon that subject. Now, I think that I may be justified in expressing, in my turn, some considerable surprise at this passage in your letter; because, while on the one hand, I am quite sure that nothing which I ever said or did could justify you or any other man in forming the opinion which in this passage you express of my view of the voyage of the *Vixen;* on the other hand, my private letter to you, dated the 10th of March, 1837, and which you received before you left Constantinople, and therefore long before our conversation in Downing Street, was calculated, as it seems to me, to have effectually dispelled any illusion which other persons might have created in your mind on this point."

MR. URQUHART TO MR. BACKHOUSE.

(Extract.) *July* 20, 1838.

"Who were the parties who could have misled me? The only persons with whom I had had communication upon this subject were, his late Majesty; Sir Herbert Taylor, his Majesty's Private Secretary; Mr. M'Neill, Envoy to Persia; Mr. Strangways, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs; and (by letter) Lord Ponsonby: added to the positive approval of Lord Palmerston of my own reports and published papers on the subject, and of 'every word' that had appeared in the Portfolio."

His Lordship, in his letter of March 10, did not assert that the voyage of the *Vixen* was unsanctioned. He did not assert that the voyage was illegal. He did not assert that reparation from Russia was not to be demanded for the capture; there was nothing then expressed in that letter of those views that roused my astonishment. It asserted that I had taken steps, with reference to the voyage of the *Vixen*, incompatible with my duty. The voyage of the *Vixen* having been sanctioned and carried through by Lord Ponsonby, it led me to suppose that I had been misrepresented; but it did not lead me to suspect that collusion between Lord Palmerston and a foreign state, the conviction of which resulted from the conversation which I had with his Lordship.

In reference to Lord Palmerston's letter of March 10, I find in my letter of the 5th of April, to Mr. Strangways, the following passage:—

"Believing that we have much the same views, I am satisfied that you have other and sufficient reasons for what has been done;" and again—if "I omitted to state in my letter of December the fact of communication with Lord Ponsonby, on

which omission I imagine Lord Palmerston's censure to be grounded, the tenor of my whole correspondence must have supplied the place of that omission."

Had aversion to the expedition appeared in Lord Palmerston's letter, I should indeed have been astounded; nor could I have comprehended how Lord Ponsonby's conduct in practically bringing that expedition to bear, by personally destroying the effect on the merchant and master of the communication by the English Consulate of the orders of the Russian Government respecting the trade of the Circassian coast, should be approved of, whilst I, who had no responsibility and no power, except in acting in the sense of my responsible chief, was to be punished for his act. But that which is most strange of all is, that in July last, Lord Palmerston did not express surprise at the astonishment evinced by me at the new line which he assumed, but reserved the expression of that surprise for a reply on the 20th of the following June, extorted from him by the dread of public exposure. In the same passage his Lordship says—"I am quite sure that nothing which I ever said or did could justify you or any other man in forming the opinion which in this passage you express of my views of the voyage of the *Vixen*." I find in a letter written by me to Lord Palmerston in the interval between the two interviews, and before the detailed exposition which was made in the latter—"Surely, my Lord, the publication of the *Portfolio*, and your very specific approbation of its views shortly before my departure, could leave no doubt as to your Lordship's views at the period I mention." If this statement had been erroneous, it would have been corrected verbally, or by letter: and if I had misrepresented Lord Palmerston in one interview, he would not have invited me to a second.

These statements include all I have to say on the subject, except this, that in the statements made, as if drawn from my letter, that which is not true is insinuated—namely, that I "sent for" Mr. Bell; unless there was some object in this misrepresentation I don't think his Lordship would have made it. I alone have charged myself with communications with Mr. Bell; and if Lord Palmerston has considered my conduct in this respect as reprehensible, I have made no remonstrance against such decision; but when his Lordship sanctions in Lord Ponsonby the active and official approval of an enterprise, and punishes me for encouragement of a private kind given to it—when he punishes me in the month of March for what he pretends to approve of in the month of January—when he denounces me as a traitor to my country, while he continues his favour to his own confidential agent (Mr. Strangways,) who has commended the act so denounced, and volunteered his testimony against any misconstruction of my conduct respecting it—then do I assert, not indeed that I am unjustly treated, but that the principles of Eastern policy, of which I was the advocate, and which had previously triumphed in London, were to be overthrown through my disgrace. Lord Palmerston was to escape from the consequences of the part he had taken therein by marking me as the guilty victim, by the sacrifice of which harmony was to be restored between his language in 1836, and his deeds in 1837.

That no misunderstanding may possibly exist as to the value of the only allegation against me contained in Lord Palmerston's letter of June 20th—namely, my encouragement given to Mr. J. Bell (which rests only on my own testimony, and on a private letter which ought neither to have been communicated nor used)—I must state that the step which I encouraged was entering the territory of the independent Cirsassians, in violation, of course, of any supposed Russian regulations; that offence, if offence it be, has been over and over again repeated, and as often approved by his Lordship.

In 1834, I, confidentially employed by the British Government, with the sanction and by the advice of His Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople, did so

enter that country. I was not censured for so doing, but on the contrary my conduct was approved, my views adopted, and I was advanced in a manner that extraordinary services and important views could only justify. In 1836, Mr. Stewart, as alluded to in Lord Palmerston's letter, admitting my statement on the subject, was sent into the same country, equally in defiance of all Russian regulations, by Lord Ponsonby. At the end of the same year Mr. Bell and the *Vixen* were sent by the joint concurrence of the Foreign Office, and of the ambassador at Constantinople. After the capture of the *Vixen*, Mr. Strangways wrote to me to get some person fitted to describe Circassia, and to send him to that country, which communication has been in Lord Palmerston's possession since September 20, without leading to the removal of that officer. Finally, Lord Ponsonby has held communication with that country through individuals sent there by himself (one of them a discarded servant of my own, of the name of Andrew, who has recently been accused of abstracting the correspondence of the Englishmen in Circassia), in equal violation of the Regulations under which the illegality of the voyage has been assumed, and English property confiscated.

To this letter there was an elaborate reply from Mr. Backhouse, but no statement or inference here contained was impugned; this subject was dropped. It will have been observed that Lord Palmerston's first letter was dated nine months after the receipt of the letter to which it was a reply.

Part III.

Turkish Treaty frustrated.

The Greek Byzantine emperors, whom the populace of Constantinople raised at pleasure to the throne, or hurled into the dust, had one above all things to provide—*cheap bread.* The neighbouring provinces were consequently prohibited from exporting wheat; but this, like all other attempts against nature, instead of supplying the Capital, depressed, and exasperated the provinces, and ended in ruining the Empire.

The Turkish system was simplicity itself; it enacted by law, and sealed by religion, the rule of administration, which from the earliest times had prevailed in Arabia: unfortunately, however, the Greek system was not entirely blotted out with the Greek empire, and though the Sultans were under no necessity of flattering their people, they followed in this respect the practice of their predecessors, and gratuitously ruined their foreign commerce, without even obtaining cheapness for the capital.

This state of things lasted 376 years, from 1453 till 1829, when, after many ages of security, Constantinople was once more placed between foes on the north and south; traffic by sea stopped, and she was in want of bread. She had still the two continents open, but the corn administration (Moubaya), invented to feed the capital, blockaded it as effectually by land, as the Russian squadron by sea. Under the presence of absolute famine, they suspended the old laws, and instantly, plenty reappeared.

Since Russia obtained access to the Black Sea, her attention has been given to the cultivation of wheat. Her soil, her climate, the distance at which she is placed, a difficult navigation, and a frozen

sea, during several months of the year, presented to such an enterprise great obstacles. The Bosphorus, too, was then closed against this commerce. Her perseverance has triumphed over all, even to the causing of the prohibition to be repealed by the Porte for the passage outward of her corn, while for that of Turkey, it was retained in force. Across the narrow seas of the Ottomans, and between their vast uncultivated plains, Russia sent her cargoes to the markets of Europe, and received in return those moneys which place her in the position to aim at the empire of a reasoning, but stupid—warlike, but venal world.

The Turkish empire is composed of countries that in former times were the most flourishing on earth. The conditions of the tenure of land, the relations between proprietor and occupier, present no systematic impediment to prosperity. It possesses the most remarkable natural facilities for transport. The sea, which only washes the borders of other states, penetrates into its centre, and gives it a maritime coast of about 1200 leagues, or twice and a half that of England, and five times that of France. The rivers communicating with these seas traverse the most fertile regions. Egypt has her Nile. The rich plains of Syria reach the Gulf of Acre to the south, and join the Orontes in the north. In the east, there is the Euphrates. The mountain chains of Asia Minor run all east and west, so as to allow the plains and water-courses to penetrate into the interior, and by the four rivers that run to the west and the two that run to the north, present the elements of a system of internal water-carriage through the whole extent of that vast province. Roumelia is traversed by the great artery of Central Europe, the Danube, which a canal of five leagues would cover with craft, letting the Black Sea into the land, carrying it right up to Hungary, and uniting to the Bosphorus, the repose and prosperity of the adjoining Austrian empire.

These provinces are placed under the most happy sky. They neither know the rigours of winter nor the intensity of summer. A frugal and docile population of nearly forty millions is sprinkled over a soil not yet broken to labour, or fashioned by art.

With such a surface for the growth of corn, with such facilities for its transport, Turkey would unquestionably have seized upon the commerce of the world, if the sentence had not gone forth against her: "You shall not traffic in the stores of your granaries,

the flax shall dry upon the stalk, the olive shall rot under its tree, the forests shall never descend from the mountains, nor the brass and iron, the gold and silver, emerge from their entrails." This sentence the Sultan Mahmoud undertook to reverse, but the times were no longer when an Ottoman Sultan was his own master. He did not dare to say to his people, "Enjoy the gifts of Providence." He did not dare to say to the nations, "Come and trade with my people."*

Turkey nevertheless had for the basis of her system, freedom of trade. This freedom was avowed and consecrated in the treaties with all countries. The productions of foreigners were not loaded with duties; she did not wage a war of exchange against her neighbours; she did not dream of the protection of national industry; the talons of the fisc did not gripe salt and tobacco; and no octroi blockaded the dwellings of men.

Whence the mysterious contrast? Why this monstrous yoking of a living man with a dead body? The cause is explained by its effects. In Turkey nothing could be bought that Russia sold;

* The "Spectator," reviewing a recent work on Turkey, makes the following remarks, and gives the subjoined quotation:—

"A scanty population, a fertile soil, and the absence of commerce, or of any outlet for produce—partly from the want of roads and the backward state of the country, partly from the obstacles which Austria (!) and Russia interpose to trade —render prices ridiculously low.

"'I feel assured, that if some of our enterprising countrymen, acquainted with commercial pursuits, were to visit these provinces of European Turkey, they would find a rich field, as yet unexplored: both here as well as in Moldavia and Wallachia, I found a most anxious desire on the part of the inhabitants to establish a more intimate commercial connexion with Great Britain. Prince Constantine Soutzo, of Moldavia, one of the most extensive landed proprietors of the province, frequently expressed to me his wishes to that effect, and begged me, on my return home, to open for him a negotiation with some English merchant for the disposal of his timber, corn, and cattle, which seemed to lie upon his hands without the possibility of a sale.

"'In the interior of Bulgaria and Upper Moesia, the low prices of provisions and cattle of every description is almost fabulous compared with the prices of Western Europe. A fat sheep or lamb usually costs from eighteenpence to two shillings, an ox forty shillings, cows thirty shillings, and a horse, in the best possible travelling condition, from four to five pounds sterling. Wool, hides, tallow, wax, and honey, are equally low. In the towns and hans by the road side, everything is sold by weight; you can get a pound of meat for a halfpenny, a pound of bread for the same, and wine, which is also sold by weight, costs about the same money.

"'In Servia, pigs everywhere form the staple commodity of the country. I have seen some that would weigh from one hundred and fifty to two hundred pounds, or more, offered for sale at three hundred Turkish piastres the dozen; in the neighbourhood of the Danube they fetch a little more.'"

but for all articles which Russia did not sell the markets were open without stint or limitation. It was this prohibition, not her own resources, that has made Russia what she is; and it was a singular effect of her greatest military triumph, that the war which placed in her hands the second Capital of the empire, and for the first time enabled her to cross the Balcan, ended with reversing the balance between the victor and the vanquished; for had the restriction, which the pressure of her blockade had caused to be removed, not been reimposed, no vessel would thereafter have passed on to the Black Sea, but would have laden on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The re-imposition of the restriction was now a new enterprise and its accomplishment a new victory; it was achieved in the Treaty of Adnoupe, by means of a stipulation for unlimited freedom of trade. Every Russian or every subject of the Porte who chose to go to Odessa for a passport, or to seek the protection of a Russian consulate, might traffic far and near free from all charges, save that of the scarcely more than nominal Russian tariff. Russia at the time had not one native subject or merchant in Turkey, but soon the whole country was covered with her "subjects;" they possessed themselves of all the channels of industry; they broke through the whole order of administration; every difference was solved in their favour by a threat; for to this commercial stipulation Russia had appended for any remissness or neglect the unparalleled penalty of "reprisals." The Russian Ambassador rode rough-shod over the empire; and the Porte, not knowing which way to turn, at last had recouse to a door of escape, afforded in a limitation of the old capitulations: to "prohibited articles" this freedom of commerce did not apply. She "prohibited" article after article, and then granted firmans for their exportation. No foreign power could now interfere: it was a matter between herself and her servants. The Treaty of Adrianople was more flagrantly violated than by the small abnormal duties hitherto imposed; nevertheless the terrors of the "casus belli" clause were left to slumber. Russia, ceased to be the patron of liberty of commerce, she retracted her demands, smoothed down her countenance, and sacrificed her *protegés*—"Her end was gained."*

* See "England, France, Russia, and Turkey," where these facts will be found published, in 1835, by the then English Ambassador at Constantinople.

But at this moment the Ottoman empire, shaken from without and agitated from within, was floating upon the tide of experiment. If old institutions were in danger, habitual abuses had also lost their hold. The result of 1829 could not be forgotten. The incessant vexations connected with trade, surrounded the doors of every minister with hosts of harassing supplicants; disorder would not be silenced, the precariousness of the position in reference to Russia by the very measures into which she had driven them, could not fail to obtrude itself upon graver minds, and above all the necessities of the Sultan, then intently engaged in creating an army—urged to devise, or at least to listen to schemes by which the restoration of commerce might be made subservient to the replenishing of the Treasury.* Thus arose the proposal made by Turkey, who had never entered into any Treaty, commercial or political, with a foreign power, and the mission of a special Ambassador to England with no less an object than the revision of the whole system of commercial legislation.

At this time, by the avowal of her minister, "the old channels had been blocked up." England's trade with her ancient customers had been cut off, and she required to bring new trafficking worlds into existence. The countries of the Continent had in peace combined to make commercial war on this nation, which, during the last struggle, had saved most of them from subjugation, subsidised while protecting them, and had been in the hour of victory as heedless of her interests, as in that of danger she had been prodigal of her blood. Mistaken theories in some; political animosity in others; in many both conjoined, had prompted a blockade of custom-houses, inflicting at once positive loss, and implanting notions inimical to her prosperity and feelings dangerous to her power.

Against this concert we had striven by professions of liberality, by reductions of duties, by statements of figures. We could appeal to resemblances of manners, community of science and literature, friendly recollections for benefits conferred, gratitude from dynasties, who owed to us their thrones or their existence. In this enterprise we had planned no less than thirty-two new commercial treaties; but all was in vain. Repulsed and discomfited we had turned from

* This idea was afterwards followed in the Budget of 1841, when it was proposed to meet a deficiency by a reduction of taxes.

the east to the west, and from the north to the south. The House of Brunswick arrayed all Germany in a hostile league—sympathetic France rejected our yarns — subsidies, auxiliaries, and all the muskets in the Tower could obtain no hospitality for our wares from the Houses of Bourbon and Braganza: while the new continent, rivalling the antipathies of the old, showed imperial and republican institutions, in one point at least united, alike deaf to the political economy of Downing Street. Till at last, sick of defeats, and worn with toil, the President of the Board of Trade exclaimed, "Thank God, we have done with commercial treaties."

How now stood the matter with Turkey? What sympathy had we to expect from her, we who had attempted to burn her capital, and who stood the avowed patron of her revolted subjects and the close ally of her deadly foe? Indeed, we ever professed community of interest, but ever exhibited animosity in act. We, burdened with duties her wares, granted to her no reciprocity—who alone in Europe—alone in the world—gave free admission to every product of our industry, suffered us to enjoy the carrying trade of her own coasts, conceded to us the faculty of internal traffic, and permitted to our subjects settled in her dominions the unshackled, unwatched, untaxed exercise of every municipal, commercial, and judicial right and function.

Turkey opens with you a negotiation with the view of improving commercial intercourse. You profess to have besides the commercial object a political one, that of counteracting Russia. Let us glance, then, at this point.

Turkey and Russia stand in commercial legislation, as the north and south poles. The one prohibits nearly all the manufactures of England, and seeks to force the imports of her raw produce; the other admits all the manufactures of England and prohibits the export of her raw produce. The foreign merchant in Russia is surrounded and hampered by the most minute and oppressive restrictions: he is in every point inferior to the native. The foreign merchant in Turkey enjoys the fullest immunities, and is placed above the native. The Russian system is the result of no theories—it is a mere calculation as to how commerce is to be used for political purposes. The Turkish system, in as far as it is restrictive, proceeds from no theories, but is the result of the success of Russia in interfering with her internal regulations. Turkey is

engaged in no design against any neighbour to carry thither, either political influence or restrictive system. Russia is engaged in designs against all her neighbours, and wherever she establishes her power, there follows her system. Against Russia England takes no step, either to enlighten the people or to resist the Government; but favours her commerce, befriends her political ends, lends to her the whole weight of her power to support her aggressions, and extend her system. At the time that this negotiation commenced our trade with Russia was declining and our trade with Turkey within a few years had quadrupled.* Yet it was not England who moved in the matter. With her activity pervading the world she had no time to consider what might be effected with the empire, through which flowed the Danube, and the Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates; which held in its hands the Isthmus of Suez and the Straits of the Dardanelles; which extended from the torrid zone to the snows of the Cancasus, from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf,—whose dominions in Europe, Africa, and Asia (exclusive of Arabia), equalled France, Germany, Italy, and Spain; which was all agricultural, and where freedom of trade was the law of the state, and borne down only by an interfering foreign power. This empire had to come to her to propose that mutual abolition of restriction which she in vain had been preaching all round the globe.

Why did the Sultan apply to a foreign power? How could England assist him in mere internal regulations? *He feared.* At that time at Sebastopol, the manœuvre of embarking, and disembarking 30,000 men was constantly practised, and the rapidity with which such an operation could be executed had been signally evinced in 1833. The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had just been submitted to by the Porte after in vain attempting to induce England to protect her from it (her secret communications for that purpose being betrayed to the Russian embassy): no sooner is she shackled than the English and French Governments make a naval demonstration against *her* for having had it imposed upon her—not against Russia who had imposed it. The Eygptian forces had indeed retired, but the army of Ibrahim Pasha might at any hour reappear on the Taurus. The new Turkish army, the Nizam, had

* In 1836 the exports to Turkey exceeded those to Russia: they had *doubled in four years.*

been nearly annihilated. Two-thirds of the empire were in a state, if not of open revolt, at least, in one which no way resembled submission. The Sultan well knew that, of all measures, the one which most would incense Russia was the opening of his ports. It was not merely the dread which one state may entertain for another by reason of weakness—the individual ministers feared for their lives. It was not the dread of one enemy, whatever the weapons he might employ—it was the certainty that in a rupture with Russia she would have no friend in the world.

These considerations prompted the embassy to England, and a direct appeal from the Sultan Mahmoud to William IV.* It was not that the Porte dreaded a declaration of war because she opened her ports, but that Russia would make a quarrel upon other ground, and in that quarrel obtain the support of England. Danger never presented itself to the Turkish ministers as proceeding *from Russia*, because there could be none if England were with Turkey; discussions with Russia were alarming, only because she always obtained the *co-operation of England*. However, England never ceased to repeat her earnest desire to support Turkey and oppose Russia, and words have their effect; therefore the Porte did not reason to a conclusion on the whole, but explained each act by a special cause, so that on every recurrence of a dilemma it again fluctuated between hope and fear, and remained incapable of any decision. It was not then, properly speaking, the support of England that they wanted, but—her neutrality: that could only be ensured by making her a party to the measure, which appeared to run on all-four with the interests of Great Britain and the opinions of the then administration.

But before this embassy reached the shores of England, the Tory ministry had come into power. The Duke of Wellington, conceiving that Turkey was utterly lost, and laying the blame upon his predecessors, refused to entertain any question, whether of a political or a commercial character. Soon, however, the other party returned to office, and expectation revived. England, indeed, at that time did not admit foreign grain; but Turkey's object was not to import corn into England, but to be able to export it from her own territory. The English administration was now of free-

* Mr. Blacque, charged with this important mission, was poisoned on his way.

trade and liberal principles, while the foreign minister was, of all living statesmen, emphatically the antagonist of Russia.*

I know not in what terms I am to describe the reception of the proposal by the new administration. Reception! it was scouted, hooted out of doors, stigmatised. By what withering epithet will the reader imagine or believe?—as—RUSSIAN! †

This was in January, 1835. The Porte, astounded and alarmed, hastened to withdraw its proposal; and I resolved now to endeavour to get it adopted by England and by her proposed to Turkey. Fortunately there was then on the throne a sovereign who believed it to be his right and duty to attend to those matters, which especially are confided and resigned to his prerogative. He examined with patience and care the whole case: when satisfied, he lost no opportunity, and spared no pains, to bring others to the same conclusion. Sir Herbert Taylor, his private secretary, applied to the subject his clear, judicious, and vigorous mind, and devoted to it his unwearying assiduity: the apparently hopeless task must over and over again have been abandoned, but for his aid, counsel, and encouragement. I was then also so fortunate as to possess the co-operation of the ambassador at Constantinople, who did then most heartily enter into those views,

* "The originator and signer of the quadruple treaty, which withdrew Spain from Russian influence; the statesman who embarked with such frankness and boldness in the constitutional league of the west, and who on the Indus and the Danube, the Persian Gulf and the Dardanelles, made the boldest stand of any European politician against the encroachments of Russia in Europe and in Asia." —*Morning Chronicle, January* 16, 1844.

The authorship of this article was, by the "Morning Herald," traced to the Minister himself; and the "Morning Chronicle" did not deny it, but only complained of the breach of editorial etiquette.

† "TO SIR HERBERT TAYLOR.

(Extract.) "*January* 20, 1835.

"I have just been dismayed to learn that Nouri Effendi has written to Constantinople, expressing all the discouragement and despair that Lord Palmerston had filled him with in their last interview, particularly his Lordship's observation, that my proposal for the tariff, that has cost so much to bring to the pitch where it now is, was a *Russian proposal.* This indeed is an act of suicide, and I am most anxious to know your opinion on the subject. Unless you have gained Lord Palmerston entirely—unless he understands the fault he has committed, I do not see what chance there is of my being of any—the slightest use, as serving the Government; and, on the other hand, I am sacrificing myself and the question.

"I have just learnt, also, that the mission of Ellis is in a state of abeyance, and that Mac Neill has come to the resolution of resigning his situation, unless the government adopts a more worthy policy."

and labour for their advancement both in Turkey and England.* So also the two under Secretaries of State, though in various degrees. I cannot omit the name of Sir John McNeill, afterwards envoy to Persia and author of the "Progress of Russia in the East:" of his co-operation I need not speak—we walked in one path. In fact, all the official staff of the Foreign Office, and the Board of Trade, were ranged on one side, the chiefs of the two departments excepted.

The treaty, rejected by England when proposed by Turkey, was within a few months adopted by the minister who had rejected it; and I was now commissioned on the part of the Foreign Office to discuss it with the Board of Trade, and sixteen months after it had been rejected as Russian by the chief of the Foreign Office, it was rejected because injurious to the Baltic trade by the chief of the Board of Trade.

It was finally settled *five days after* Mr. Poulett Thomson made this avowal. He made an attempt to induce me to admit of ten per cent. export duty on Turkish produce, a proposal which I successfully combatted, showing that the whole object of the negotiation would thereby be frustrated.

I now left for Constantinople, but the treaty was delayed till October, and then sent out with instructions to admit of no modification, and to be immediately presented. In May, 1837, I received my credentials with special instructions to undertake nothing while in charge of the embassy: I was immediately afterwards recalled. Two years had elapsed since the settlement of the conditions of the treaty, when it was suddenly taken up, and hurried through and signed. All the other measures of a similar nature had meanwhile been sacrificed.

* "My dear Sir,—By Mr. Urquhart's desire, I forward to you a Letter for Moosheer Ahmed Pasha, and also a copy of a Memoir respecting the commercial system of this country, &c.

"This Memoir, I think, deserves to be minutely explained to the Pasha, and studied by him.

"I am of opinion, that were it acted upon in its main points, it would produce the most magnificent results to the Ottoman empire.

"The latter part of the Memoir states the mode of acting, to which I have always looked as the certain and effectual means whereby to defeat Russia—means most easy to be applied by us, and which, in the application, will produce great benefit to England; independent of their political action.

"I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

"Yours very faithfully,

"Ponsonby."

I saw the official copy at Hall, Dec. 11th, 1838, and immediately denounced it as falsified. I shall now examine the treaty as it stands.

It assumes to be a contract in which England bargains for the abolition of prohibitions and monopolies by conceding a higher rate of duty. This increase amounts, upon English manufactured goods, to two per cent., if sent to the interior from the cities where imported, and upon the exportations from Turkey to nine per cent.; the old duty of three per cent. being still levied; thus making on importation three or five per cent., and on exportation twelve per cent. *In limine*, two questions arise, and they contain the whole case. Was an equivalent required? Was the concession so hampered of any value? That no equivalent was requisite must appear from what I have already stated, and will be made still more evident hereafter, and what illegal vexations could overbalance this legal burden, it is difficult to imagine.

Turkish exports must be classed in two categories. Many articles were nowhere subject to monopolies, and several provinces (containing ten million souls) were subject to no monopoly of any article. Silk, cotton, opium, tobacco, gums, dyes, &c., were perfectly free everywhere: grain, tallow, wool, timber were free in Syria,* Egypt, Wallachia, Servia, Moldavia, and Samos. In regard, then, to the first class of articles and to all articles in the cited provinces, the increased duty was a pure surrender of the rights of British subjects, and a gratuitous imposition on Turkish trade. Whatever the benefit in regard to the prohibited articles, I must observe, that as the treaty was a substitution of one kind of impost for another, the relief of a taxed article could not be obtained by the burdening of an untaxed one.†

* "*Aleppo, August* 3, 1843.

"The trade of the north of Syria, nor of Syria generally, derives no benefit by the abolition of monopolies; because, previous to the Convention, no commercial monopolies existed. The Convention in relation thereto cannot be considered a boon, nor in fact a compensation of any kind, to the trade of Great Britain with Syria; certainly not for having inflicted on its produce an exportation duty of 12 per cent., after the grower has paid on the spot the ushur of 10 per cent. to the government."—MR. WERRY.

† "The duty of 12 per cent. amounts, in reality, on many of the products of Turkey—especially the coarse ones—to a total prohibition. It is, therefore, a matter of trifling consideration to merchants, what estimate the tariff places on objects which the convention has now set without the sphere of speculation." —*Times.*

The Prohibitions were not permanent or universal, and might any day be unconditionally raised; firmans must be obtained on the payment of a certain sum; to this there was a limit, and if it would not pay it was not purchased. Firmans were yearly purchased for Mitylene, and under them oil was exported. Grain was likewise at times exported by similar firmans. What has been the effect of the new system? Mitylene exports no more oil, and Constantinople *imports* grain! Thus, then, your equivalent has on the free goods imposed an uncompensated burden, on the monopolised goods a tax which is a perfect prohibition! In the restricted provinces it has replaced a partial by a general impost, and into the free provinces introduced the prohibitive system. The articles which were obstructed before are obstructed now, and the articles that were free before are obstructed now.*

It required not to wait for the result to be certain that a duty of twelve per cent. was more than heavy articles, such as grain, Indian-corn, oil, and the like could bear. The absence of roads had been the subject of lamentation to all those who had taken an interest in the Ottoman empire,—and what did this mean save a charge on heavy goods? As it was, the whole country beyond 150 miles from a point of shipment was doomed, as far as external traffic went, to sterility; and the imposing of a duty of twelve per cent. was equivalent to lengthening the journey by fifty miles, or reducing to that extent the area of productive land; and this is the result of change introduced by system at the very moment that you are endeavouring (or professing to endeavour) to induce Turkey to call science to her aid in order to become a producing country. I have already stated that Mr. Poulett Thomson, a Baltic merchant and a sleeping partner in a Russian house, had proposed ten per cent. on Turkish exports, offering, on this condition, to withdraw his opposition to the treaty: he and I, opposed as we were in our objects, concurred in our belief that ten per cent. export duty would save the Russian trade and shut up the Turkish. But when my treaty came at length to be put in operation, I found it changed to his, and two per cent. added, to make assurance doubly sure.

But this was not all.

* What grain has been exported since 1839, has either been from provinces where the treaty has not come into operation, or during an increase of price sufficient to over-ride the tariff.

The twelve per cent. was not left to be paid at each port in kind, or at a valuation of each article, but a fixed amount in money was settled by Tariff for all the empire. At Constantinople a consumption duty of eight per cent. is levied on grain, and the price is raised by heavy transport charges; while corn is selling throughout the empire at seven piastres the kilo, it is fourteen piastres in the capital; and even contrasted with the ports of shipment the price may be stated at an advance of twenty per cent. In settling the tariff, the price of Constantinople, and not the average of the whole country was taken, and the twelve became twenty-five per cent.! At this time England was under the sliding-scale, which was fixed every fortnight by averages taken all over England; she therefore perfectly understood how such matters were to be managed. *It was England that proposed the scale of Constantinople prices.* She also suggested the specification of the "Constantinople kilo,"—the smallest measure, the highest price.

Nor was this all.

The foreigner enjoys greater privileges than the native; if then, the former was made to pay twelve per cent., the latter must pay it also. Goods derive their nationality from the trader, not from the place of production. What the foreigner buys is foreign and no longer Turkish merchandise, and the foreigner can trade in the interior. The word "exportation" was thus accepted in its first intention, and applied in its natural sense, and whatever was "carried out" paid the duty whether it went to the next Turkish town or to Canton. But foreign goods came in on the old duty of three per cent., and for Russia, who did not join the treaty, at one and a half per cent.: consequently at Constantinople or the other ports, Russian grain was charged but a third or a fourth of the duty imposed on Turkish grain. Constantinople now imports from Odessa to the value of 40,000,000 of piastres of wheat and flour. Such things may appear incredible to a person who reads them in Europe: they are so even in Turkey. A Turkish minister declared the fact here stated to be impossible, and would not believe it till he had it confirmed to him by the Customer. In fact the Turkish government were utterly in the dark respecting this negotiation from the beginning to the end.

It is the same with respect to every other article. Tobacco is charged in the tariff two piastres, all but four paras. The

tobacco exported from Syria to Alexandria averages two piastres in value; the duty amounts to ninety-five per cent.; consequently the tobacco of America, which at Alexandria pays but three per cent. (the additional two per cent. is only when sent into the interior), is brought across the Atlantic to undersell in the ports of Turkey its own produce. Take again a manufactured article, silk. The people of the Lebanon pay first a direct tax of ten per cent.* then an export duty of twelve per cent., which in reality is fifteen, before sending it to the towns where it is manufactured. Manufactured it is considered a new produce and is again subject to an *export* duty, which in this case is twenty per cent., so that an inhabitant of the Lebanon before he can wear his own silk, manufactured in a neighbouring town, has to pay thirty-five per cent. What is the result? He buys the silk, or the silk and cotton imitations of Switzerland and Prussia, which are charged but five per cent. Lest this appear an exaggeration, I subjoin an extract from the consul at Damascus. †

So far then the two preliminary questions are answered, and as no equivalent was required ‡ for the abrogation of monopolies, so has their abrogation on such conditions proved entirely sterile of all advantage. The commerce of the country has increased, but it has not been in those articles where alone it was desired to open

* I take the lowest legal sum; but I should be nearer the mark if I said twenty-five per cent.

† "MR. WOOD TO COLONEL ROSE.

"*Damascus, July* 6, 1843.

"In this Pashalic, the British merchants experience the disadvantage of having to pay the commutation duties specified in the Convention of the 16th August, 1838, without enjoying in return any advantage or privilege, whereas the Russian merchants do not pay them; in consequence of which, some British merchants carry on their transactions—be it in importations or exportations—in the name of some Russian merchants, or in that of some Native under Russian protection, for which they pay a percentage or commission to the latter, less than the commutation duties. So general is this practice, that many Natives, under Russian protection, have realised large sums of money from thus lending their names; which fact proves, in some degree, the real disadvantages experienced by British merchants in competition with Russian merchants. * * * *

"1st, That even before it came into operation, the trade in these parts was free, inasmuch as no monopolies existed of the produce of this Pashalic: 2ndly, That after the Convention, the duties and imposts levied on the staple articles of growth

‡ "The Sublime Porte doubts not that a benevolent *system of reciprocity* will soon come to be considered by the Government of your Majesty," &c.—*Speech of Nouri Effendi to William IV.*

it, and on which alone the burden of the treaty has fallen, because they are too bulky to be smuggled.

But England had the right in Turkey by the capitulations of exporting and importing all articles on the payment of three per cent. and "nothing more."* No vexation could therefore exist save by her sufferance, and to resist all such she required no new Treaty: † on this head there cannot be a shadow of doubt; she may have neglected to exercise this power, but from the moment that she chose to do so, it was in her hands: what use could there be in new Treaties if old ones were not executed? But let us grant that the stipulations were not precise and specific enough—then England possessed the right of the "most favoured nation:" ‡ this Turkey never did nor would contest, and as we shall presently see would have been too happy if she had claimed it. The seventh article of the Treaty of Adrianople was framed to meet every supposable case, and conferred the most absolute power of forcing its execution.‡

and manufacture have been greatly increased; for instance, the articles of oil and silk are liable to the following duties and imposts, or internal duties:—

"Oil. 1st. 10 per cent. paid by the grower, under the title of tithes.
2nd. 10 per cent. paid by the grower to the ispahis or yeomanry.
3rd. 12 per cent. customs, on being sent into the interior for internal consumption.
4th. 40 per cent., or 300 piastres per cantar, when it is purchased by the manufacturers of soap.
5th. 12 per cent. customs, on its being sent to any other place after it has been manufactured into soap.

84 per cent. in all.

"Silk. 1st. 10 per cent. paid by the grower, under the title of Miri.
2nd. 12 per cent. customs, on its being sent from one city to another.
3rd. 12 per cent. customs, on its being manufactured into stuffs.
4th. 12 per cent. customs, on the stuffs being made into cloths for the use of the inhabitants of the interior.

46 per cent. in all.

"Although soap purchased by the British merchants, for exportation. would be liable to the full duty of 84 per cent., yet silk would only have to pay 22 per cent. in its raw state, and 34 per cent. when manufactured into stuffs."

* "CLAUSE 30.—That having once paid the customs at the ports, not an asper more shall be taken or demanded." See also Clauses 31, 34, 50, 51, 52, 53.

† "CLAUSE 18.—All the capitulations, privileges, and articles granted to the French government, and other powers, having been in like manner granted to the English." See also Clauses 44, 48.

‡ See this Article, appended at the end.

Your professed object was the development of the agricultural resources of Turkey. If an equivalent was necessary, surely it must have been laid upon British imports not upon Turkish exports. You invent a novel distinction between British imports and Turkish exports to frustrate your very object! The aggregate increase is ten per cent.—say that this is the equivalent required. Why not halve it? five on imports, five on exports. The only explanation that ever has been offered for this scheme was that of Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, on the 1st March, 1847, when he said, "You cannot go to the minister of a foreign power with a draft in one hand and a pen in the other, and say, 'There, sir, sign that or jump out of the window.'" But it has not been observed that this was said particularly not with reference to the ten per cent. on exports, but to the two per cent. on British goods carried into the interior. As to the export duty it was *imposed* by England. Such is the explanation of the Turkish minister. I did not, I could not fail, to ask an explanation from a Government, who, at my suggestion, had entertained the plan and had offered to appoint me its representative in London to carry it out: the answer I received was, "What could we do: *it was the condition on which England granted her support against Mehemet Ali.*" So that, in fact, the English minister had literally applied the threat, which he declared to be impossible.

Finally: the Treaty did not abrogate monopolies, nor being abrogated does it prevent their reimposition. They were abrogated by the act of the Turkish Government,* and the wording of the Treaty, as we shall presently see, deprives England of all powers under it, of resisting the imposition of every tax; and further deprives her of the rights which she possessed, under the old Capitulations.

The negotiation, which commenced with the view of setting free the ports of Turkey, has ended with sealing them up. It has, in a word, at the moment when Turkey was about to abandon its

* "En effet, après l'abolition de tous les drois intérieurs qui ont été remplacé par le droit de 9 per cent., payable à l'exportation, et de deux sur l'emportation, nous voyons resusciter tous les jours les anciens *droits qui etoient tombés en desuetude avant d'être supprimés par les traités.*"—*The Consul General of Russia to the Pasha of Beyrout*, 26 *March*, 1850.

prohibitions, substituted for them prohibitory duties. This is the measure for which the English minister has claimed, and England and Europe have admitted his claim, credit for having over-mastered and outwitted the cabinet of St. Petersburgh on the field of all its triumphs; this is the Treaty which all Europe has rushed in hot haste to join, believing it to be a masterpiece of commercial legislation and of political design.

The first Treaty secured :—

1st. The "most favoured nation" clause.

2nd. The privileges of the British merchants to subjects of Turkey..

3rd. The duty on imports retained at three per cent.; for exports the scale to rise or fall on each article according to the difference between its value in the markets of Turkey and Europe, for which a commission of merchants was to be appointed : in no case the sum to exceed that previously paid.

4th. Transit free.

5th. To come into operation only when all powers had joined.

The negotiation was to have been secret, and when settled between England and the Porte, they were conjointly to address themselves to the other powers to obtain their adhesion. No one would have gained by standing aloof.

This was the Treaty as accepted by the Board of Trade, by it proposed to the Foreign Office and so settled. As signed, it stood as follows :—

1st. The "most favoured nation" clause.

2nd. Subjection of the English merchants in regard to internal trade to the duties paid by the subjects of the Porte, and not paid by other nations.

3rd. The concession of the right of internal legislation as against Treaties with foreign Powers.

4th. Imports raised from three to five per cent. Exports from three to twelve : one and the same sum for all articles whether they could bear it or not.

5th. Transit charged at three per cent.

6th. To come into operation although no other nation joined.

This Treaty was still considered as the original one; Lord Palmerston said that the two "differed in no material respect."

The alterations were made so as to appear to secure additional advantage. The British merchant is made to pay "as much" as the Turkish subject, by means of the words he shall pay "no more;" the stipulation abrogating the "most favoured nation" clause, appears to unite the privileges of the most favoured subject to those of the most favoured nation. I intended here to review the explanation given by Lord Palmerston in the House of the difference between the two Treaties, and to which by one of those proceedings which are admitted as parliamentary, I was prevented from replying; but I find the task so difficult at once and so needless, that I content myself with quoting his wonderful words.*

From the hour that the Treaty came into operation no advantage was taken of the first clause. It was not that Turkey attempted to object—we have it on official authority that the Porte had made arrangements to indemnify the farmers of customs, as she had imagined she had signed a Treaty by which the English duties were to be reduced. One of our consuls fell into the same mistake and demanded the repayment of duties on a cargo already shipped.† The money was repaid.

Of course the Turkish government were put forward to ask the increase of duty. They had repeatedly themselves asked for five per cent.; but I assert they had been brought to demand on the contrary, the reduction of British duties,‡ and that the Porte was ready to accede, and had it been presented by Lord Ponsonby, was ready to accept the original Treaty or draft as sent out in 1837. He indeed expressed himself differently, because —Russia was "*all powerful;*" § I assert the contrary. Lord Ponsonby must have been at that time instructed to sacrifice

* See Note 3 to this Part.

† See Blue Book, despatch of Mr. Young; Jaffa, 14th *December*, 1839. The sum paid had been 1113 piastres, according to the old English tariff, but by the Russian tariff the duty amounted only to 67 piastres, or ¾ per cent. on the article, which was soap. 1046 piastres were repaid.

‡ See Appended Note No. 1., Address of Nouri Effendi to William IV.

§ Lord Ponsonby, in a letter to me, quoted in the published correspondence, says:—"I wrote to you when you were away, that I was sure the agitation of it (the treaty) would lead to nothing like a settlement. I say, that I have not the smallest expectation of its being accepted. Russian interests wonld be deeply affected by it. The Russians are not, I must presume, ignorant of the consequences of it; and I know they are at this moment *all powerful.*"

the Treaty; it was requisite that he should, for otherwise it would have been at once carried into effect.

The truly marvellous portion of this negotiation is, after all, the adhesion of the other powers. The abolition of monopolies being effected by the English Treaty, why should France submit to a gratuitous charge? The French merchants memorialised their Ambassador, who having received instructions to negotiate a Treaty similar to the English, delayed, relying on the memorial, and wrote home to say that he could obtain more favourable terms. He was answered by peremptory orders. No reasons were assigned, no objections made to the statements of the merchants, and no explanation offered. The French government "had yielded this point to England." That was all!

The French merchants, as soon as the Treaty was signed, demanded the execution of the first clause. They were answered that a "*tacit agreement* existed between the powers not to require in that respect the execution of the Treaty!" One of them exclaimed, "Had Turkey no friend when she signed that Treaty?" —Had France no friend when she joined it?

Austria's repugnance was openly avowed, yet she, too, yielded to England as regarded the trade of the Mediterranean; but retained her old rights for the land trade!

Every cabinet of Europe was brought to surrender its rights and betray its people's interests; not a single power, however great, or however small, stood out. Russia was left alone to play the part of antagonist, and to realise the profits of their self-imposed disabilities.

One important truth is here brought to light. Whenever England takes a course having in view, or being supposed to have in view, the maintenance of public law—that is to say opposition to the only power which seeks to subvert it—she is immediately followed by every state and government of Europe. She has been so in a measure utterly preposterous: how, then, would she be supported in a noble and generous purpose? A fact like this shows that the originality of design, or the hostility of dispositions, we lend to France, are but supposititious; and that the obstructions we there meet with, or the dangers we may thence apprehend, are solely, in as far as they may be or become real, of our own creating.

It will be recollected that it had been treated by Russia, not merely as a hostile, but as a perfidious measure. She coupled it with the occupation of Carack, as acts forcing her to have recourse to arms, laying "on England the terrible responsibility of such a conflagration." * In her avowed, as in her official organs, she washed her hands, and threatened to retrieve at Calcutta the defeat she had experienced on the Bosphorus; but in the manner of these threats she could not suppress her exultation, and on the very day that the Treaty was settled at the Board of Trade, these words were published in the "Frankfort Journal"—

"We will make their profoundest combinations and master strokes of design, the pivots of our policy, and the instruments of our greatness."

On the other hand the English journals, and especially those connected with the foreign department, showed that this Treaty (the original one) would transfer from Russia to Turkey that European demand of raw materials by which she (Russia) had profitted within the century to the amount of two hundred and sixty millions sterling. Was it not, then, natural for the statesmen of Europe, ignorant of everything save—opinions; blind of eyes, save for—print; to believe that here was a mighty struggle going on between Russia and England? When at last the Treaty was concluded, pompously announced from the throne, extolled by the opposition, hailed with raptures by the nation,† who but those who knew that the statesmen and the cabinets of Europe were but the tools with which she worked, could have suspected that the whole was a fraud? What proof would you require that it was so? —That she herself should join? Well, after seven years, she has done so!

Did England, in 1838, make no endeavour with Russia? Did her influence fail in that quarter? If Russia stood aloof, was it by mere indifference? The Treaty either served her, or threatened her. In the one case, why did she not join; in the other, why did she

* "Odessa Gazette."

† "It may be assumed, without any unseemly exaggeration of self-deluding triumph, that by the prudence of Lord Palmerston and the efforts of Lord Ponsonby, seconded by fortunate dispositions in the Court of Vienna and of the Porte, Russian influence has sustained a signal defeat—a defeat which arms cannot retrieve, which bravado cannot efface nor menace, nor perversion repair."—*British and Foreign Review.*

not oppose? While any power stood out, the Treaty was inoperative, because the merchants of the dissenting power, and through them all other merchants, rode right over it. Had she not influence with one? If not *one* stood out, clearly she was not opposed. Why then did she not join? Because by her simulated opposition the English ministry got the other powers to concur. When all had joined, she remained with a magnificent position. Her merchants could import at one half the duty paid by the merchants of all other powers, and export at one quarter, so that all her triumphs had conferred upon her no privileges to be compared with those which she reaped from a Treaty, which all Europe deemed to be a blow, levelled at her existence; well might she boast that she would convert into the pivots of her policy the master strokes of their design. Why again sacrifice this—*Why did she join?*

A new administration had come into power in England. Remonstrances poured in upon it from every quarter. English and all other merchants were forced, in order to carry on their trade, to borrow the names of Russian firms, or obtained from the Custom-house accommodations by threatening to do so.* The first remedy that presented itself was to revise the Treaty; and so evidently necessary did this appear, that the Turkish government and the Customers entered into an agreement in prospect of the reduction.† But means were found to lead them away from any idea so sane as this. They were set upon devising a process for

* Col. Rose writes, on the 7th September, 1843:—"An unanswerable fact proves the superiority of the advantage which the Russian merchant now enjoys over the British merchant. I know that a British merchant gave 1 per cent. to a person trading as a Russian merchant, whom I also know, to trade as a Russian merchant in his name; and I further know, that a sort of national pride alone has prevented the rest of the British merchants in Syria, from doing the same."

† "BEYROUT, *6th July*, 1843,

"Even the Custom-house appaltators here, sensible of the advantages enjoyed by the Russian trade, and foreseeing the probability in consequence of a modification of the English Convention, have *stipulated with the Government that they are to be indemnified* for the loss they will sustain should the modification take place. . . .

"Need a clearer proof be adduced of the advantages which Russia has gained by the treaty, than the fact that *a crowd of nominal Russian merchants has sprung up one hardly knows from where, since it came into operation.*"—*Conjoint Despatch of* COLONEL ROSE *and* MR. MOORE (*Consul-General for Syria and Consul of Beyrout.*)

equalising the duty between the British and Russian by *making the native dealer who sold to or bought from the Russian pay an illegal tax.* The plan designated by one of their own agents, "a bold and unexpected attempt" — which he attributed to Turkey—was met by the Russian agents by an "armed janissary" sent to embark the goods "by force." *

Puzzled and confounded by the working of a measure which, when in opposition, they had hastened to extol; the new administration now sent about to the consuls and merchants to ask their opinion, and it was this unanswerable question which they put forth—Shall we keep the third clause, or, abandoning it, take to the first? Shall we retain the disadvantages of the Treaty or shall we demand the *greater* advantages of the Russian merchant? Here are the very words of Lord Aberdeen :—

"WHETHER the *dis*advantages under which British merchants labour, are of such an *extent* AS to render it *more* advantageous to Great Britain for Her Majesty's Government to claim the *benefit* of the First Article of the Convention, AND insist upon British merchants being placed on the same footing with Russian merchants, ALTHOUGH such a course might lead to the sacrifice of *whatever* advantages the British trader now enjoys under the Convention, BY the substitution of fixed for variable and arbitrary duties of import and export, and by the abolition of monopolies and other ancient sources of vexation and annoyance?"

There can be no alternative between two clauses of a Treaty; if

* THE AMBASSADOR.—"Upon my inquiring of the Minister of Foreign Affairs *in what manner the really important difference* between 12 and 5 per cent. paid by British merchants on exports and imports respectively, and the uniform duty of 3 per cent. paid on both by Russian traders *was removed*, his Excellency assured me that in BOTH cases *that difference* (!) was levied upon the Turkish subject—in the former as a seller, in the latter as a purchaser."—*Sir Stratford Canning*, (*18th Nov.*, 1842.)

THE CONSUL-GENERAL.—"A Russian merchant, or at any rate trading as such, purchased lately a large quantity of silk, but the appaltator having been unable to discover the sellers or producers thereof, in order to exact the 9 per cent. export duty from them, objected to his so doing. . . . The cancellier proceeded to the Custom-house with a janissary armed, and declared his determination to embark the silk by force. . . . The Custom-house officer applied to Assad Pasha for support, to prevent its embarkation; but in consequence of a communication from the Russian cancellier, his Excellency ordered the appaltators to allow the embarkation of the bales on the payment *of the 3 per cent. only!*"—*Colonel Rose* (*7th September*).

you have something to choose between, you have nothing to stand upon. If rights are granted, it is for you to take them up, but you had none by the first article, for it is general, and the obligations incurred by the third are special. Never was there exhibition equal to the three volumes of correspondence presented to Parliament. They, however, contain one passage of sense which settles the matter.

"We cannot see how our being placed on the footing of the most favoured nation, can in any way subject us to variable and arbitrary duties of import and export. The Russian merchants and others, under Russian protection, are liable to no variable or arbitrary duty."*

Notwithstanding all this, when Lord Palmerston is at length charged in the House with surrendering the rights of the "most favoured nation," he meets it boldly by emphatically declaring that:—

"The hon. and learned gentleman really has not read the treaty. He may lift up his eyes at that statement; but I repeat that he cannot have read the treaty, or, if he has, he has not read it correctly. He stated, that by the treaty as signed, British subjects and ships were not placed upon the footing of the most favoured nation; if the hon. Member will only look at the treaty itself, he will see that the first Article states—

'All former rights and privileges are confirmed, and all rights, privileges, and immunities, which the Sublime Porte now grants, or may hereafter grant, to the ships and subjects of any other foreign Power, or which it may suffer [not merely grant] the ships and subjects of any other foreign Power to enjoy, shall equally be granted, exercised, and enjoyed by the subjects and the ships of Great Britain.'

If that is not securing to British subjects and ships all the advantages enjoyed by the most favoured nations, I do not know how the grant of those advantages could have been expressed in words more clear or more comprehensive. It is not only so in the plain meaning of the words, *but it has been so acknowledged since by both parties. We have acted upon that interpretation.* Indeed, there could have been no interpretation required in the matter, because the words are as clear and plain as words can be, and from them it is clear that British subjects and ships are upon the footing of the most favoured nation."

* Mr. Scott of Shimlan.

This statement was received with loud cheers. Good God! why print volumes of correspondence! Varro did not despair after Cannæ; he must, after this.

The British officials put up their prayers for one, one only, boon, —that Russia may join—then is covered all their sin and hidden all their shame. Little did they see, and less did they care, that her adhesion was a blow to British trade, because it enjoyed the immunity of the Russian subject—because Russian subjects either trafficked in British goods, or lent the benefit of their name to her merchants. When a favourable reception was to be managed for the Czar, on his visit to London, the Russian cabinet could devise no better plan than a *promise* to gratify their wishes. Their joy was unbounded as their belief: Lord Aberdeen solemnly announced the event to Parliament, and assured it that "Her Majesty's government had not been idle in this matter." But the promise, declaration, and activity went for what they were worth. She stuck to her "*base, positive et invariable,*" stood unmoved, though beaten black and blue with blue books, until, in the midst of the din of the Spanish marriages, and the annexation of Cracow, and in anticipation of the effects of the extraordinary exportation which commenced in that year, she quietly and unobtrusively, without the observation of a single soul, or the comment of a single journal, joined the Treaty.

Here was cut the ground from under our feet. All interest in the subject was suddenly chilled—extinguished. The English merchant was no longer injured or irritated at the sight of her immunity, and yet in what age do we live, when the fact alone of her joining, did not suffice to startle Europe into at least curiosity? Could stultification be more complete on the one side, or demonstration on the other?

While in Europe, in 1838, the Russian Cabinet was assuming towards the Treaty this air of indignation and defiance, she was quietly preparing in the East the occasion for shifting her ground. An elaborate despatch was transmitted to the ambassador at Constantinople, and communicated to the consuls. It contains the views of the Cabinet on this important matter. The question appeared exactly in the same light to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh as to that of London! but apprehensive that the "loose wording" of the document may frustrate the proposed end, and enable

the Turkish Government at a future period either to impose new duties or to re-impose the old monopolies, it delays taking any decision until it has seen "what results shall manifest themselves."

In 1846 she had then obtained the desired results; they must have been either favourable or unfavourable. If the first, the monopolies were abandoned. Why then impose on her trade a burden of 12 per cent.—why sacrifice all the advantages which she exclusively possessed? In that year her courage was not low, nor England's mettle high. She had usurped Cracow, and England and France were protesting against each other about a treaty (Utrecht), which had ceased to exist fifty years before. If unfavourable—if, in the words of one of her agents, "worse than the abuses were now reappearing, which had fallen into desuetude even before the Treaty was signed," why exchange the stringent clauses of the Treaty of Adrianople for the loose wording of the English Treaty? She has herself placed herself between two alternatives, each incompatible with a *bonâ fide* transaction. If she, who has made that right the chief reward of her campaigns of 1829, abandons the faculty to interfere in the internal administration of the Porte, it is clear that she has gained something more important. If she surrenders a clause, which was the most monstrous assumption which, up to that period, one State had ever attempted over another, she secured something more monstrous still. We have here the moves and doubles of a simulated conflict between confederates, not of a game such as two Governments may play against each other.

Against Russia Europe will never strike a blow. In the contest of the strong mind and the weak no idea of relative power can find place: the clear head will beat the strong hand, as surely as the reason of the man will triumph over the instinct of the brute. Therefore it was that I attached paramount importance to this Treaty, which uttered the relative bases of the two powers.

Every remarkable man for the last fifty years has prognosticated the extinction of the Western States and the triumph over them of Russia. Several of these were themselves Sovereigns and Ministers, and had practical means of working out their thoughts. Not one of them has succeeded—not one of them has even approached towards the way to success. Russia owes infinitely

more to the energy with which she has been opposed by men of first-rate genius and highest station than to the devotedness with which she has been served either by her own officials or by the traitors whom she has had at all times at her disposal in foreign Cabinets. It is not the difficulty of the enterprise that has caused these failures. When in the smallest state of Europe (say, for instance, Sardinia,) there arises a man equal to her in mind—otherwise there can be no contest—Russia's ambition will have passed away into a dream. The mere cessation of diplomatic action emanating from Paris or from London would allow the world to recover. Like a web that is wove, and which requires the continuity of thread, and the uninterruptedness of labour, so her position based upon contrivance depends upon the continued strain of the props and levers, foreign as well as domestic, which have raised her up. I take an illustration from the other hemisphere:

A dozen years ago, the plains watered by the Parana and the Plata, fertile as they are vast, where herds might multiply like the sands of the sea, towards which a tide of emigration had set in from Europe, gave promise of an enormous supply of hides and tallow, at a trifling cost. These prospects were overcast: internal dissensions arose, and England and France commenced a series of the strangest freaks that ever have been seen. One of the leading merchants was sent over in 1847 to see what could be done. He came to me with his case. After he had concluded his narrative, he asked me if I could explain the source of the malignity of which they were the object. I asked him in turn what were the articles of export—to what amount—and what the increase would have been had not England and France interfered? He replied, that a million and a quarter sterling worth of hides, tallow, &c. were exported, and had they been let alone, or the matter once for all settled, they would be now exporting to the value of six, eight, or ten millions. I then asked him the amount of and nature of export from the Baltic. He commenced to reply, when, suddenly, he stopped, and after a pause, exclaimed, "Sir! you have caused the scales to fall from my eyes." He then informed me of a variety of circumstances which had never struck him before, all indicating the connection of Russia with those countries, and it even appeared that the brig of war which had been captured by the blockading squadron was a present from the Czar to Rosas.

Infer then the effect on Russia of the cessation of the diplomatic action of England and France on the States of La Plata. Directly, she can do nothing in these Provinces. Therefore, I say, that it suffices that Europe should interrupt diplomatic action, for awhile, for Russia to be overthrown.

This being understood, it will be seen why Pitt, Napoleon, Talleyrand, Gustavus III., have failed. They knew nothing of commerce; they could not counteract a system of which commerce formed the basis, whether it be in the resources it supplied, in the ends to which it was directed, the intelligence which it possessed, or the resolution with which it was animated.

The proposed Treaty met her on her own ground. Being simply assented to by England, its effects would have been quietly, gradually, without decision to take, or effort to make, to withdraw from her the means of aggression. It was assented to, and then a proposal, which Lord Palmerston had resisted as a Russian scheme, which Mr. Poulett Thomson had rejected, because destructive of the Baltic trade, came forth indeed a Russian scheme and no longer alarming to the Baltic trade.

Let it not be supposed that any wrong was here intended to Russia: there was no purpose to injure the legitimate Baltic trade, and all that was proposed was, to allow the English merchant to buy on the same terms as in Russia. The project might have its political side; it had also its commercial. It opened to England a new and a vast supply derived from a country where our export trade is only hampered by our inability to obtain returns. From Syria, we take one and sell forty. Russia, for her raw materials, requires gold, and affords no market, far less a prospective field for our wares. With Turkey the whole transport would be effected in British bottoms.

Had the British minister been *constrained*, in 1838, to admit these high duties, he would subsequently have made some endeavours to reduce them. France and Austria had yielded unwillingly: he was sure of their backing; Russia assumed to be on the same line; not only she professed to desire unlimited freedom of trade, but she exacted it. How, then, is it that England could never obtain a single reduction? The little king of Greece is not so helpless.*

* The British consul of Janina (12th July, 1843) arguing that it is easy to

Were these high duties a principle of Turkish legislation, or were there any prejudices of the people in favour of them, or any profit realised by the Treasury, then one might imagine scruples or difficulties; but they are in opposition to the precepts of the religion—to the habits of the Government—to the prejudices of the people—and inflict a heavy loss on the revenue. Not a penny is the Government the richer for its duty on grain. The Treasury receives the tithes: what would be its profit were grain free? In fact, ten per cent. is paid in every case on exportation, independently of any Customs' duty. The Governments of Europe have lost the tithes, so that it is with the greatest difficulty that they can impose direct taxes, and they are driven to tax trade. The interest of the Turkish government is therefore that of proprietor, not of tax-gatherer; the tax-gatherer is its enemy by taxing exports, so as to stop the demand; rendering unsaleable its own goods and unrealisable its own revenue. The English minister, then, could have no scruples in endeavouring to reduce duties, and would have encountered no obstacle; but he was looking the other way. The commissioners named to draw up the Tariff, prepared a report on the grain trade, urging its free exportation: the English ambassador refused to transmit it.

The servants of the British government in Syria reported home that a civil war must be the inevitable consequence of imposing the Tariff on the Lebanon. They were themselves empowered by the Turkish government to modify it; but they declared to the people that they had no such power, and required them, unconditionally, to submit to it. They then induced the Pasha to suppress the remonstrance of the people, "the favourable consideration of which" they had themselves declared could alone avert a rebellion. The British government had, in 1840, pledged itself to the people, if they joined in the expulsion of Ibrahim Pasha, to obtain from the Porte the reduction of the then existing duties!

obtain reductions by taking advantage of *concessions made by other States*, mentions "a secret understanding come to with a Hellenic merchant in 1841, for an abatement of duty on a cargo of wool;" another reduction of the duty on wool in favour of the inhabitants from 24 piastres 24 paras to 21-10, "which privilege was also shared by Hellenic merchants," and that "the same rule was followed in a reduction of the duty on valonia to 40 piastres from 68 piastres as is established by our tariff:" and he says that he had, in consequence, claimed and obtained the same concessions for British merchants.

In the Danubian Provinces, the Porte is prohibited by the Capitulations under which they are annexed, from imposing any duty on their trade. For twelve years a struggle has been going on to subvert their rights as well as to annihilate their resources by means of the imposition of the English Tariff. The Chambers and the Princes, as will be found in the blue books, remonstrated and protested against it. It was no secret that Russia exerted all her influence in its favour; the knowledge of this fact reached even the Board of Trade, as it is mentioned in the semi-official publication of Mr. MacGregor.* However, after one or two elections of Princes, she has got them on her side; and the Customs' duty having been resigned to the Princes as a part of their civil list, it was no difficult matter to persuade them that an augmentian of duties was an augmentation of revenue. They, consequently, have made urgent representations at Vienna to induce the Austrian government to surrender her old treaties for the Provinces, as she had done for the Mediterranean. Her refusal hitherto has alone prevented the English Treaty from becoming here also the law and curse of the land. Exportation is restricted to the narrow border along the banks of the Danube, where the cost was lowest; but if the twelve per cent. be imposed, that strip of land available for exportation will be, as is calculated by agriculturists on the spot, reduced one half.

Now the Treaty as it originally stood would have opened for the Provinces free transit with the interior. It would have abrogated entirely the duty upon the export of grain, and arrested all that interference on the part of Russia, which, as we have seen, stopped the rapid development of their resources in 1836; consequently, in the history of the closing of the Danube, the perversion of the English Treaty is one of the important epochs.

I have now concluded my summary of the transaction, but I cannot leave the subject without endeavouring to dispel a fatal delusion as to a matter of fact, under which the Turkish government labours, and which is at present leading it into the most erroneous opinions.

* "The efforts of the Provincial Chamber to induce the Government to modify this exorbitant duty, have produced but a slight relaxation of it. They were secretly informed that if they became pressing in their demands, Russia, in order to protect her own trade, would find herself constrained to prohibit exportation all together. This hint was wisely received."—M'GREGOR'S *Statistics*, vol. ii., p. 52.

I was perfectly astonished when informed by a minister of the Porte, that the Treaty was a good Treaty because it procured them between 800,000*l.* and 900,000*l.*

Egypt, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia are not included in the Customs' farms. This revenue is, therefore, derived from the remainder of the Empire, the exports from which for last year amounted to 1,850,000*l.** The importation, including the goods that pass in transit to Persia, and some portion of that to the Danubian Provinces, is 4,250,000*l.* I may then set down in rouud numbers, 200,000,000 of piastres exportation, 350,000,000 importation, and 100,000,000 transit.

Export 200,000,000 at 12 per cent. . . .	Piastres	24,000,000
Import 360,000,000 „ 5 „		17,500,000
Transit 100,000,000 „ 3 „		3,000,000
		44,500,000
Deduct for consumption of towns at 3, instead of 5 per cent.		2,500,000
	Piastres	42,000,000

Thus, 42,000,000 is all that could possibly be received if the preventive service were perfection itself, if there were no mistakes and no cost of collection. But contraband is so easy that we must deduct 15 per cent. on the duty received on exportation: this will leave 18,000,000. Then come the expenses of collection, of the preventive service, the interest upon the capital advanced, and the profits of the Farmers, which are enormous. These we cannot set down at less than 25 per cent. upon the whole, and the 42 millions are reduced to 25. But let us say 30,000,000: how then can 86,000,000 be received by the Treasury? 56,000,000, which the Government cannot explain! Yet the the explanation is easy, and I have already given it. Every province of the Ottoman empire has become a foreign state for its neighbour, every change in the nature of an article subjects it to a new duty, and every change effected in a foreign article subjects it to the duty of native produce. The Customers roam throughout the land levying Black Mail upon the villages, for to no other form of taxation can this imposition be compared.†

* See Appended Note, No. 4.

† In a table of the farms belonging to the Grand Vizier, drawn up by the well-

This was the Treaty that was to abolish the old internal duties.*

In the history of human folly, never has there been devised any thing so extravagant, in the history of human oppression, any thing so wicked. For this 600,000*l.* the Armenians purchase the right of universal plunder, and they realise, it is said, an equal sum, which, by directing in a stream of corruption on the Turkish government, secures to them impunity.

But this, it may be said, is not the fault of the English government. What! Did you not profess to regulate the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire? Did you not parade your Treaty as a master-stroke of design? Did you not pretend that you had triumphed over Russia "on the Bosphorus and the Danube!"

In this sum, 36,000*l.* are derived from the tax on grain; but that is not a tax upon Turkish grain exported, it is a tax either upon Russian grain imported or Turkish grain consumed. The export duty kills itself, the whole system of exchange is disturbed, the impulse that the Tariff gives to importation with the check that it gives to exportation, drains the country of its specie: the Government is constantly in the fear of commercial bankruptcy, and it expends in money advanced to its banking establishment for the purpose of negotiating its bills and keeping the exchange at 110, as much as it receives from the whole produce of the 12 per cent. duty on exportation; in addition to this it pays 40,000*l.* a-year to Russia for the grain which, under this system, it imports, while the additional tithes alone would amount to 300,000*l.* The Tariff, after all, has done trifling damage as yet: it must ultimately bring the dismemberment of the empire itself.

Whether Turkey could supply grain to Europe or not, would have remained a problem under the Treaty had it not been for the dearth of 1846—

The price of grain in Roumelia, on the thrashing floor, averages seven piastres the kilo, or one shilling and three pence the

known agriculturist, Joanesco, in the expenses of every village, I observe an item, *Gumbruk*,—that is, "Customs,"—with so many hundred piastres against it. On inquiring, he explained that the Custom-house officers came and asked a sum or composition in order to leave the village at peace.

* "It was a great object to us to abolish those interior duties."—*Lord Palmerston, 1st March*, 1848.

English bushel. At the end of 1846, it began to rise, and soon attained twenty piastres; and the outpouring commenced. From the walls of Vienna might be traced, along the plain, as far as eye could reach, double lines of waggons, the one arriving full, the other returning empty; night and day, week after week, month after month, this stream continued to flow, and when the price no longer permitted exportation, the granaries were still full. By the Black Sea alone, twenty millions of kilos were exported, and Turkey received between two and three millions sterling. Had this supply not been forthcoming, this money would have gone to Russia, while she might have increased the price, and thereby, the severity of the famine in Europe. This exportation was not the result of a particularly favourable season—the high price had tided traffic over the bar of the Tariff. Now Russia had practically before her eyes the terrible consequences of its abrogation, and she hastened to renounce the suggestive privileges which she had hitherto maintained.

This is the result—England puts herself in Russia's shoes. It is England that has to exert her influence to obstruct the development of the territorial resources of Turkey. Every attempt to facilitate trade is now broken by the interposition of the English embassy. "You have," said M. Thiers, on a memorable occasion, "adopted the interests of Russia for your own. You have nothing more to do." Say rather you have taken her work off her hands.

I am far from having exhausted the subject, but I trust that the foregoing pages will justify the declaration made in the House of Commons the 23rd of February, 1848, but for substantiating which, an opportunity was not afforded me:—

"Now I am prepared to prove, and I stake my character upon it, and the House will be justified in applying any censure to me if I fail, that in one negotiation which has been referred to to-night, viz., that of the Treaty of Turkey, there have been changes made in the stipulations, with the view and with the effect of securing the interests of Russia. Sir, I am possessed of documents so numerous and minute, and of testimony so consecutive, that no body of men, sitting down with the purpose of ascertaining the

facts, can arrive at any other conclusion, save that of intentional falsification to serve the interests of a Foreign Power."

This negotiation was taken up by the Porte and the English government successively in consequence of my own endeavours. It was a plan affecting the most important interests, and accepted because admitted to have an influence on the balance of European power. I, the originator of the Treaty, come forward to denounce it as fraudulently altered to serve an opposite purpose. In the course of the negotiation, I am myself charged with being the agent of a foreign power by a person standing in the grave position of Minister of England. I charge two Members of the British Cabinet with acting for the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. The result of the first of these allegations is, my appointment to a post of weight and confidence; of the second, the adoption of the Treaty rejected, up to that moment, by the British Government. These facts are established; they are well known; they are not disputed. They have no parallel in the history of this or any other Government. In consequence, I have been forced into a course which it appears to be invidious. In reviewing now the transactions at an interval of years, and in making for the first time a public statement in regard to them, I feel that I may claim to be heard on a personal matter, in reference to certain impressions which have been superficially admitted, but are generally accepted, and which I hold to be incorrect as regards the circumstances—unfair as regards myself.

I have not entered upon these matters of my own choice. What I have done has been of necessity; there was no escape for me: I mean no honourable escape. I was in the position of a man who obtains the knowledge of a conspiracy or happens to witness a murder:—nature points out the course he has to pursue; the law enjoins it. It was to me no matter of calculation, either of advantages or difficulties. The sun did not go down, after my first conclusion was formed, before I had laid before the Sovereign of these realms, the matter of this charge. This was before I occupied an official post. The Minister then ostensibly changed his course. It is, therefore, not true as stated by him, that I had suppressed my pretended suspicions till I had lost that post; but it is true that he appointed me after I had made this declaration. Neither is it true that I brought forward the charge on my recall. I declined the

suggestions and offers of the Opposition to bring my case forward. But what is true, is that, eighteen months afterwards, when I found the measures sacrificed, which had been for a time simulated, and facts and statements appeared wholly inconsistent with what I knew to be the truth—wholly inconsistent with any other interpretation, save that which I had given before to the acts of that time; I then reverted to my former conclusions, and publicly denounced to the nation what I had, three years before, privately presented to the King. These facts no one will venture to deny; they will satisfy any impartial man, that—with such convictions, (and not a single point has ever come out in explanation or in refutation), I could have followed no other course. It was not a case of abstract speculation, not one of retribution. During the course of this pursuit one nation has perished, in my most solemn belief, by his means alone—as another had at the very outset of his ministerial career.

I proceeded from matters within my own knowledge to others, as diplomatic papers made their appearance, and a multiplicity of transactions arose to confirm the same view, a considerable number of which I analysed, publishing the results in various forms. Several of them appeared in the columns of the most influential journals: to no one such statement was reply made or attempted. I applied to Lord Melbourne, as head of the Government, and as member of the Privy Council, to obtain enquiry: I did so to Sir R. Peel. The charge was made not figuratively, but practically; not in the spirit of invective, but with a view to adjudication. Finally, after long endeavours, I have succeeded in bringing it into the House. If this step has not been attended by those consequences which in other times must have ensued, that is no matter of mine.

I know not what more I could have done—I know not how more conclusive evidence could be afforded of the strength of a conviction, or of the sincerity of a charge. The time will come, that the words "malevolence" and "pertinacity" will give place to other terms; when, perhaps too late, it will be accounted to me in tardy justice, as not a demerit, that I had neither allowed my mouth to be closed nor shrank from opening it; that, smitten and bruised, I have not recoiled; that, wearied and hopeless, I have never given in.

Whoever has perused the foregoing statement, will at once

perceive how hopeless a task it was to bring this or similar matters before Parliament, alike by the nature of the subject and the character of the body. "In truth," says Mr. Macaulay, "it is impossible to deny that impeachment, though it is a fine ceremony, and though it may have been useful in the seventeenth century, is not a proceeding from which much good can now be expected. Whatever confidence may be placed in the decision of the Peers on an appeal arising out of ordinary litigation, it is certain that no man has the least confidence in their impartiality, when a great public functionary, charged with a great state crime, is brought to their bar. They are all politicians. There is hardly one among them whose vote on an impeachment may not be confidently predicted before a witness has been examined; and, even if it were possible to rely on their justice, they would still be quite unfit to try such a cause." If this be the High Court of Parliament, what are we to say of the Grand Inquest of the nation—how is it to entertain a case against a high political functionary? The matter has been brought into Parliament and—*dropped!*

There are ancient processes by which judicial enquiry could have been obtained, as being local as well as general grievances; but the Cabinet itself being an illegal body, the laws do not apply, although the army and navy obey. The functionary called "Secretary of *State for Foreign Affairs*" being, in the eye of the law, but the "Secretary *of the Council of State* for Foreign Affairs," cannot be held responsible when the "Council" is dropped. In the "Cabinet" Council no signature is required as advising measures, and signatures in ordering measures are not to be judicially got at.

Judicial responsibility is practically excluded, political responsibility is no longer even a delusion. There remains but that "aggregate of all the fallacies," called public opinion, but which means, when of any use, public approbation or public censure. It is available only against abuses that are or can be known, and in cases where attention is awakened; in the matters, to which an able contrivance or a silly illusion, has given the designation of "Foreign," no means of knowledge are possessed, because they are conducted in secret. There is no constitutional check; there is no legal restraint, and therefore power is absolute.

The holders are in the same position as the servants of the East India Company before it assumed ostensibly the government of India, and this state of things cannot alter while the Crown is but a phantom, and Parliament but a mask: were England to become ostensibly a republic, or rather an oligarchy, the people would hold its rulers responsible for consequences, even though the law did not hold them responsible for acts.

But is this charge, for which there is no tribunal, an unheard-of chimera of some foolish and solitary brain? It is the most familiar of words in reference to crimes committed by virtue of a delegated authority. It has even got a peculiar epithet. The word "Jew," represents the spirit of gain; "Greek," that of intrigue: the Hebrew and the Dorian are gifted with those parts, and buy and sell the rest of the world; but when you say *Russian,* something very different is meant; it is not a character belonging to the Muscovite race that is implied, but all that "Macedonian" conveyed in the time of Demosthenes. We do not speak of "Englishmen" in France, or "Frenchmen" in England, but we do of "Russians" in both: that is the crime to which I refer. It is to men in office that the word applies, meaning that in the use of the power confided to them, they are either the unconscious dupes, or the conscious instruments of that Cabinet. In the latter sense Louis Philippe and M. Guizot were charged with being Russians in the official organ (the "Morning Chronicle,") of the English Foreign Office, and it was this charge, so vehemently made, and with the force thus given to the blow, that brought the revolution of 1848. The throne of July was upset by the allegation of the odious crime of being "Russian." The present President was publicly caricatured in Paris, as a cub, in the arms of a bear; and one reason for the demand of the surrendering of the Hungarian exiles, was to afford Louis Napoleon the opportunity of winding his horn, and blowing a concerted blast of simulated defiance. Namic Pasha, sent on an extraordinary embassy to this country, was, on representation from the Foreign Office to the effect that he was a creature of Achmet Pasha, who was a "Russian,"—treated as such by the late king, until he was made aware of facts, which left no doubt as to the falsehood of this charge. Messrs. Abel and Maurer,

members of the Royal Regency of Greece, constituted by solemn Treaty, to which *Russia was a party*, were driven forth from Greece, by order of Lord Palmerston, as "Russians."* I myself, as will have been seen, have been in like manner charged by Lord Palmerston with being "Russian."

Now, in all these cases, the charge of being "Russian," was made to serve Russia, not to expose her agents, and break her instruments. I refer to it, however, to show, that the charge I make is not strange or extravagant; that it has been for years ringing through Europe, and turn by turn applied to Emperors, Editors, Sultans, Chartists, Viziers, Arch-chancellors, Ministers, Ambassadors, Regents, Palatines, Primates, Bishops, Kings, and Dragomans. On no lips has it been found more often, or with more deadly effect, than on those of Lord Palmerston; he was, in fact, the first to give to it its odious character. This is the crime against which England remains without remedial process, and which day by day she assures herself that an *English* minister can never be guilty of.

And in one respect they are right, for what crime can there remain to commit for the minister, after the degradation of the Empire by mere intercourse with so infamous a Government. Lord Castlereagh once threatened to issue a circular, suspending at every foreign Court intercourse between the English and Russian representatives: that was a retort to some incivility on the part of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh—England ought to have been grateful for her rudeness. Overreach you by her craft,—she contaminates you by her contact!

In private station the knave whose shameless life has lost the mask of seeming honesty, acquires thereby a fearful power; by the very fact of the currency his infamy has acquired, his victim is shunned, and degraded in his own esteem. So it is in States; and therefore is it, that out of a negotiation which you entered into, with the profound purpose of clogging the action, *i. e.* diminishing the power, of an immoral state, you have given to her the mastery over you, and thereby over the rest of the world.

* These matters are no secret. The gentlemen refered to, the tutor of King Otho, and the English secretary of Legation in Greece, have in three separate works, which coincide in the main features, laid bare the whole transaction.

Note 1.

Address of Nouri Effendi to William IV.

SIRE,

Called by the confidence of the Sultan my Master to represent the Sublime Porte at the Court of your Majesty, I am rejoiced to have the distinguished honor of expressing to your royal person the strong sentiments of esteem of his Highness.

The harmony which for so many years has subsisted almost without interruption between Great Britain and the Sublime Porte is not only founded on reciprocal esteem, but reposes upon interests the development of which must tighten the bonds of friendship between the two Governments.

The commerce of Great Britain has constantly found in the Ottoman Empire a liberty, and conditions of facility which it has met with, to the same degree, in no other country; and the people subject to the sway of His Highness have been able to enjoy, without any restriction, the admirable industry of the subjects of your Majesty.

The Sublime Porte, who appreciates and esteems at its true value the importance of these relations with one of the most enlightened and powerful nations of the world, knows also, Sire, that they have already secured the attention of *your Majesty*, and doubts not that a benevolent system of reciprocity *will soon come* to be considered by *the Government* of your Majesty as a means of fortifying and increasing that desirable union which exists between these two high Courts.

That union, Sire, is one of the objects nearest to the heart of His Highness, and his solicitude will always be chiefly directed to give proofs of that sentiment to your Majesty, in manifesting the sentiments of veneration and respect which he entertains for the royal person of your Majesty.

Note 2.

VIIth Article of the Treaty of Adrianople.

Russian subjects will enjoy throughout the whole extent of the Ottoman Empire, as well on land as at sea, the full and entire liberty of Commerce which the Treaties assure to them. The liberty cannot be infringed in any case or under any pretext, by any prohibition or restriction of whatever kind, nor *as the consequence of any regulation or measures whether of interior administration or legislation.* The Russian subjects' ships of merchandise shall be protected against every violence and every fraud. The first will remain under the exclusive jurisdiction and police of the Minister and Consuls of Russia; the Russian vessels will never be subjected to any visit on board whatever, on the part of the Ottoman authorities, neither in the open sea, nor in any of its ports or

anchorages, and *merchandise or produce belonging to the Russian subjects*, after having acquitted the duties established by the tariff shall be freely sold, deposited or transported, from one vessel to another, whatever nation that vessel may belong to, without the Russian subject having need to notify the fact to the local authorities, and still less to ask them their permission; and if, which God forbid, any one of these stipulations should be infringed without full and prompt satisfaction being made, *the Sublime Porte recognises, beforehand, the right of the Russian Court to consider such infraction an act of hostility, and to have recourse immediately to reprisals against the Ottoman Empire.*

Note 3.

Lord Palmerston's Explanation of the Difference of the Two Treaties (March 1st, 1848).

"I can state to the House the differences between the draft of the treaty sent out in consequence of communications between Mr. Urquhart, the Board of Trade, and the Foreign Office, and the treaty concluded by Lord Ponsonby. The draft provided that British goods should pay only the import duty of 3 per cent. after which they might be transported to, and sold in, any part of the Ottoman dominions, without any further payments. The treaty, in addition to the 3 per cent. import duty, laid on a further duty of 2 per cent. upon the transport and sale of goods; and beyond that no other duty is to be paid in any part of the Ottoman dominions. *This was one of the things to which in negotiation we were obliged to submit.* Nobody can suppose, especially in arranging commercial transactions between two countries, that you can go with a draft treaty in one hand, and a pen in the other, and say to a foreign Minister, 'There, Sir, sign that treaty, or jump out of the window.' You cannot do that, therefore, you must negotiate. *The draft makes no provisions with regard to foreign goods purchased* in Turkey by British subjects with the view of their being again sold in Turkey. *This was an omission in the draft* (!); but the treaty provides that foreign goods so purchased may be resold upon the same conditions as Turkish goods (!). The draft allows the Porte to levy upon goods exported a duty *not exceeding the rate of 3 per cent.* (!); and in return it allows British subjects to purchase all kinds of goods in the Ottoman dominions either for resale or exportation, subject only to the payment of the transport duty on such goods, and to the tolls demanded for the maintenance of the roads along which the goods are conveyed: the *treaty limits the export duty to 3 per cent.* (!), and admits of duties being levied upon goods purchased by British subjects for resale in Turkey to the same amount as those *levied upon subjects of the most favoured nations* (!). It further stipulates with *regard to goods re-exported*, and which may not have paid interior duties, that British subjects shall pay in lieu of such interior duties, one fixed duty of 9 per cent. (!). It was a great object with us *to abolish these interior duties* (!), which were a great obstacle *to the progress of British manufactured goods in Turkey*, and which being made arbitrarily at the caprice of the Governors of the provinces, were uncertain in their amount, and excessively vexatious in their mode of being levied. The draft provides that no duties shall be levied on goods *in transitu*: the treaty *limits* the duties on

goods *in transitu* to the 3 per cent. impost (!). The draft does not allude to the point I am now about to state. *The treaty* specifies in detail the various ports of the Ottoman Empire at which it is applicable (!), and *records the consent of the Porte to other Powers* settling their commercial matters upon the same basis (!). Of course it was intended to bring all other Powers within the same regulations; and this is the memorandum I have upon the draft (!). The above seems to be the essential point to be discussed. I think I have now stated enough with regard to the commercial treaty.

* * * * *

"This I will say, that the treaty *as concluded does not differ in any material respect from the draft of the treaty* as settled by the Board of Trade and by the Foreign Office, and as sent to Mr. Urquhart to be proposed to the Turkish Government."

Note 4.

Exports (Exclusive of Syria, Egypt, and the Provinces.)

Silk: Broussa, Persia, Amassir, and Adrianople, packages 15,000	£200,000
Goat's Wool, 13,000 bales	100,000
Sheep's Wool, 10,000 kilos	20,000
Yellow Wax, 20,000 okes	4,000
Yellow Berries, 100,000 okes	15,000
Otto of Roses	5,000
Box Wood, 10 Cargoes, 30,000 kilos	10,000
Wheat,* all Turkey, 600 Cargoes, average 9,000 kilos	540,000
Wheat, Maize, and Barley	
Hides, 80,000	3,000
Nuts, 4 Cargoes	8,000
Opium, 4,000 Chests	360,000
Valonia, 250,000 kilos	120,000
Madder, 100,000 kilos	200,000
Fruit, Cherries, Chesme, Vourla, and Carabournou, 200,000 kilos	140,000
Figs, 4,000 kilos	10,000
Oils, 200,000 kilos	360,000
Linseed, Roumelia and Asia Minor, 60 Cargoes, average 8,000 kilos	90,000
Sasam Seed, 10,000,000 okes	15,000
Gum, &c.	50,000
Leeches	20,000
	2,170,000
Deduct Grains	540,000
	1,630,000
Add for Syria	240,000
	£1,870,000

* From the Black Sea transhipped at Constantinople.

The subjoined Official Tables will illustrate the Commercial movement at Constantinople.

Imports, Constantinople.	1843.	1844.	1845.	1846.	1847.	1848.	1849.
Liverpool : General Cargoes	£1,236,000	£1,251,000	£1,526,100	£1,448,365	£1,645,740	£1,956,000	£1,984,000
London : General Cargoes	312,000	374,000	270,000	365,833	319,582	454,626	530,000
Southampton : Steamers	180,000	449,040	587,938	566,325	719,250	837,000	686,970
England : Coals	5,922	9,155	7,058	7,827	5,247	14,025	14,051
England : Iron	35,957	23,694	43,578	33,759	58,509	66,144	37,866
Of which sent to Galatz	90,000	201,600	221,380	372,354	359,712	367,497	319,159
„ Trebizond	36,480	37,200	12,640	120,135	50,365	45,360	95,285
„ Odessa	62,500	80,800	68,574	65,542	42,431	108,877	101,707
Foreign Vessels	...	...	51,750	49,460	39,000	3,969	16,005

Principal Exports.	1843.	1844.	1845.	1846.	1847.	1848.	1849.
Silk, cases and bales	2,886	3,198	1,874	1,720	1,016	1,762	Bales 950 Cases 770
Do. Persian, ballots	343	491	184	789	237	208	...
Opium, cases	327	83	101	79	191	312	78
Wool, bales	1,150	410	1,069	1,072	588	353	148
Yellow Berries, sacks	533	657	894	554	1,343	Sacks 487	1,228
Boxwood, tons	1,350	242	250	...	100	2,418 Pieces 7,671	74
Goat's Wool, bales	2,910	4,249	5,102	5,209	6,231	5,601	13,330
Wheat, kilos	...	...	100,182	37,287	229,368	161,719	596,720
Barley, do.	...	10,300	39,020	...	104,099	82,945	74,598
Indian Corn, do.	...	...	12,600	231,909	662,881	1,130,911	1,502,589
Specie	£6,870	£3,200	£33,100	£282,800	£74,000	£1,130,911	£858,393
Leeches	...	...	Tubs 120	180	108	106	133

Ships of all Nations.

	1843.		1844.		1845.		1846.		1847.		1848.		1849.	
	Arrived.	Departed.	Arrived.	Departed.	Arrived.	Departed.	Arrived.	Departed.	Arrived.	Departed.	Arrived.	Departed.	Arrived.	Departed.
British	543	540	666	659	566	569	812	802	2,035	2,035	1,397	1,364	1,046	1,076
Ionian	289	284	282	284	272	264	267	269	242	259	248	235	216	220
American	2	2	3	3	4	13	5	5	4	4	5	5	...	...
Austrian	945	923	1,169	1,238	1,076	1,073	880	880	1,489	1,430	715	677	737	737
Belgian	9	9	5	14	6	6	8	8	26	26	8	8	2	2
Danish	14	14	12	12	11	11	12	12	42	42	3	3	4	4
Dutch	12	10	8	8	20	20	26	26	51	51	19	19	7	7
French	16	14	27	26	147	146	223	223	668	668	225	225	256	256
Greek	2,478	2,453	3,050	3,027	3,221	3,184	3,402	3,414	3,457	3,420	2,686	2,469	2,311	2,296
Hanoverian	4	4	7	7	33	33	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Hanse Towns	5	5	22	22	31	31	62	62	118	118	31	31	7	7
Mechlenburghian	...	...	21	21	...	...	32	32	26	26	15	14	48	48
Neapolitan	69	69	176	181	132	114	96	99	465	468	40	41	39	39
Oldenburghian	...	...	3	3	...	...	...	...	5	5	1	1	...	...
Papal States	...	...	6	6	...	...	5	5	...	...	...	...	...	...
Portuguese	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Prussian	40	40	39	39	46	46	32	32	99	99	13	12	10	10
Russian	963	1,016	1,028	1,010	1,025	990	1,031	1,065	1,180	1,156	885	869	689	693
Sardinian	928	921	1,123	1,111	933	932	887	887	1,511	1,511	700	700	546	546
Spanish	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Swedish & Norwegian	17	17	66	66	68	68	54	53	300	298	46	49	18	18
Tuscan	15	15	19	18	38	39	37	36	77	79	40	40	30	30
	6,349	6,336	7,736	7,745	7,639	7,539	7,871	7,909	11,771	11,719	7,077	6,762	5,966	5,989

Ships and Steamers.

	1843.	1844.	1845.	1846.	1847.	1848.	1849.
Liverpool	63	86	73	76	90	101	96
Of which to Galatz and Ibraila, whole	4	10	12	19	26	16	14
„ „ part	2	2	1	...	11	6	14
„ Trezibond, idem	6	3	2	12	6	6	1 and whole and 7 part.
„ Odessa, idem	6	6	5	3	4	11	Part 5
„ Varna	...	Salt 1	...	...	3	1	...
London	26	34	26	38	36	50	53
Odessa and other Russian Ports, part	13	22	16	19	14	20	...
Galatz and Ibraila, whole	...	Whole 1	1	2	5	6	5
„ part	...	Idem 1	...	5	6	6	11
Trebizond	...	Idem 1	1	...	1	...	1 whole and 24 part
Southampton	4	11	13	12	14	14	13
Liverpool	...	...	2	1	6	11	20
England, with coals, tons 16,792	40	20,847 57	16,810 51	23,552 75	15,084 87	40,214 136	22,983 86
To other Ports, tons 2949	...	2,537	1,386	1,190	120	140 and 1	...
England, with iron, tons 5151	10	3,949 6	4,842 10	3,956 7	7,101 17	10,759 37	6,751 37
To other Ports, tons	...	(30 of Tin)	(45 of Tin)	205 (53 Tin)	600 (31½ Tin)	613 and 3	...
England, in ballast	...	...	...	13	241	29	1
Malta	10	18	13	15	53	45	38
Foreign Ports	12	24	9	18	128	75	88
Turkish Ports in the Black Sea	15	27	21	46	40	17	35
„ Danube	...	...	...	...	413	35	134
Trebizond Steamers	...	...	3	25	28	29	23
Other Turkish Ports, ditto	...	...	...	...	3	5	4

Part IV.

Austrian Treaty—Frustrated.

It was only when the first cargo which arrived under it was seized, that this Treaty was discovered to be the "most extraordinary proceeding in the history of this or any other country." * Yet it surely required neither time nor events to conduct the sagacious mind of the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, who pronounced the verdict, to the conclusion on which it was based; the simple perusal of the subjoined clause must, one would have thought, in an age of practical statesmen, have led to the instantaneous rectification of the anomaly, and the reduction of the Department in fault, to obedience to the habits of business and the rules of common sense.

"All *Austrian* vessels proceeding from the *Harbours of the Danube, as far as Galatz, inclusive,* as well as their cargoes, may sail direct for *the ports of Great Britain,* and of all other the possessions of her Britannic Majesty, *as if they came* direct from the harbours of Austria; and, *reciprocally,* all English vessels, as well as their cargoes, shall be admitted *into the Austrian harbours,* and depart therefrom with the same immunities as Austrian vessels."

The Austrian harbours! Where? "As far as Galatz." But if this age was modest as to diplomacy, at least it was pretentious as to its acquirements in geography, and remains there not one unbending finger to point!

Below Galatz the Danube flows between Turkish and Russian territories: above Galatz it flows through Turkish territory, up

* Mr. Herries.

to the frontiers of Hungary, where it breaks through the connecting link of the Carpathians and the Hæmus, by a rude passage (the iron gate of the ancients), called by the Turks *Cherdap*, which small boats can shoot, but which arrests the upward navigation as completely as if the height and foam of Niagara interposed. Neither above nor below Galatz is there an Austrian port!

Here we have a "Reciprocity Treaty," granting to the vessels of the country with which it is made, the faculty of importing the produce of their own territory, and the non-enumerated articles, the produce of other countries of Europe, on the payment of no higher duties than British vessels; but in this case extending the privilege to all ports of the Danube as far as Galatz, that is, to ports *not* Austrian, yet designated as "Austrian." On the other hand, it admits English vessels as Austrian to these harbours. Every man connected with commerce or politics knew that a Reciprocity Treaty could not have effect in neutral territory; but, to their minds, "the mistake was too gross to be committed in a Treaty," and credence grew from incredulity. The world is now at least six thousand years old; but, in all that course of time, there has never appeared, maturity such as this, of contemptuous invention—dotage such as this, of decrepit belief.

When people say that a thing is extraordinary, they would generally imply that to them it is incomprehensible. When, therefore, after the announcement of this and the Turkish Treaty from the throne, they cheered, it was not that they really approved, but that they wished to prevent its being suspected that they did not comprehend, still if it did not arouse suspicions, at least it awakened curiosity. An adventurous spirit of inquiry was called forth among the leaders of the people, and they approached the stream. They stripped and plunged in, and each in turn, baffled by his own lightness, rebounded to the surface, and back to the bank, dry. The darkly-rolling Danube, the while, bore on to futurity, the mystery in its troubled breast.

The first was Lord Aberdeen, who, on the 8th of February, 1839, wished to know "how under this Treaty British vessels could be admitted as *Austrian* into Turkish ports?"

To him Lord Melbourne:—

"*That advantage* must be procured by *another treaty.*"

I am ashamed, yet constrained, to comment or explain.

The object was to admit into England, Austrian vessels bringing Turkish produce from Turkish ports, on the same terms as if they brought Austrian produce, from Austrian ports; that could be effected only by a concurrent Treaty with Turkey, and a Bill in Parliament. Lord Aberdeen does not ask how this is to be effected under the Treaty as it stands, but asks something else which has no analogy to the Treaty or the facts—for Austrian vessels have no privileges in Turkish ports, and British vessels have no wish to pass as Austrian. The answer has as little to do with the question, as the question with the Treaty. Lord Melbourne does not answer Lord Aberdeen's question, for which he was not prepared; but he answers the question that Lord Aberdeen ought to have put, and for which he was prepared. However, the ex-Foreign Minister is perfectly satisfied, and believes he has suggested, or hastened, a new and important negotiation to confer on English bottoms an Austrian nationality in Turkish ports!

Two days later the subject is introduced into the Commons, and, in answer to various questions, Lord Palmerston states, that the purposes contemplated in the negotiation, but not effected by the Treaty, are to be carried out by "MUTUAL CONSENT." If that was sufficient to repair the omissions of treaties, why treat?

"By mutual consent the benefits of the treaty were to be applied to the ships of either country coming not direct from the ports of the other country, but from any ports *above* Galatz, that is, *the Turkish ports* of the Danube."

No "mutual consent" could bring Austrian vessels in against the Navigation Laws. When the truth comes to light no one will recollect the previous declaration, which sufficeth for the time. But now the "Austrian harbours" of the Treaty have dissolved into "Turkish ports."

Sir Robert Peel now joins the combatants, and after a courtly eulogium upon the document and negotiation, proceeds to inquire "Whether another treaty *with Turkey* were not necessary to secure the *full advantages* of the Austrian treaty?" Lord Palmerston tells him, "Nothing of the kind was required, as to the footing on which ships coming from the Danube should proceed." "No engagement is necessary between *Austria and England.*" Sir Robert Peel is not satisfied, and proceeds again to ask, "Whether TURKEY cannot *impose restrictions* on the Danube, unless she is a

concurrent party in the treaty?" Lord Palmerston tells him, "she cannot," and there the matter drops.

So soon as the one unquiet spirit is laid, the other is raised: to the knight of Tamworth, succeeds the thane of Haddo, who rides fiercely in, and charges the one colleague with contradicting the other. But he himself has wholly shifted his own grounds, and now asserts, "that it is clear that without the concurrence of the *Porte*, British vessels *could not be received into Turkish ports.*"

Lord Melbourne's answer is a thing unique, and worthy of a place in a museum. To his then mind the Treaty was a bad Treaty, the stipulation a worthless stipulation, and he apprehended that nothing repugnant to this view had been said in the other House; it was, in fact, a freak of Austria, who wished to do something that she could not do, and which the English Government, for peace and quietness, consented to let her do.* So that, after the schoolboy-romp with the Austrian plenipotentiaries, a practical joke was played upon the Queen, the opposition, and the merchants of the Danube; the first having proclaimed it from the throne, the second having applauded it as a measure of policy, and the third having acted upon it as an international compact.

The Austrian stipulation had reference to a Treaty to be made with Turkey. Lord Melbourne makes it appear that Austria was endeavouring to stipulate *for* Turkey. At least we have the avowal of Austria's anxiety to do something in reference to the Danube—the discussion took place only because that endeavour had been frustrated. Lord Melbourne would make it appear as if the object was a Treaty with Turkey, which Austria, by putting herself in Turkey's place, had frustrated. The other Treaty which he had spoken of, for allowing British vessels to enter as Austrian into Turkish ports, was therefore still necessary. And yet there is nothing in all this inconsistent with the view taken in the other House—where it had been declared, that no further Treaty with

* "That the stipulation complained of was an Austrian stipulation—that it was prepared by the Austrian Plenipotentiary, and insisted upon by him—that those engaged in the negotiation on the part of this country saw that it was liable to this objection, yet, as it was the wish of the Austrian Government, the stipulation was inserted. Therefore there was no question but that there was a stipulation to do a certain thing upon the *part of Austria*, which Austria had no power to do, and therefore which was not binding upon Austria, and he apprehended that nothing repugnant to this had been stated in the other House."—*Lord Melbourne.*

Turkey or Austria was requisite; that everything was to be settled by "mutual consent" between England and Austria! All this while no one perceives that the whole question lies in the state of the law at home. They are bandied about from post to pillar, from Austria to Turkey, and from Turkey to Austria, and back again into the river, in order that they may not see that they have got before them, a *Mutilated Treaty.*

However, the shippers of the Danube dive also; they get through the foam and surge of "Austrian" and "Turkish ports," of "Turkish prohibitions to the navigation of the Danube;" and opening their eyes in the clear water, perceive what the gladiatorial intellects of the British senate had never dreamt of, a relaxation of the Navigation Laws; and scarcely had six weeks elapsed from the announcement from the throne, and the skirmishing in the Houses of Parliament, when a cargo of Turkish produce, shipped at a Turkish port, in an Austrian bottom, reached an English harbour, to be instantly seized for an infraction of British law!

What, then, shall we say of the Austrian shippers! Did they misconceive the meaning of the Treaty? Not in the least. But it never entered into their minds, nor into the mind of any other human being, that the English Government should solemnly enter as a stipulation in a Treaty, a concession which they never made. To have assumed before it happened, that it should allow foreign vessels to come under the sanction of a Treaty, and then seize and confiscate them, would have been to cause a man ever afterwards to pass for a person, not of erring judgment, but of unsound mind.

At length, on the 25th of March, Lord Aberdeen has discovered "that the advantage of the Treaty cannot be enjoyed without a relaxation of the Navigation Laws." Lord Melbourne "admits" that this relaxation ought to have been made; "confesses" that he cannot tell why it has not; is "not able" even to ascertain what the reason has been—for Mr. Poulett Thomson is in Canada. But he "supposes" "that *as negotiations were on foot with Turkey,*" he did not think fit to apply to Parliament "*twice upon the same subject.*"—And again the subject drops.

The vessel is released under a nominal fine, and the leaders of the opposition are satisfied that matters are put straight; but again there is a difference between them and the shippers of the Danube. They will no longer trust to the stipulations of an

English Treaty, or to the foreign Minister's explanation of the value of "mutual consent," and, consequently, the Treaty falls dead; it remains as if it had no existence. A powerful opposition, meanwhile, which had applauded it to the skies, believe that they had taken measures to realise its "*full advantages.*"

Strange that the last words uttered by Lord Melbourne should not even rouse curiosity. What a revelation was there! "Negotiations on foot with Turkey," in conjunction with Austria, for an object which Austria had earnestly pressed. Here was the real political end of the Treaty as originally designed, realising what Austria and Turkey had severally desired—a common alliance of both with England, to resist Russia's imperious interference. If the negotiations with Turkey superseded the necessity of applying to Parliament, in reference to the Austrian treaty, why were not the results of that successful negotiation required? Why was explanation of them not demanded?

I have stated that one of the objects of the originally proposed Turkish Treaty was reciprocity for Turkish vessels. That being severally granted to the Turkish and the Austrian vessels, a Bill to allow it to be interchangeably granted to both, was a mere formality which would have met with no obstruction in its passage through Parliament. If the English Minister had been seeking the professed end, he would himself have inserted that clause, not excused himself by saying that it was not contained in the draft. Lord Melbourne's words show that the consequences of the insertion of that clause were perfectly apprehended. The clause, if not in the draft, owing to the hurry with which it was at last proposed, was urged in the memoirs first presented and inserted in the accompanying memorandum: it was, therefore, purposely excluded from the Treaty with Turkey; the tripartite Treaty was not signed; the Bill to modify the Navigation Laws was not introduced—not even after the seizure of the vessel; and the government had recourse to all species of subterfuge and tergiversation, to prevent their being forced by the opposition to introduce it, and thus give effect to their own measure.

This transaction is the counterpart to that with Turkey. Russia, indeed, did not prevent, by menace, the exportation of Austrian produce; but she stopped its passage through the Danube. Austrian Ministers were not, indeed, apprehensive for their lives;

but they were hampered by other considerations.* Like Turkey, Austria, holding England to be the antagonist of Russia,† applied to her, wishing that the measure should come as her proposal. Prince Metternich and Count Colowrat adopted precisely the same course as Achmet Pasha and Perteff Pasha. They had the co-operation of the ambassador, Lord Beauvale, and, through him, of his brother, the Prime Minister; so that the Foreign Minister, as in the Turkish treaty, found himself placed under the necessity of accepting ostensibly a project, which he knew how to frustrate privately.

Austria, to remove every possibility of delay or misconception, offered to place her interest in the negotiation with Turkey, in the hands of the English negotiators; and the gentleman who was to have charge of it was hurriedly despatched to Milan, where the Emperor then was with Prince Metternich, the Treaty being to be sent after him the next or the following day. It did come after a delay, but entirely altered. There was no longer to be negotiation with Turkey, and consequently the clause respecting Turkish vessels which, as Lord Melbourne tells us, the Austrian government had insisted upon introducing, and which belonged to a tripartite

* The highest personages had pensions, and influential ladies were in debt to the Czar.

† On the person of Latour was found, and published at the time in all the papers, a remarkable review of the position of Austria by her leading diplomatist, M. Prockesch, actually Envoy at Berlin. It is dated Athens, 30th of August, 1848, and contains the following passages, which will show that this delusion was not universal at Vienna:— "What makes me most uneasy are our *unfortunate relations with regard to Hungary.* I think we ought not to deceive ourselves as to the complete separation of that country, and it would be one of the greatest blunders possible to furnish the Hungarians with the means of effecting their object. *I explain that state of affairs by the co-operation of Esterhazy with Lord Palmerston, and by the influence which the latter exercises with us.* Now, I have for years considered Lord Palmerston our most decided enemy, and still consider him to be so; and to trust *to England,* as long as that man guides her policy, appears to me an anachronism scarcely to be equalled. . . . The Russians gain ground in the Danubian Principalities. We have, (in the year 1829,) with an inactivity bordering on treason, allowed the mouth of the Danube to fall into their hands, and that at the very moment when the position of the Russian army was such that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh readily would have listened to any proposal. Perhaps even now we shall allow ourselves to be duped by phrases, and we shall assist the Russians in establishing their paramount influence as far as the Drave and Save. The Porte resists, but there is no one to back her. *France follows in the train of England; England is in understanding with Russia.*"

Treaty, remained as futile and absurd as he described it to be. In this fashion the Treaty was signed, not without the expression of great indignation on the part of Prince Metternich, who, as I have heard from the person charged with the message, did not fail to intimate to Lord Melbourne his suspicions of the quarter whence the blow was dealt. If that statesman was placed between two alternatives in judging of the motives of the British Foreign Minister, he was also placed between two alternatives as to the conduct which he had to pursue; and having failed to obtain the support of England against Russia, he from that day resigned himself, and making the best terms he could with Russia, immediately signed a Treaty for the navigation, or rather say, for the interruption of the navigation, of the Danube.

From the seizure of the "Vallaco," Parliament slumbered for sixteen months. At that period Mr. Herries rudely disturbed its equanimity, by proposing a vote of censure, in the form of an address to the Crown, imploring her Majesty to put an end to such proceedings as these on the part of her Ministers. He demanded "Why a Treaty had been signed in violation of the law, or why the law had not been altered to suit the Treaty?" Mr. Labouchere could only answer on the 6th July, 1840, that "Mr. Poulett Thomson was in Canada." But he, too, has his supposition; it differs from Lord Melbourne's. Some discussions, "he supposes," were going on at the time, which "*it would not be expedient to publish.*" He adds, "he had consulted with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, *who had agreed with him,* that it was a subject which ought *to be brought* under the consideration of Parliament by the Government!"

Lord Palmerston at last speaks; he had not been in Canada; the Treaty was his, not Mr. Poulett Thomson's; he was the responsible person, and on the spot, and in the house; but as no one has troubled him with questions, he did not trouble them with answers. He rises at the end of the debate, after the opposition had lost the thread and swallowed Mr. P. Thomson in Canada, to sneer at the traffic of the west of the Euxine, as in 1836 he had scoffed at that on the east—to treat with contempt the idea of the negotiation with Turkey, and put aside, as utterly absurd, every object hitherto professed. By the Treaty, he informed the house, Austria was *precluded* from seeking, or asking from Turkey any *further privilege*

for Austrian vessels than were enjoyed by British vessels in Turkish ports! Austria, of course, must have been trying to over-reach England. "It was *now* said, that another treaty with Russia would be necessary to *prevent the Turkish Government* being moved by any other influence to *exclude our vessels from the Danube.*" The question was the exclusion of British ships from Turkish ports, and Austrian vessels from Turkish ports, and Turkish vessels from her own ports by Russia; but it seems, that on this, as on all other occasions, it is Turkey who, according to Lord Palmerston, is the aggressor.* He continues, "but according to the old treaty between England and Turkey, British ships were entitled to enter the Turkish ports of the Danube, and as to their proceeding *to the higher part* of the Danube *that was secured by the treaty of Vienna.*" So that the treaty of Vienna does apply to the Danube, but not to any of the harbours of the Danube!

Russia had, by Ukase, in February, 1836, interrupted the navigation of the river. Lord Palmerston had told the House of Commons on the 20th of April, 1836, that it need not take up the matter as the Government was determined to allow no infringement of British rights by any power. He announced, on May 5th, 1836, that he has submitted the case to the law officers of the Crown, and he commissioned a private firm to resist her exactions. Here is the flagrant case of injury standing unredressed, and bearing all its consequences in the interruption of traffic, endured for four years. He now declares the violated public law of Europe to be the protection of England against any infringement of it.

This assertion of the rights which Russia infringed is adduced as an argument against taking any steps to maintain them—is a denial of the very facts; for to assert that no measures were requisite to maintain British rights was to assert that no obstruction to British trade existed. What would have been said if Russia had made that defence? What would have been said if Russia had argued, "You have no reason to complain of my quarantine establishments at the mouth of the Danube, of my visiting your vessels, or exacting a toll from them, because you have free right of navigation in this river, by your Treaties with

* Speaking of the war of 1828 he says, "I say that Turkey had violated her treaties with Russia, and had been induced to commit acts of aggression against Russia."—23*rd February*, 1848.

Turkey, and by the Treaty of Vienna?" Lord Palmerston can say for her what she cannot say for herself; he can do for her what she cannot do for herself.

Are these words such as belong to the originator of the policy that has assumed so lofty a tone, which has aimed at such beneficial ends, which has included such vast and various interests and countries within the scope of its purposes, or converted them into instruments of its design,—or are they words such as we should expect from the Minister on whom these different schemes had been forced, and who, as I assert, and as has been asserted by every other man connected with these negotiations, has laboured all the while for their overthrow?

But at the same time that Lord Palmerston declared the Treaty of Vienna applied to the Danube, he also declared it to be null and of no effect; for he admitted that the confiscation of Cracow was a violation of it: a Treaty violated in one point is thereafter powerless in all; he further said that this act had been endured by England only through physical inability to prevent it: line-of-battle ships, he said, could not find their way to Cracow. Austria had joined in the confiscation of Cracow, after he had repulsed and betrayed her in her attempted federation with England in reference to the Danube. But Russia then was doubly in flagrant hostility against England; yet he takes no means to meet her at the mouths of the Danube, where there were soundings for line-of-battle ships, and steamers; and nine days after (July 15, 1840), he signs a treaty sent from St. Petersburgh, which stipulates the eventual occupation of the Turkish capital by a Russian military and naval force: this Treaty he subsequently justified by his "entire conviction" of Russia's good faith, and the identity of her policy and interest with those of Great Britain.

But the consequence of the act which more particularly concerns us is the Danube Treaty between Austria and Russia.* It stipulates that those vessels only are to enter which belong to countries "having a right to navigate the Black Sea," and who "are at

* Treaty of the Danube between Austria and Russia, July, 1840:—"Les navires marchands Autrichiens, ainsi que ceux de toute autre nation, ayant le droit de navigeur dans la mer noire, et qui est en paix avec la Russie, pourront entrer librement dans les embouchures navigables de Danube, le remonter, le descendre, &c."

peace with Russia." This "right of navigating the Black Sea," may not convey any distinct idea to an age which has neither penetration for her purposes, nor memory for her acts. In 1822, she claimed the right of converting the North Pacific into a *mare clausum*. The pretension was, indeed, abandoned; but it was so in consequence of the undiplomatic decision of the Americans to arm their trading vessels. She possesses, or is suffered to assume to possess, the Black Sea, from the mouth of the Danube on the west, to St. Nicolai on the east. She has obtained the exclusion of the men-of-war of all European countries from that sea. She has been able to seize an English vessel and confiscate it, without a judicial sentence. It is but a small step for her, therefore, to declare the Black Sea a "*mare clausum*," and to make it so for merchantmen, as she has already done for men-of-war. And what is there more to dare than what she has done? She has baffled every attempt of the House of Commons, of the Sovereign of England, of the Government of Austria, to open the river which she had closed. She has done so without having to apply force, or to utter threats. Her preponderance and conquests are secured, not by her own strength, but by the prostration of character and honour in the Parliament of England, and consequently in the nation which it represents—a securer ground of dominion than any strength of her own, and a ground which leaves open to her all the energy and the power of the British nation, when aroused by passion against those who, by a similar process, she will have aroused against it.

The difficulty of credence constitutes, in such a case, the difficulty of sight. People cannot trust their very eyes. What they learn through them shocks all their convictions—at least until they have made, over and over again, the experiment. Now, the same process here detailed as respects Austria and Turkey, has been employed to frustrate the Treaties proposed with Persia, the small states of Italy, Naples, and France. In respect to the latter Lord Palmerston, in his defence on the 1st of March, 1848, coupled it with that of Turkey, and attributed to me its "details." The general bearing of all these Treaties coincided with that with Turkey: on that the battle had been fought, and that carried, the plan of a general league of free commercial intercourse followed as a matter of course: I had no more than this

to do with either the French, Austrian, or Neapolitan Treaties: I was, however, conversant with them in every stage, from the beginning to the end. Well, the Treaty with France was a matter of the gravest importance, it opened the prospect of traffic to the amount of 10,000,000 yearly. The gentleman selected for the negotiation, refused to go to Paris, unless on the assurance that Lord Palmerston would not be allowed to interfere, and he declined the honour of being presented to that Minister. On the last moment before the signature of the Treaty, *when the pen was already dipped in the ink*, it was so thwarted. All this has been charged in Parliament,* and in replying to the speech in which the

* On the 23rd Feb., 1848, Mr. Anstey said:—"But, sir, did the French alliance gain anything by this mean condescension of the French minister? No, sir. The cordial understanding was gone for ever, after the events of July, 1840. I recall here an incident narrated by a gentleman whom I will name;—for his authority for the statement has been cited in a printed document in 1841, with a full knowledge, and without the least protest or disapprobation on his part, and was never protested against. I refer to Mr. Porter of the Board of Trade. He was the gentleman who, in 1841, negotiated with so much success the treaty of commerce with France. Mr. Porter, then of the Board of Trade, has lately been promoted to a higher office. I presume, therefore, that he enjoys the confidence of the colleagues of the noble lord. Now, on this gentleman's being selected in 1840,—before the Treaty of July,—by the then colleagues of the noble lord, in consequence of his connexion with the Board of Trade, to negotiate a treaty of commerce with France, Mr. Porter informed those ministers that he was confident that, whatever treaty he might negotiate for such a purpose, would be interfered with by the noble lord,—and either brought to nothing, or, as in the case of the Turkish treaty, perverted to the ruin of its objects. Mr. Porter, therefore, demanded and obtained this condition from the then ministry—that the treaty should be kept out of the Foreign Office; and that he should not be called upon to report to, or to receive any instructions whatever from the noble lord, or his department, in the conduct of that negotiation. On the faith of that condition alone he undertook the mission. It is further stated, on the same gentleman's authority, and in the same document, that he brought the matter to a happy conclusion—that the French government were quite ready to adopt, sign, and ratify the treaty which he had framed—that they were most willing to adopt it—that it was based upon the most perfect system of free trade and reciprocity—and that in spite of the precautions he had taken, and the conditions he had exacted, that treaty was at length set aside by the noble lord. There is no doubt that the direct act of the noble lord occasioned its failure. An insulting despatch on the subject was addressed by the noble lord to the French minister, which occasioned the utter shipwreck of that treaty; and all chance of renewing the negotiations with respect to it was in consequence of that event, as well as those of July, 1840, made for ever afterwards impracticable.

"Sir, I state this on the authority of Mr. Porter, and I refer to the fact of his recent appointment, as showing, that notwithstanding that declaration was made in 1841, the noble lord has not induced his colleagues to disgrace that gentleman."

charge was made, Lord Palmerston is entirely silent: had it been groundless, nothing could have been more easy than a refutation, but for that refutation the sanction of Mr. Porter was requisite, and that it appears was not to be obtained. So there remains the most flagrant act in the history of official life—the authority of a chief officer in one department used in Parliament to substantiate a charge of a criminal nature against the head of another department: not less flagrant perhaps, is the fact, that the denouncer on that occasion of the Minister, is received under that Minister's roof, without any retractation.

Thus were simultaneously sacrificed two negotiations. Thus were cast away at once the good-will and co-operation of two distinct Governments—the Austrian and the Turkish. Each of which by a process, concurrent, though distinct, would have removed the restrictions of Russia on the Danube, and while unlocking the resources of the Provinces, would, at a time the restrictive barriers were raised against them in the west, have afforded an entrance to British goods into Germany.

On the 1st of June, 1829, Lord Palmerston declared an Austro-Turkish alliance to be dangerous to England; in 1838, *he* substituted for it an Austro-Russian.

Pruth
czin

Part V.

Canal of the Danube.

THE face of the earth presents no invitation to enterprise comparable to that of the junction of the Ister and the Euxine. The facility of execution reduces to dimensions, not exceeding the resources of a parish, the execution of a work which will unite and enrich two quarters of the globe, and which will add in security and wealth to the empire, to which it will belong, more than the conquest of a powerful kingdom.

The Danube, running in nearly a straight line from the centre of Hungary, to within a few miles of the coast, suddenly turns up to the north, and after a devious and intricate course, loses itself through shallower channels, amongst noxious marshes, in the Black Sea. Its useless wanderings extend a hundred and fifty miles, carrying it away from the direction of its usefulness, and bringing its navigation within autumn's fatal miasmata, and winter's icy chains. But the degrees of northing it attains exposes it to worse infection than that which strikes the flesh, and more benumbing thrall than that of polar snows: the fabled dragon of the Pontine eastern coast, called to-day into virulent existence, guards and covers the inhospitable western shore; guards but to crush, covers to devour. From these to set free the king of rivers—to open the floodgates of fertility on the heaven-blessed and man-cursed Dacian plains; to cast off—no, to escape from, the hard dominion of lawless might and direr craft—such are the guerdons of a labour which every consideration of prudence

and of profit, diligently recommends, to the wonder-working ingenuity of our Phœnician times.

The exports of the countries watered by the Danube have to pass through the Bosphorus to reach their ultimate destination; so that for commercial purposes, the river may be considered a continuation of those straits and the Dardanelles. In former times, they were considered a continuation of the Danube. The winding of the river is, therefore, a lengthening of the voyage between two hundred and three hundred miles in space, but as calculated in time, of months. The marshy nature of the country through which the crews have to track the vessels, to the ports of shipment, occasions loss of life; and the accumulation of sand at the only mouth, necessitates the unloading of vessels of size; political and sanitary obstacles affect vessels of every class and nation, and consequently the freights are so much increased as to amount to a charge of fifty per cent. on the staple produce and principal export of the country.

The proposed canal would bring the Danube straight out into the Euxine, clear of obstruction, fever, and violence; and for all practical purposes, the inland countries of Transylvania, Serbia, and Hungary, would find themselves possessed of a maritime coast.

These countries have not yet gone through our laborious experience, in advancing from the pack-saddle to the cart, track-boat, and railway waggon; they have not made even the first step.* They would at once attain to the most perfect communications who are destitute of the worst. By reference to the map, it will be seen, that the river passes along the great plain of Hungary, and afterwards takes the very centre of the rich alluvial lands, lying between the Carpathians and the Hæmus: these are the two largest and richest plains in Europe; they are inhabited by 23,000,000 of an almost exclusively agricultural and pastoral population. The tributary Teisse traverses the centre of the plain lands of Hungary; the Save comes down almost from the head of the Adriatic;

* Yet springs are a Hungarian invention, first applied by Mathias Corvinus to relieve his gouty leg; and from the village, where his essay was made, Cotzi, comes our "coach." The Turks still retain the original word.

various small confluents afford limited ranges of navigation transversely through Wallachia; and the Pruth and the Sereth bring down the produce of Moldavia: from the north and from the west all the communications converge to that point where the river is nearest to the Black Sea, and to Constantinople. The river in itself, and its chief confluents, presents inland navigation of two thousand miles; the stream is not rapid; vessels, properly rigged and managed, might aid themselves greatly by sails, but in consequence of its being shut out from the sea every process is rude and barbarous; in fact, nothing has been done by art, to turn to account the incalculable resources of this region, or to profit by the unrivalled facilities of this river.

It may be supposed that great physical difficulties have alone prevented hitherto the execution of this project, and that mountains or rocks interfere; but no such difficulties present themselves to the opening of this passage, which is supposed to have been the ancient mouth; there are neither mountains to tunnel nor rocks to blast, nor sands to build out. The distance is between thirty and forty miles, and through half of it runs a hollow filled with water, and offering to our hands a ready made canal.

There is but one only harbour along this coast, and it is placed precisely at the point where the canal would come out; the ruins which still subsist, but which were still imposing eighty years ago, attest the importance of this place at a period not far removed from our times. It is, however, confined, and could not, without a heavy expenditure, be made available as a place of safety for a concourse of large vessels. This would present the chief difficulty to the enterprise, and constitute its chief expense, if there were not, as I conceive there is, a way to avoid this necessity.

In 1844 the Austrian government alarmed at the shoaling of the waters at the mouth of the river, sought to obtain from the Porte permission for cutting this canal; it sent out engineers to make the survey; they estimated the expense at under half-a-million sterling. The Turkish government entertained the project, but it was subsequently abandoned in consequence, it is said, of the efforts made by Russia, and in which she is reported to have expended 100,000*l.*

The produce from the Danube, is carried down in river barges to be reshipped in the sea-going vessels which bring it to Europe. By the Austrian project these would have ascended into the Danube: but why should not the river barges rather come down to the sea? In that case the canal might be reduced to one-half the proposed dimensions, whilst the lake of Carasou would become available, and reduce the distance one half. It may be that this simple and easy plan was overlooked at the time, because the project originated with the Austrian Steam Company, whose object was to secure a passage for their large steamers now stopped at the mouth of the river; if the canal was not wide and deep enough for them, it was anything but desirable for the projectors.

This plan, for other reasons, was not thought of. The barges navigating the Danube are of the most unwieldy form and dimensions, some of them carrying 2000 tons, and it was easier to bring the sea-going vessels up than to bring them down. The vessels for this trade should, however, be able to navigate the Black Sea and the Danube. European sailors have a natural aversion to this sea, and, of course, are little familiar with it; whilst there is a large maritime population around its shores, who are also expert in naval architecture, and build fine frigates and line-of-battle ships. Labour is cheap, materials of all sorts abundant, and vessels can be built (the hull) at 2*l.* 10*s.* a ton. There would soon spring up a class of vessels similar to the hoys of from 80 to 100 tons, that carry on the coasting trade of England, to which build and rig the Turks have latterly taken a great fancy. These vessels penetrating into the river would carry thither sails, and expertness, and increase the internal facilities of navigation. They would also conquer the difficulties of the Bosphorus; for instead of having to wait on their return for northerly winds, like the sea-going European vessels, their crews could track them up against adverse wind and stream. No vessel would be sent into the Black Sea that could load in the Sea of Marmora, or better still, on the coast of Troy, or at Tenedos; Constantinople would then become the centre of the grain trade, and by this indirect result, commerce would be benefited almost as much as by the cutting of the canal. The Genoese when they had their establishments at Galata

and in the Crimea, had recourse to the same plan. They had a small class of vessels which navigated the Black Sea, and brought the corn down to Constantinople, whence the vessels from Europe could carry it away.

By restricting the dimensions of the canal, the purpose of the longer one would be more than attained, without its expense: and the works at Kustendji, would be no longer required, for these hoys would be able to enter at once the basin opening on a tideless sea. This coast is not exposed to the dangers of the other portions of the Euxine. Fogs, low invisible coasts, deceptive appearances, or a current setting on shore, render perilous every other frequented port, such as the mouths of the Danube, Odessa, Taganrog, and the entrance of the Bosphorus. The current here sets off shore; the land is not low, and is well defined; against the prevailing westerly and northerly winds, there is shelter; to the south alone is it entirely exposed, and then there is sea-room for vessels making the port; there is good holding ground, and a basin behind to run into, for vessels anchored. At the present rate of exportation, 2000 of these craft would be required, making five or six trips in the year; they would employ 15,000 seamen, converting the Danube into a naval nursery, and opening a congenial employment for the Cossacks.

The enterprise would thus be reduced to very manageable proportions, the character of the workmanship brought nearer to the level of what the country can supply, and the period for realising shortened to a period of months. The Austrian estimate was for a canal large enough for two of their paddle steamers to pass, and still it was under 500,000*l.* The canal reduced one half in dimensions, and one half in length, should not cost above a quarter of that sum.

For the Suez Canal, a ship canal of the first class, and through sand and sandy soil, 3000*l.* per mile, has been allowed; we may then safely take 2000*l.* per mile. The Lake of Carasou requires dredging, banking, and pile-driving, for a towing-path; let us allow for this 1000*l.* per mile. In consequence of the change of level of the river, a pair of locks may be requisite, and as water may be scarce, Congreve locks may be necessary. The remaining expenses would consist in basins. If any protection

be judged requisite for the Harbour of Kustendji, that must be defrayed by port dues.

Canal 20 miles, at 2,000*l.* per mile	£40,000
Clearance of lake, 20 miles, at 1000*l.* per mile . . .	20,000
Basins and locks at Cernovoda	30,000
Basins at Kustendji	20,000
Jetties, &c., at ditto	50,000
Survey, &c.	10,000
	170,000
Add for contingencies	30,000
	200,000

These are merely guesses, but they are within the compass of data which are sure; we know that the distance does not exceed forty miles, and that there are no natural obstructions; we have also the Austrian survey to go by, and if it were to be of dimensions sufficient for line-of-battle ships, if it were to cost 20,000*l.* instead of 2000*l.* a mile, still would there be ample inducements for the undertaking.

Everything bought from or sold to foreigners by 10,000,000 of people inhabiting the adjoining Provinces would float through this channel. They buy at present German wares, which reach them by land, but that is solely in consequence of the quarantine charges (equal to two per cent. on the value), with which ours are met. Everything produced for exportation on 60,000 square miles would pass through it.

It would be also the chief outlet for Hungary, with 120,000 square miles, and 16,000,000 inhabitants; its grain might not, but its wool, hemp, and wines, would come down: no Custom-House lines would prevent manufactures and colonial produce from passing up for its use. Galicia, Bohemia, the Austrian states and Bavaria, would feel, more or less, the benefit of this opening on the east, affording to them new markets, new supplies, and an easier passage to the sea, than those which they at present possess.

Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bulgaria, produce the finest and the cheapest Indian corn, and if not the finest wheat, at least the cheapest within range of the Black Sea. The charges at present incurred on passing through the Danube amount to three

shillings the quarter,* which is equal to twenty per cent. on the cost price of wheat, and fifty per cent. on Indian Corn: notwithstanding which they are exported to the amount of 1,000,000 quarters, of which 450,000 directly, and 250,000 indirectly, to England. A few years ago, on a sudden demand, they furnished 4,000,000. An agriculturist of eastern reputation, calculates that a rise of price of less than ten per cent. would double the production throughout the two Principalities, which at present amounts to nine millions, so that ten millions would remain for exportation — the quantity that England imports. The dues on the canal must not be excessive, otherwise the object would be sacrificed; but they might well be fixed at a third of the present charges, amounting to from twelve to fourteen shillings per ton. Taking one dollar toll, there would remain a saving on Indian Corn of thirty per cent., and of fifteen on grain.

The question will naturally arise, to what amounted the Russian exportation, when so large a quantity was shipped from the Danube? It did not exceed 450,000 tons;† but an equal quantity was sent from the Turkish provinces, south of the Danube, by carts and waggons to the coast, so that of the exports in 1847, from the Black Sea, two-thirds were Turkish, and yet in ordinary years Constantinople is dependent on Odessa for bread!

To any one examining the state of agriculture in the Provinces and in Roumely, these quantities will perhaps be more surprising, than to strangers at a distance. The processes are so rude, the means of transport so cumbersome, the want of

* *Statement of a London Broker.*—"Galatz and Ibrail are free ports. At Odessa there are great inconveniences from quarantine, heavy charges, uncertainty, venality, and your business is not discharged without some payments, as bribes, which a master must know how to manage; nevertheless we can take charters from Odessa at from 10*s.* 6*d.* to 3*s.* less per quarter than from the few ports of the Danube. These additional charges are incurred partly from the state of the river, partly from the nature of the climate, partly from the influence of Russia. The lighterage is effected under contract with Russian boats, so that at times they charge what they like, and vessels are exposed to great risks. The climate in the autumn is so bad that great expense is incurred for medical aid: a vessel recently came home, having lost all her crew save two. The other charges are for quarantine, which is vexatious, and in the last degree hampering."

† See Appendix, Note 1.

care in thrashing and housing so great, the taxes (forced labour in Wallachia and Moldavia) so oppressive, that even without the obstructions on the river, it would appear impossible to bring to bear in any such degree the resources of the country, until there was an amelioration in these particulars.

There results, however, a difference in price between Russian and Turkish wheat, to the extent of ten per cent. on the soft, twenty per cent. on the hard; adding to this the surplus charges by the Danube, amounting to nearly one and a half piastre per kilo, which is again equal to twenty per cent., it will appear, that Russia enjoys an advantage of thirty to forty per cent.

The obstructions of the river do not indeed affect the country to the south, but there, means of transport are wanting, and the export duty (nominally twelve, really twenty per cent.), places them exactly at the same disadvantage.

WALLACHIA.	
Tithe	10 per cent.
Labour, toll, and dues	10
Danube, surplus charges	20
Deduct for inferiority of quality (soft)	10
	50
TURKEY.	
Tithe	10 per cent.
Salian, from 5 to	10
Export duty	20
For inferiority of quality	10
	50
RUSSIA.	
All charges on grain shipped	15 per cent.

That is, Turkey can produce it at from 30 to 40 per cent. lower than Russia. The average export of the Russian ports of the Black Sea is 2,000,000 quarters, but with the facilities stated, and the consequent amelioration of the processes, which, indeed, has already commenced, this is not the limit of the increase that is to be expected; and the exports of St. Petersburgh, Riga, and Dantzic would not escape the effects of the competition that threatens Odessa and Taganrog.

But grain is not the only produce. Wallachia contains

mountains of salt, which would supply the whole of the Levant. Operations of this description, and the impulse given to enterprise, would doubtless lead to the re-opening of the ancient mines of which Russia has already endeavoured to obtain possession, and which she proposed to send 40,000 miners to work. Another important freight for the canal would be timber, and staves, from the oak forests of Serbia, and the upper parts of Wallachia. The herds and flocks are worth, at present, little more than their hides, skins, wool, and tallow; with their extension, what limit is there to the supply of tallow and hides?* Already they export 2000 tons of tallow, and it is the best in the world:† last year 500 tons of preserved beef were exported, by a new English company. Nor must the pigs of Servia be forgotten, either as live-stock, or cured. By this opening Constantinople would be supplied with animals for slaughter: this is a sure result, and might alone defray the expenses of the canal. At one quarter of the consumption of London, and rating the ox at one-half of English-fed beef, Constantinople would require 100,000 head per annum, and with the prevailing currents and winds they would reach the Bosphorus in forty-eight hours.

Whatever the provinces gain by their exportation, they immediately expend on foreign goods: the greater portion of which is already from England; but the whole would come from England, were it not for the obstructions so often referred to. In 1849, 539,712*l.* sterling in value, (10,000 tons bulk,) were shipped direct from London and Liverpool, and it is estimated that the Russian Consul's fees thereon amounted to 13,000*l.* I have before me an account of fees paid by a shipping house; the following are specimens:—

Ships.			
—— 128 tons, Consul fees	£80	18	8
—— 155 ditto	83	15	8
—— 117 ditto	84	8	4

* The cattle are at present exposed to epidemic diseases, which commit frightful ravages. This is entirely owing to want of winter shelter, and provender.

† Those who use the blow-pipe know alone its value; it gives the best light, and clearest flame, owing to the careful application of heat in rendering it.

But these are not the only charges; there are cases and tarpaulins, which are required for making up the packages, by the Russian regulations, of the expense of which I cannot get a satisfactory statement. Then there are the charges in the Danube, and the addition of freight and insurance, connected with the obstructions of the navigation of the river; the charges may amount to from 30*s.* to 2*l.* per ton.

It is to be remarked, that the Russian Consular fees demanded in London and Liverpool are mere extortion, and might be recovered as such in a court of law. This is not the first time that such a course has been adopted by Russia; Peter, on his visit to this country, made a similar arrangement, for a charge on tobacco, exported from the Port of London, for Russia, the proceeds of which, amounting to about 100,000*l.* a-year, were paid to the Marquis of Carmarthen, and by that means he obtained the co-operation of England, in wrenching from Sweden the territory on which St. Petersburgh now stands. These charges were placed upon merchandise, which though ultimately destined for Russia, passed through neutral territory; the present imposition is upon goods proceeding to countries which are not Russian, to which she pretends no right, and in which she has no possession. She exacts them in London rather than at the mouth of the Danube, because she seems to have more reliance on the individual meanness of British traders, than on the aggregate servility of public opinion. According to the relations in which this country stands with Russia, this proceeding does not deserve to be characterised as an insolence, but rather taken as a compliment.

Whatever extension is therefore given to the export trade of the provinces, may be considered as so much increase to the importation, the whole of which will be furnished by England, and carried in English bottoms. This import trade will bear a higher rate of tolls than the exports; and following the same rule as we have adopted for grain, the toll would be three dollars a ton, which would amount to a saving of between 100*l.* and 200*l.*, on a cargo of 200 tons.

The increase of price in the year 1847 exhibits, by anticipation, the effect of a diminution of charges; we may therefore

take it as a basis for calculating the traffic of the canal. In that year, 507,680 tons* were shipped from the Turkish ports in the Danube. From the Russian ports, the Danube inclusive, 430,000 tons; from the Turkish ports, south of the Danube, 500,000 tons; in all, from the Black Sea, about 1,500,000 tons. Now, I have no hesitation in saying, that had the canal been opened in that year, 1,000,000 tons would have passed through it. It will not, therefore, be too much to calculate on 750,000 tons, within a couple of years of the opening of the canal. This sudden demand affected only one article; the lowering of the charges would affect all articles. The other produce, salt excepted, would bear a higher toll than grain; passengers and live-stock must be charged per head. These data would give the following return:—

Grains of all sorts, 750,000 tons, at one dollar . . .	$750,000
Salt	——
Timber	——
Tallow, hides, &c. &c. 30,000 tons, at two dollars . .	60,000
Passengers	——
Cattle	100,000
Imports 30,000 tons, at three dollars	90,000
	1,000,000
or	£216,000

In fact, the passengers alone conveyed by track-boats, or small screw-steamers, would very nearly furnish returns sufficient to cover the enterprise. But taking the dues at one-half, still would it be one of the most productive enterprises ever undertaken.

The Government would expect to have a large share in this profit; but if it received nothing, even if it advanced the whole of the capital, it would still be a gainer. It would save the

* Ibrail	1688	Ships, averaging	140	Tons . . .	228,320
Turkish side	1200	„ „	90	„	105,500
Galatz	1234	„ „	140	„	171,360
				Tons . . .	507,680

forty millions of piastres at present sent to Odessa, to buy grain for the capital and the troops; it would save the forty millions expended in the contrivances for regulating the exchange; it would profit indirectly from the increase of wealth of the capital; become the centre of the grain trade; it would feel in every branch of its revenue the 3,000,000*l.* poured in, in yearly repayment for harvests gathered from fields now lying waste, or for grain rotting in the granaries, or actually burnt on the thrashing floor; and lastly, it would have the tithe on every object exported, which, in fact, is equivalent in itself to an export duty of ten per cent. Under these heads the saving or gain of the treasury may, without exaggerating, be set down at one million sterling.

The arrangement to be entered into with the Turkish government presents little difficulty. Let it guarantee ten per cent. on the outlay, and take the surplus, after deducting charges, and a sinking fund, so as at the end of a term of years to pay off the capital, when the Government will enter into entire possession. But, to realise these advantages, there must be a relaxation of the transit duty, as regards grain, otherwise there can be no mart established below the Bosphorus or Dardanelles: not a penny is at present received from this tax, for the shipments are made at Constantinople, afloat, the one vessel lying alongside of the other. The duty has only been maintained from the mistaken notion which has been carefully instilled into the Turkish government, that they are *bound* by the Treaty to exact the sum it specifies; yet already have they infringed upon this superstition, though, indeed, not in any way to touch Russian interests: at all events the pretext is taken away, for they have allowed the free exportation of carpets, they have reduced by more than one-third the duty on valonia; manufactured silks, from Aleppo, one-half; and finally, the Pasha of Egypt has reduced the transit duty on all goods, from three to half per cent.

The export duty has not been imposed on Serbia, Wallachia, or Moldavia, nor could it be exacted on the exportation through the Danube from Hungary. It is a question if the transit duty would be exacted from Hungary, it could not from Wallachia and

Moldavia.* The twelve per cent. would exclusively fall on the produce of Bulgaria, and in that case nothing would be exported from that Province, while those around rose to wealth and prosperity; such would appear to be the penalty of being under the direct administration of the Porte, which would gain nothing, and lose the tithe: so flagrant an absurdity could not endure.

The Turkish government would, in fact, be soon brought to distinguish between its unproductive interests, as Taxgatherer; and its beneficial interests, as Undertaker, Tithe-holder, and Proprietor.

This enterprise would augment the military strength of the empire as much as it would improve its financial resources. By means of steam, and with this passage, the contingents of the remotest Provinces, might in a few days be distributed over the whole line of operation, in case of a war: and the canal so placed, with the city that would soon arise upon its borders, would necessitate the strengthening of that important plain of the Dobroja, so singularly neglected to this day. This channel would bind still closer the alliance between the Danubian Provinces and the Porte, and would connect with it the material well-being of Hungary; these populations would find on the Bosphorus the centre of their commercial activity, no less than that of their political defence.

The Turkish government has recently expended 40,000*l.* upon a futile and absurd plan, which has ultimately failed—the road from Trebizond to Erzerum. Its ostensible object was to save the transit duties on the trade to Persia. If it was an object to prevent this trade with the centre of Asia from falling into the hands of Russia, surely it is no less, to rescue out of her hands that of the centre of Europe. If Russia can be beaten on the east of the Black Sea, she surely can also be discomfited on the west.

If the English government was anxious to further the one project, can it be indifferent to the other? If England possesses influence in Turkey, and seeks to use it to lead

* I am speaking here not according to the Customs' rules of Europe, but according to the notions prevailing in Turkey.

her into the ways of progress and civilisation, surely this is the time, and this is the way. Her influence is paramount — how is it used? When Austria, in 1844, pressed her scheme to the utmost of her power, did England support her? When Russia set to work in a matter of trade, navigation, and canals, to thwart Austria, and domineer over Turkey, did England then come forward with influence or counsel? No! she left Russian threats and gold to win the day. Last year the plan was revived, and the Porte was so favourably disposed, as to appoint a commission to examine it. *Russia then never moved!* But England awoke from her trance to suggest a counter-project—a railway from Silistria to Varna! *

Even in Europe, railways are not found to pay for traffic alone. Here the merchandise is of the heaviest kind, and the lowest value; the great export of the provinces is of less value than coal in England. The distance from Varna to Silistria is more than twice that from Kustendji to Cernavoda. Labour is cheap indeed, but all the materials have to be sent out, so that the estimate can scarcely be less than 10,000*l.* a mile; say then, it costs no more with establishment and engineers, than one million, and that the traffic of the canal would pass over it, and that it realised the full 200,000*l.* profit; even then at the calculation I have made for the canal, the interest of capital and working fund would only leave 50,000*l.*, or 700*l.* per mile for working charges, maintenance of works, and wear and tear of machinery, and the Turkish government could expect nothing. But the capital required would be much more than a million, and the traffic of the canal would not pass over it. With a return of 25,000*l.* the canal would pay, for there is merely the first outlay; with 250,000*l.* the railway would not. The canal may realise the larger sum, but the railway would not realise the lesser, because it would not afford the same facilities, even if it transported the goods at the same price. My estimate of 200,000*l.*, practical men would probably disallow; but supposing it sure, no Company would undertake a railway in

* "The English ambassador has become a Russian engineer." Such was the remark of a person holding a large place in the public eye, when he heard of the military road from Trebizond to Erzerum.

Turkey on such an amount of returns, unless guaranteed by the Government, which must be indeed insane to incur a risk by sacrificing a certain gain;—the plan has been rejected by the Government. Who would advance the money for such an enterprise, which would take years to execute, when in three or four months a canal of twenty miles might be cut, and so render it at once utterly worthless.

But supposing none of these difficulties to exist, or that they had been effectually removed, there remains behind, one of a wholly different class. The grain by the railway would be charged twelve per cent. export duty, or rather according to the prices on the spot, twenty per cent. Our calculation has hitherto been based on the difference between the charges of the Danube and Odessa; the Treaty not having come into operation in the Danube, I have assumed that this duty would not be exacted on vessels passing through from the ports of Wallachia and Moldavia. But if you land the grain on the right beach, or if you export that of Bulgaria from Varna, then the English Treaty comes into play. Now, of course, this obstacle may be removed, and the canal may be the means of effectually removing it, not from that district only, but from the whole of the empire. But the railway runs right into the dilemma: besides it is the suggestion of those who have imposed the Treaty.

If executed, the objects of the canal would be frustrated, because you neither would admit sea-going vessels into the Danube, nor bring the vessels of the Danube to the sea; clearly the profits of the enterprise must depend upon the one or the other of those expedients. One of the chief sources of profit of the canal would be the rafts of timber which would pass through the canal, but never could support transit by rail. It was this consideration that induced the Council to negative the project of the railroad, but the end had been gained, the canal was dropped. The project of the railway, like that of Cairo, was devised merely to frustrate the canal, without being like it at present capable of being carried into execution.

Is not this, then, one of the mysteries of the Danube?—The others rest on documents, official statements, and declarations in Parliament; for this one I am not enabled to produce such,

but I claim a verdict in my favour: first, from the credibility attaching to the other parallel cases substantiated by incontrovertible evidence; secondly, on my assertion of the truth of the allegations here made; thirdly, from the avowal of the possession of influence, and its secret exercise. The following passage appears in Hansard's debates:—

"OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

"Mr. URQUHART wished to ask the noble lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he would lay on the table of the House all correspondence which bore upon advice given to the Ottoman government with reference to the internal government of that empire. As it was the noble lord who governed the Ottoman empire, and as he was not responsible there, it was but fair and consistent with ministerial responsibility that the House should be made aware of his proceedings.

"Viscount PALMERSTON was sorry that he could not answer the question. It was obvious that any communication of that sort generally passed between Governments which were on the most friendly and confidential footing, and, from the very nature of the case, such communications could not be made by one party, nor required by the other, except with the perfect understanding that they were not to be made the subject of discussion."

Place beside this, the results—the canal not made—the proposal frustrated!

But this action can only be secret because it is perfidious. Were the matter taken up by mercantile men in the City, it could not be thwarted in Downing-street. I make this statement with a view to inducing the moneyed interests to look to a speculation, in which they would find their advantage, and in pursuing which they would, being forewarned, meet with no obstacles; and thus private gain, the only moving power in England, might be brought into conflict with the political action of our antagonist.

This plan was proposed nearly twenty years ago; if carried into effect then, the Provinces might have benefited up to this time to the extent of 100 to 120 millions sterling, and England might have had, by this time, in the Black Sea customers to the amount of six or seven millions sterling.

The strength of a nation depends, as we have been told long ago, upon its alliances, or in other words, upon the respect that is borne to it. In this kind of power Turkey has, in recent times, rapidly progressed; but there is no act or measure which

could more raise it in the estimation of material Europe, than an enterprise such as this; which would be looked upon as an evidence of political foresight, no less than as an earnest of its faculty to imitate Europe in things that are really beneficial. As to the obstacle which stands in the way, it is impossible to offer to the Porte any argument beyond her own example. The creation of an army could not be agreeable to Russia: if she has braved her in this case, she can brave her also by cutting a ditch. It only requires that she herself should appreciate the importance of the end. Let her see that a canal is as desirable an object as an army, and Russia will no more stand in the way of the one than of the other. In the one case she has had difficulties of execution and no allies; in the other case there are no difficulties; European capital and science would be employed, and she would be backed by the good-will of all Europe, which she is sure to have from the moment that she shows that she has regained her liberty of action at home.

Note 1.

Exportation of Grain from the Russian Ports of the Black Sea.

Odessa.

1847.	„	„	Cetwerts	2,775,837
1848.	„	„	„	2,059,297
1849.	„	„	„	1,714,838

Other Ports.

1847.	„	„	„	620,000
1848.	„	„	„	536,000
1849.	„	„	„	250,000

Russian Ports of the Danube.

1847.	„	„	„	About	200,000
1848.	„	„	„	„	137,000
1849.	„	„	„	„	100,000
			„ „	Cetwerts	3,000,000
Average				Say quarters	2,000,000

Note 2.

Trade of the Danubian Principalities.

The rapid development within the last few years, in the agriculture of the countries bordering the Danube, render this market now a most important one for England. Galatz (in Moldavia), and Ibraila (in Wallachia), are the principal shipping ports, and though before the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, they were scarcely known in the commercial world out of Turkey, during the year 1847, 1224 vessels were despatched with cargoes from the former, and 1638 from the latter,—a great part of which were British bottoms.

The exports of grain from Ibraila, which in 1837, amounted to only 220,000 quarters, and in 1840, to 325,000 quarters, attained in 1846, 750,000 quarters, and in 1847, 1,338,138 quarters; to which, if we add about two-thirds for Galatz, and about the same quantity for the Turkish ports, we have a total of nearly three

millions of quarters exported to Constantinople and different ports in Europe in the course of one year. This amelioration, favoured by the more enlightened system of government which has prevailed of late, will, it is hoped, be progressive, and gradually lead to the destruction of a prejudice, already much diminished, against the grain of these countries, which has hitherto interfered with their consumption.

EXPORTS.—The principal are *wheat*, till lately but little adapted for the British markets, owing to its being mixed with dirt, being damp, and having a bad smell from being kept till sent to market, under ground: the improvement in agriculture is, however, gradually doing away with these imperfections. Moldavia, which produces about two-thirds soft, and one-seventh hard wheat, gives now a crop but little inferior to the middling qualities of Odessa, whilst the soft wheats of Calafat, Altēnitza, and Isvor (in Wallachia), are equal to them, and well adapted for the English markets, although the rest is still inferior and mostly consumed in the country and at Constantinople, The weights of the different qualities are, on an average, as follows:—

Galatz, hard wheat	61 @ 62	lbs.	℔ bushel.
„ soft „ „	60 „ 61	„	„
Ibraila, soft (Calafat) „	60 „ 61	„	„
„ „ Altenitza and Isvor	59 „ 60	„	„
Inferior qualities „	58 „ 59	„	„

Indian Corn.—That of the Danube has got into much favour of late, and is now considered as the best produced. Galatz gives, *in general*, a superior quality to that of Ibraila, although much of the corn that comes to the latter market, such as that of Domnesti, Foran, Bruses, (in Wallachia and Rahova in Turkey,) is fully equal to it. The production is considerable, attaining in good years, in the principalities, about 1500 quarters. Indian corn is gathered in autumn, and left to dry till spring, it being seldom safe to ship the last year's crop before the month of June. The following are about the weights of the different qualities:

Galatz. „ „ „	61 @ 62½	lbs.	℔ bushel.
Ibraila, Domnesti „	61½ „ 62½	„	„
„ Foran „ „	61 „ 62	„	„
„ Buseo „ „	60 „ 61½	„	„
„ Rakova „ „	61½ „ 62½	„	„

Barley is exported largely from Ibraila, to Constantinople and the Continent, and is, generally, foul and light, say from 44 @ 46 lbs., although a superior quality is produced in a comparatively small quantity on the Turkish side, which weighs 49 @ 51 lbs., and is, generally, bought up early in the season.

Tallow is divided into two qualities, viz, Chervish, the produce of the purest part of the ox, including the marrow, consumed for the most part in Turkey for culinary purposes. Tallow, the produce of the inferior parts of the carcass. Besides goat's and sheep's tallow, which sells at 6 per cent. cheaper than Chervish.

The first two are sold together, as sorted in the proportion of one-third tallow, to two-thirds Chervish, in skins, from which, when exported to the western markets, they are generally put into barrels, the proceeds of the skins paying the expenses. Wallachia yields about three millions of okes of ox tallow, and one million okes of goat's and sheep's. About 1¾ @ two millions of okes are exported to Constantinople, and ports of Europe. The yield of this grease is very uncertain, disease amongst the cattle in these countries being frequent and fatal. The quality of Danube tallow is considered superior to that of Russia.

Sheep's Wool.—The trade is mostly in the hands of houses, who, carry it on regularly and on an extensive scale. The Danube wool is of two qualities, *zegay* and *zurcan*. The former is white, or has but a small proportion of grey, and gives about 10 per cent. of an inferior short wool, called *stajos:* the fine, divided into first and second quality, with the latter of which the fairest pickings of the *hojos* is sometimes mixed. The clip may be calculated at one and-a-half to two millions of okes, half zegay and half zurcan. Washed parcels are generally exorbitantly high, and the best and most advantageous plan of purchasing is on contract during the winter, with about one-half to two-thirds advance for delivery in June or July. Great part is exported, to London. An establishment *ad hoc* offers many advantages.

The other exports are *kidney beans;* good, and grown to a large extent; *linseed*, inferior and little exported; *hogs' bristles*, mostly exported to Austria; *yellow berries*, inferior quality, exported to Austria and England; and *timber*, mostly exported to England.

Imports.—The principal are *manufactures*, cotton twist, grey and white goods, prints, &c.;—*sugar*, *rum*, *iron*, &c. Supplies are, for the most part, now received directly from England, and the consumption is yearly increasing.

Purchase of Produce.—It is, in general, advantageous to make contracts during the winter months, for delivery at the opening of the navigation in spring, or a little later. In making contracts, 1½ to two-thirds of the amount has to be paid in advance, and it is therefore necessary to provide such funds, without any restriction as to shipping documents, as, even when goods ready for shipment are bought, it is frequently long before vessels can be procured.

Exports from Ibraila in 1847.

Wheat	395,276	Imp. qrs.
Indian corn	507,320	„
Barley	323,894	„
Kidney beans	9595	„
Oil Seeds	2529	„
Millet	4341	„
Tallow	1352	Tons.
Butter	816	Cwts.
Cheese	690	„
Jerked beef	80	„
Yellow berries	878	„
Sheep's wool	434	„
Prunes	92	„
Tobacco	174	„
Hare-skins	10,200	„
Goat's horns	227,114	„
Staves	791,230	„

Exports from the Galatz two-thirds of the above.

Part VI.

Canal across the Isthmus of Suez.

"Necho commenced the digging of a canal, but was frightened at some oracular words of the priests."

WITHIN the last few months no one has been more popular than Sultan Abdul Medjid. There have been meetings throughout the land in his honour; resolutions passed, and addresses voted, significant of the admiration entertained by the English people of his generous conduct, and his exercise of independent power. But on the 24th October, an assembly of a very different character was held in the City of London, composed of persons of weight and authority, met to promote the construction of a railway from Alexandria to Cairo; these gentlemen actually excited the Pasha of the Sultan to persevere in his unseemly conduct towards his sovereign, which had led that sovereign to interfere, to prevent the construction of the railway. It was argued that Mehemet Ali had made the canal of Mahmudieh, and that he had likewise constructed the fortress of Alexandria, and consequently Abbas Pasha might make a railroad. Those gentlemen seem to have forgotten that Europe had combined to put down Mehemet Ali because of his ambition, and that England was prepared to go to war with France because she abetted him. It was argued that Abbas Pasha had hereditary rights, and that the treaty guaranteed by England conferred upon him the faculty of doing legitimately, what in his grandfather might have been usurpation. The Treaty of the 15th July, nominally to maintain the Ottoman empire against his usurpations, stipulated the adoption of measures to limit his power, but it had the effect to extend its duration: there was not, however, a word said with reference to altering its character. The firman granted

to Mehemet Ali, and in which the hereditary succession was promised, was the act of the Porte alone, and has not the remotest reference to any foreign power or guarantee. It regulated the conditions upon which Egypt was to be held, as to number of troops, as to taxes, as to the officers which the Pasha should nominate, viz., none above a colonel,* and the descent of the Pashalick to some member of the family; but only upon the conditions specified, and to be revoked should they ever be infringed. The meeting, however, was violent against the Sultan, and declared that he entertained purposes hostile to British communication with India—that the Pasha of Egypt was identified with British policy and British interest; and the Government was called upon to exert itself in this sense. It was thus shown with what facility this nation can be turned round to declare the reverse to-day of what it had said yesterday, and to exchange, with utter recklessness and indifference, admiration for animosity. All that was asserted at the meeting would have come true, if it had been only held in time: but the matter was settled before the report could reach Alexandria or Constantinople. The Pasha, thus encouraged, would have resisted; the Sultan, thus outraged, must have resisted equally. Then, a course of hostility would have been entered upon, affecting the British communication with India; then, the Pasha of Egypt would have become the creature of the Minister in Downing-street, to be used against the Sultan; and then the change of opinion in England, against the Sultan, would have justified the foresight and energy exhibited at this free and enlightened meeting.

It will, I think, be self-evident that the interference of foreign states, in relation to the Sultan and his vassal, was exactly what any power, friendly to Turkey, must have sought to prevent; and that interference carried to the point of imposing a new order of administration, in violation of the fundamental rules of the empire, was a friendship more deadly than any hostility. The recovery of power of the Ottoman empire has depended upon putting down the hereditary succes-

* Throughout the rest of Turkey, the Government nominations do not extend lower.

sion of usurped rights; and, therefore, however gratifying it was to the passions of the day, to obtain the arms of England for the attack upon Mehemet Ali, nothing on earth could be more offensive to the Porte, than the establishment in his line of hereditary succession: and nothing could have caused the Porte to submit to that indignity, save, in the first instance, the perfidiousness of the means employed, and, in the second, the overwhelming nature of the power that was brought to bear upon it.

But this was not the only consideration. Mehemet Ali was first encouraged to throw off his allegiance by the English Government in the year 1828: Colonel Cradock was sent to Alexandria on this delicate negotiation, but which, of course, immediately reached the Porte. At a later period, whatever vehemence was exhibited by the English Ambassador at Constantinople against Mehemet Ali, at one time, was counterbalanced by equally vehement declarations in his favour, at another: one of the expressions of Lord Ponsonby was, "Mehemet Ali wields the sword of Islam." The Turkish Government had, therefore, to dread England's taking part with Mehemet Ali.

The power of Egypt, under Mehemet Ali, was the power of Mehemet Ali; it disappeared as soon as he was gathered to his fathers: but, by the establishment of hereditary succession, the seeds were laid for future dissensions between Egypt and the Porte, when the cause of difference had disappeared, and even of a more fearful character than during his tenure of life and office; for his successor could only depend upon the enemies of his Sovereign for existence, and, that boon at their hands, he could only hold, upon conditions analogous to their objects and interests.

"The power of Mehemet Ali must fall with himself. The introduction of hereditary succession, a principle at variance with the laws and administration of the empire, can only be proposed for the purpose of perpetuating differences between Egypt and Constantinople, and allowing the Powers of Europe to interfere under colour of rights conceded by their intervention." These words I wrote before the treaty was signed. I am certainly now justified in referring the analogous events to the causes which I then asserted must necessarily produce

them. Were a foreign power to interfere to establish hereditary succession of the Lieutenancy of Ireland, in the family of some intractable Lieutenant, to what state would the Government of England be reduced? What principle could remain intelligible —what authority legitimate? And this is what you have done in Turkey. Away with the supposition that Turkey can be endangered from any movement of her Christian subjects: nothing can endanger her within, save a Mussulman schism, and of that field is Egypt: there by this Treaty you have planted the lever, at once, of foreign intrigue and domestic conspiracy.

The commercial Treaty, as we have seen, was extorted through dread of the Pasha of Egypt. This is a fact which I have had, not from one member only of the Turkish government; and it has been stated in the presence of witnesses. The English went to the Turkish minister with a draft in one hand, and a pen in the other, and said, "Now, sir, sign this, or I will hand you over to all the spirits of the Red Sea." Here, then, was not only a bargain, but a constraint: for the Syrian Treaty Turkey yielded the commercial Treaty; but if the Syrian Treaty was not good in itself, it should not have been made a matter of bargain,—nor if it was good. What the commercial Treaty was we have seen. We have seen that Treaty excused by the Minister, because of the difficulties he encountered—while the Syrian Treaty was extolled by him, as a matter not only of the most profound, but of the most successful policy. Dealing with this subject is like walking in a bog, every step you take you go down, there is holding ground nowhere, not an appearance that is not deceptive, not a statement that is not false, not even a contradiction that is not a pretence. But the commercial Treaty and the Syrian Treaty were in this the same; they were both Russian; and as by the one the Danube was kept closed, so by the other was security taken against the opening of the Isthmus of Suez.

As regards the one transaction, we come at once to the end of the matter: he who understands the first statement has already apprehended the last. The second is far more complicated; it does not end with the dependence of Egypt upon the Czar. Egypt has to be used for Europe, and for India; it has to be used for commercial as well as political ends.

An authority, the best we have, and a better we need not desire, for nothing can be more complete than his knowledge, nothing more clear than his exposition—says, in speaking of the triumphant progress of the Empress Catherine to the Crimea, and the menacing conferences held with the King of Poland, and the Emperor of Austria: "The Porte appealed to the whole Mussulman world, but war had not yet been declared, when a correspondence was discovered, between the rebellious Bey of Cairo and the Russian Minister, and—the Turks published a manifesto, and commenced hostilities."

It has been laid down as the highest rule of Christian conduct, and consequently as suggesting the most perfect process of judgment, to put yourself in every doubtful case of conduct in reference to your neighbour, in his place; for that is implied in the words "Do unto others as you wish that they should do unto you." In like manner to place yourself in the position of those who have to bear a part in the transactions of which you wish to judge, is the highest rule of political sagacity, and places the most ordinary mind in a position of advantage, as compared with the most powerful, who does not employ it.

The entire and perfect apprehension of the value to Russia, of securing partisans in Egypt, and of placing it in opposition to the Sultan, will come home to the humblest peasant who will imagine himself the commander-in-chief of a Russian army, invading Turkey; then will he at once understand Egypt and the Nile; then will he see that if the Russian cabinet be not imbecile, a credit which no one has given it, its most intent application and most persevering labour must have been given to prepare for such a contingency. Need I pursue the theme? Does it not spring to the eye and the sense at once, that rice comes from Egypt—the Arabian Nights tells us that rice is the sinew of eastern war; that men and ships come from Egypt; that Egypt is a Mussulman, and not a Christian province; that Egypt interposes between Turkey and the holy places of Mecca and Medina; that Egypt influences the whole of the roving Arab tribes, that can inflict such wounds, or supply such strength to the empire—that Egypt is, in fact, as it was called in the counsels of Catherine, one of the horns of the Crescent,

both of which are to be shorn, before that luminary fall into the voluptuous embrace of her, or her successors.

Let us pass over the hour of strife.

I continue the interrupted quotation: "The use which Catherine made of her first successes, was to offer Egypt to France, if she would join in dismembering the Ottoman empire."

The Russian system has science, but no genius; genius labours and produces, science adopts and perpetuates: the soul of genius is originality; the power of science, order. Thus, however strange and unexpected her steps may be to the uninitiated, Russia but repeats, generation after generation, the words, the courses, which past experience has approved, and which never fail to be new and bewildering, to the short memories, and lagging invention, of her contemporaries and compeers.

The use of Egypt to her is not at present to possess but to offer; the State who accepts the offer becomes immediately her accomplice, it is therefore desirable to offer it to more than one; but it cannot, like Poland, be divided between two, nor can its fragments be held by any, and so much the more useful is it to her. It is not merely a shadow, by which one dog may be induced to drop his bone, but by which two dogs may be set by the ears, and made to worry one another.

In 1840, all England was in a frenzy of indignation at the perfidious purposes of the French, and ready to plunge into that war, which all the real aggressions of Russia had never raised the thought of. That was the first step; and by it England was to be captivated with the forbidden fruit, and, from being angry, to become jealous. By such processes, rivalry is placed between those States whose balanced power and whose similitude of character, afford scope for jealousies. As France and England are worked upon, so, in the midland parts of Europe, are the two German powers of Prussia and Austria, and, in the East, the two Mussulman States, Persia and Turkey. The system marches with the regularity of machinery, with the method of a drama, and the facility of a dream. As regards the two first, what can be added to the words set down by the biographer of Lord Malmesbury—"He had to struggle with the wiles of an empress who sought to involve England and France in a hot war, whilst she pursued her own schemes

against Turkey?" For these purposes Egypt possesses a peculiar value, and, in consequence of past events, has acquired an inheritance of facilities. The old rivalry of England and France was in India. To England it can be said, "The French seek Egypt, to drive you, as Napoleon attempted, out of India." To France it can be said, "The English require to get Egypt, to assure themselves of India, and, therefore, they will join with Russia, in the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire."

This animosity being established, how does it affect Russia's commercial prospects? I again quote from the late British Envoy in Persia:—"The power which Great Britain has to destroy the commerce of Russia, and with it the prosperity of her nobility and the tranquillity of her Government, enabled England to force Russia into opposition to France, which the Emperor Alexander was desirous to avoid. The remembrance of the fate of his father," &c. "This same power continues to be one of the most efficient checks to the ambition of Russia, and therefore one of the most valuable of the protective means which Great Britain holds for the common benefit of weaker nations. The strength of Russia, exclusively military, cannot be brought to bear on us directly; and the control which the command of her commerce enables us to exercise, is, therefore, without any direct counterpoise; but as soon as her military power can be brought to bear on India, she will have established a sufficient countercheck," &c. "From the moment that she occupies this position, it will become necessary so to augment our army in India, especially the European part of it, as to be prepared for the contingencies that may arise out of their proximity. This will be a large addition to our national expenditure, which will become permanent; because, if Russia were at Herat, *we could no longer send out our troops by sea as quickly as she could march them by land.*"

Here we have the whole matter. Russia must prevent England from having a canal at Suez, because that canal annihilates her twofold object—the one, of appropriating the commerce of Central Asia and India, by linking it, across the Caspian and the Black Sea, with Germany: the other, the suspending over India the menace of a military invasion.

The opening up of the passage from the Red Sea to the

Mediterranean, a work associated with the glories of the Pharaohs, the Ptolemies and the Califs, was one which above all, might have been expected, to be vindicated as a glory to herself, by the ruler of the ocean and the mistress of India. The Pharaohs did not supply China with woollens nor the Ptolemies Hindoostan, with cottons; the Califs were not the governors of India: none of them claimed superiority in the world by mechanical enterprise or commercial ambition. England with the dominion and the commerce of the East, with the dominion and the command of the seas, with wealth in one hand and steam in the other,—she has had no thought of doing what they have done before her—bringing India and the Eastern hemisphere half-way to her doors. If we had been ignorant of history, geography might have invited us to the attempt; if Egypt had been yet an unexplored country, enterprise might have been called thither by the investigations of past greatness. What spell has palsied our arm and darkened our eye? Is it the difficulty of fleeting sands or of shallowing waters? Is it the expense? You have been told of difficulties by none except by those who have had a purpose to serve. *

The physical difficulties of the enterprise are nothing; the harbours at the two extremities I need say nothing of, as that is a question of pure detail and expenditure. The dangers of the navigation of the Red Sea have disappeared, and if the cutting of the canal had never been attempted, or if it had been impracticable in former time, we, with the aid of locks and the power of steam, might have been expected to apply ourselves to overcome the obstacles; but if the canal was cut and kept open without such aids, must not those who talk of difficulty of level and want of scour, believe that they are addressing a generation of children; and in sooth they are not far wrong.

The canal is mentioned by all the old writers, Herodotus, Pliny, Diodorus Siculus, &c., It is referred to the Phaorontic

* Mr. Galloway was the first, I believe, to speak of "impossibility," but he qualifies it as "*financial.*" Mr. Stephenson makes the matter very difficult, by reason of an asserted want of scour, and calculates the cost at 8,000,000*l.* Both these gentlemen were railwaymen and had counter-projects; and, besides they were both under the influence of the British consul at Alexandria, if not of the Foreign Office in Downing Street.

period, although different kings are named as having completed it. It was in the Roman period restored under Adrian. Again closed up by the shifting sands, it was opened as soon as the Arabs had got possession and established themselves on the Nile. The conqueror of that country, Amru, completed the work, and it remained open for 120 years, until it again fell amidst the schisms of the Abassides and Ommiades.*

Scarcely had Napoleon a sun-rise free, when he rode forth to the desert, in search of the traces of the ancient work, and was the first to discover it; he then ordered the well-known survey. When it was brought to him, he asked whether the re-opening was a project feasible; when he was answered by the engineers that it was easy, and even offered greater facilities than had been ever presented before, he answered,—"Well, it is a great undertaking; publish a report, and force the Turkish government to find in its execution, profit and glory."

The total distance, by this report, from Suez to Tyneh, on the Mediterranean, is 180,852 metres, or less than ninety miles; the whole distance presents no serious difficulty. The cost is estimated at 30,000,000 of francs, or 1,250,000*l.* sterling, (not more than a railroad from Varna to Silistria, or from Alexandria or Cairo): they further estimate that some millions of acres of irrigable land would be recovered.

They calculate the Red Sea about thirty feet higher in level than the Mediterranean: this statement is controverted by the English engineers; I am not aware on what data: the aqueous and atmospheric currents would lead to the inference, even if the fact had not been established by positive survey, of a higher level at the western extremity of the Red Sea, than at the eastern of the Mediterranean.† I have not the oppor-

* The Egyptians alarmed at the drain of provisions which they expected as a consequence of this passage, succeeded in alarming Amru with the difficulties he would have to encounter, and probably from the reverse of "the want of scour." The Califf answered him—"The Egyptians have persuaded thee; but I will punish thee if thou dost not dig the canal so that ships may sail upon it."

† "The surface of all the seas that communicate one with another must be regarded as generally perfectly equal in respect of mean elevation. Local causes, mostly prevailing, winds and currents, have, however, in particular, extensively land-locked seas. The Red Sea, for example, produces permanent, though still inconsiderable, differences of level. At the Isthmus of Suez, the level of the Red Sea is from 24 to 36 feet above that of the Mediterranean at different hours of the day.

tunity of examining the surveys of M. Linan, but they are understood to present greater facilities, and lower expense than those of the French scientific commission.

The canal would shorten the distance, by from six weeks to three months' sail, between England and the following countries:—

	Population.
Abyssinia	2,500,000
Africa (Eastern), say	10,000,000
Arabia, say	2,500,000
Australia and New Zealand	500,000
Ava	3,500,000
Borneo	1,500,000
Ceylon	1,500,000
China	350,000,000
Cochin China, and Cambodia	4,000,000
India	150,000,000
Java	10,000,000
Madagascar and Zanzibar, Mauritius and Bourbon	2,500,000
Malacca	500,000
Persia	9,000,000
The Philippines	3,000,000
Siam	2,500,000
Sumatra	3,000,000
Tonquin	12,000,000
	568,500,000

Amongst these there are none our rivals, they are all our customers.

England's blindness is explained in the quotation I have given in speaking of the operations of Russia on the Danube. "A shorter and a safer way to the Indian Sea has been sought by the Euphrates, and should this not succeed, in the execution of a railroad across the Isthmus of Suez. *In opposition to this*, Russia will not fail to take advantage of every means presented by her position." Since that passage was written, we have opened a communication through the Euphrates, and we are now commencing a railroad to Cairo; consequently, the points put forward as

The form of the canal (the Straits of Babelmandeb), by which the Indian Ocean communicates with the Red Sea being such, that the waters find a readier access than outlet, appears to assist in producing this remarkable, permanent, superior elevation of the surface of the Red Sea, which was already known to the ancients. —*Humboldt's Cosmos*, vol. i. p. 329.

those dreaded by Russia, appear to be realised. Not in the least: the railroad will prove not less abortive than the Euphrates' navigation. The Euphrates' navigation was opposed by Russia, with all her might, and the railroad was of course equally objectionable, until it served to thwart the canal. It is the canal that is to bring India close to England; that it is which will bring the maritime power of England into the Indian seas, and establish it in the Mediterranean; will enable England to send out forces to India more rapidly, than Russia can despatch them from Herat; that it is which will render an utter vision and a dream her idea of excluding the system of "Oceanic Commerce," to replace it by an internal commerce through her own domiuions, making Germany her bondsman, and commerce her hand-maid, in raising a Muscovite throne on the shattered ruins of that of the Mogul.

We must now look to the dispositions of the Turkish government. For it, the first consideration is, that Egypt be united to the empire. If the enterprise is undertaken, Egypt being in a state either of revolt or of prec rious submission, the Porte will consider it a means of dismemberment. She will resist, and fall back on Russia—rather will be thrown by the proposal into her arms. The Porte does at present suspect England of ulterior designs; and, independently of the encouragement given to the Pasha, she has ample grounds which I have already stated. But the proposal coming from the City, and wholly disunited from any diplomatic influence, it would be favourably received by the Porte, and would not run the risk—or incur rather the certainty, of being frustrated in an underhand manner. Practically, it is a project in every way agreeable to the Porte. She is now appreciating the value of steam and the opening up of communications. She has at heart the incorporation of Arabia; and, in as far as that important district is united to the Porte, by so much is the tenure over Egypt confirmed. She looks to this in a military, political, and, above all, in a religious point of view. The pilgrimage to the Holy Cities, by this canal, would be brought within the reach of every inhabitant of the empire. Amongst those who have the chief management of affairs, the ancient prosperity of Egypt, whilst it was the passage for the commerce

of the East, is a circumstance neither unknown nor unconsidered. There is, therefore, on the part of the Turkish government, not only every favourable disposition, but every possible inducement; the obstacle which stands in the way, being only the pretensions of the Pasha of Egypt, and the backing he receives from England.

The following incident will assist in judging of the disposition of the Porte, and of the nature of the obstructions likely to be thrown in the way of this enterprise.

Colonel Chesney, at the close of 1834, succeeded in forcing the Foreign Office to adopt his plans for the navigation of the Euphrates, and intelligence came out to the Embassy at Constantinople, that a demand was to be forwarded by the next messenger for a firman. I was on the point of starting for England: I told Lord Ponsonby that I was certain the firman would be refused, and proposed to leave with him a sealed note to be in that case used, promising that on its being sent to its address, the firman would be immediately expedited: he with incredulity, but curiosity, accepted my proposal. The demand arrived, it was transmitted to the Porte, and immediately refused: he despatched a messenger announcing that refusal, but he sent my note. The following day he received the firman, and had to despatch a second messenger with it. My reasoning was this. Russia knows what is doing in the Foreign Office; and will take measures to frustrate the demand; Dragomans are Dragomans: having the field open, it would suffice to convey by an indirect channel the suggestion that the English were wanting to get possession of Syria, and that they would presently ask for a firman for the navigation of the Euphrates to mask their purposes; a number of anecdotes respecting India would be added, whether to be found in Mills' History or not. I went to Achmet Pasha, and told him of the intention to demand the firman, and my belief that Russia would find means to cause it to be refused. I narrated what had passed with Lord Ponsonby, and begged that the moment the note (directed to a physician at Pera,) reached him, he would go to the Sultan, and then, and not till then, explain the case. The conversation did not occupy the time that it has taken to write these lines. He said, "Very well;

it shall be done." And so it was done. The friend to whom the note was addressed was Dr. Millingen, who, in consequence of a letter in the *Times* exposing the Dragoman system, was brought into Court in England for libel. These facts were adduced by him, and the notes which passed between him and Lord Ponsonby published.

I may mention a curious incident which I learnt on my late visit to Constantinople. A Foreign Minister at the Porte, visiting one day the Chief of the Dancing Dervishes, who was a favourite of Sultan Mahmoud, observed a snuff-box of exquisite workmanship, which contained, in diamonds and enamel, a butterfly, the emblem of their order. Enquiring whence this piece of art had been obtained, he was told that it was a present from the Russian Ambassador; upon which the Dervish brought out a large atlas, in which a plate, containing Mesopotamia, was marked, to illustrate the proposed stations for the English expedition. The Dervish then began to expatiate on the deep and perfidious purposes of England in reference to her pretended desire of navigating the Euphrates. On further enquiries, my friend discovered that the visits of the Russian Ambassador, which were made by night, and the presentation of these gifts, coincided with the demand made by England for the firman.

Supposing, now, that there had been no one to counteract Russia, would it not have passed into a maxim to consider the Porte as opposed to all schemes for communication with India through her territory? Would she not herself have adopted that course as her line of policy—committed by the refusal of that firman?

If, before the event, I had been writing on that subject, as I am now, of the canal of Suez, and had said: the English Government cannot obtain a firman, with all its power and all its influence, and, after it has failed, a Frank traveller will obtain it by a single word,—would I not have been considered insane? Now, on the credit of that antecedent, I venture, in regard to the canal of Suez, to say that by as insignificant means as the one has been obtained, so has the other been prevented. Diplomacy at Constantinople is one web of villainy and intrigue; and all the influence of European opinion, all

the movements of public bodies in Europe, are at the disposal of that intrigue. But this shows how difficult a game they have to play; they succeed only by the absence of all *observation.* The canal of the Danube, and the canal of Suez, might both be carried with less trouble than is taken for the putting in execution of any ordinary railroad of five miles in England.

It is of little use to discuss the relative merits of the different plans, because the one the most cumbersome and the most expensive, will yet be sufficiently remunerative for all practical purposes; and it is clear that we are in a position to-day to turn to account more readily the geographical circumstances of the country, than those who in ancient times have accomplished the work, who in modern times have projected it—I refer to the Egyptians and the French: the first, by wanting the contrivances of locks, the second by fear of exposing the entrance to the naval supremacy of England, adopted a circuitous course, and made use of the channel of the Nile. On these historic, not geographic, grounds, I must conclude that by the straight line we would obtain far greater facilities. I find that an English engineer officer, Captain Vetch, has arrived at the same conclusion by survey. His estimate, including the entrances at both seas, slightly exceeds 2,000,000*l.* A consideration which he has brought forward in reference to the effect of the greater specific gravity of the waters of the Red Sea is of great importance, not merely as regards the canal itself, but also as regards the clearing of the Harbour on the Mediterranean from the deposit driven eastward from the mouth of the Nile. But when we consider that the ancient canal was of depth enough (thirty feet), to float a line of battle-ship, and that the canal of Omar was excavated in six months, so that on the seventh, vessels floated on it, it seems needless to dwell upon such details.

The railroad to Cairo is put forward as a counter-project: Mr. Stephenson says that the local traffic is sufficient to support it: if the railway is made for that local traffic, of course those who go from Alexandria to Suez will travel by it; but what has that to do with constructing a passage for sea-going vessels, from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, or

rather from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean? If the line is to be continued from Cairo to Suez, there will be a railway communication of 250 miles; then there will be the construction of Harbour and Piers, at Suez, and the unloading and reloading at Alexandria and Suez: the rate of English railway charges alone will not amount to less than ten shillings a ton. The other charges cannot be less than half as much; but 10*s.* is more than would be paid on ordinary goods.*

Taking the canal at 2,500,000*l.*, what might be the expected returns? The exports of England to the Indian Ocean amount to one-sixth of the whole trade, and may be supposed to employ one-sixth of her shipping: add a third for foreign vessels, and we will have 1,500,000; but say in all 1,000,000 tons, at five shillings per ton, and the return would be 250,000*l.* If the canal returned no more the first year, it would soon double and treble the receipts.

How is it that a man of so bold and so practical a mind as Mehemet Ali, so long in possession of Egypt, so anxious to make it the seat and passage of commerce, should not have executed this work? It was incessantly pressed on his attention; his engineer, M. Linan, had devoted himself to this enterprise; and amongst other scientific men, and merchants, I may mention Captain Vetch, to whom I have already referred; Mr. Gliddon, the Consul of the United States, the present director of the Austrian railways, &c.; there was no want of scientific data, and no lack of offers to obtain the necessary capital. These suggestions and proposals came from all quarters, except, indeed, from the two great European governments, England and France. But if he did nothing for the canal, so did he nothing for the railway that was pressed on him by an English engineer, Mr. Galloway. The fact is, that whenever the railway was spoken of, the canal was brought forward; whenever in any tangible fashion the canal was urged, then the relative merits of the railway were to be considered. Mehemet Ali staved off the one and the other,—staved off the one by the other. This is easily explained: French influence appeared to prevail at Cairo; but at Cairo the real master was the Czar.† Russia sought to

* Freight out, 30*s.* per ton; freight home, from 4*l.* 10*s.* to 5*l.*

† See "Progress of Russia," p. 117.

prevent both canal and railway; but if either was to be executed, the least injurious was the latter. Now, however, we are told that the canal is a "*French project.*" "The French wish to be able to send through their men-of-war, to drive us out of India." Such is the pretext which suffices to justify, to colleagues and subordinates, the dispatches, or "private letters," penned in Downing-street, directing the secret influence of England * to be used to nip in the bud every project tending to the accomplishment of this great, this "British," † work. So complete has been the effect of this nameless insinuation, that the Minister, who has so laboriously served Russia in all the other proceedings we have investigated, can here drop indirect means, and stand boldly forward, with menace in his air and indignation in his tone, and exclaim to the representative of a foreign Power, and that Power France, "This is a project of yours: *England will never suffer it.*" See now of what importance, if only on this account, to have excited in Egypt the mutual animosities of France and England. ‡

But, after all, these are contrivances fit only for an ambuscade. Deprived of the cover of secrecy, they fail of effect—they sink into contempt. Would that Minister dare to use, at any dinner in the City, the words he used to M. Walweski? Would he dare to answer a question in the House of Commons by stating that France had a project for a canal at Suez? Would he dare, in any public manner, to avow that he had been acting to thwart the execution of this canal, and that the Government of Queen Victoria, had determined to counteract and resist it? If he did, then most assuredly, within the space of time which intervened between the words of the Calif Omar to his Lieutenant Amru—"The Egyptians have persuaded thee, but I will punish thee if thou dost not dig the canal"—and the floating on its

* See Article "The Isthmus of Suez," in vol. xi. in Chambers' Papers for the People.

† See Mr. Stephenson's Evidence before a Select Committee on Steam Communication to India.

‡ "Having been generally misinformed on matters of that kind in Egypt, I paid little or no attention to what I heard respecting them. It was commonly said there, that the French, Austrians, and Americans desired the canal, and that the English opposed them, on the ground that it *would facilitate the intercourse* other nations with India."—*Letter of a Resident in Cairo.*

breast of the first Saracenic keel,—would a long line of English masts be traced through the desert, and the camel no longer be the only "ships" visible on its face.

Then it is suggested as a profound matter of state policy, that relations so extensive as would be thus created, are not to be placed at the mercy of the holder of Egypt. This, too, derives its effect from secrecy and mystery. Did it want a canal to bring Napoleon to Egypt on his intended way to India? With Malta in your hands, you are nearer Egypt than France, if it really signified one iota whether France was far or near. It is not France who menaces India. The danger to India is from the enemy of the Empire through whose territory the canal will run. What more perfect geographical and political position could you desire? But if you go and associate yourselves with your own enemy, if you enter into schemes of dismemberment of Egypt, then it is quite another matter. The greatest fool may in this way, baffle the penetration of the gravest sage, and power, like health or wealth, be very easily squandered away. What existence would Russia have, had she feared to place her prosperity at the mercy of the holders of the Sound and the Bosphorus? Having done so, the risk became the spring of her greatness, having inspired her with Diplomacy.

If the argument is worth any thing for Suez, it must be at least as good for Panama. Egypt is so circumstanced that England must possess, there, the last control; for no European power could establish itself there, despite of her (I speak, of course, of physical visible power—armies, occupations, and the like); having, as she has, the means of blockading Alexandria and the Red Sea. A single line-of-battle ship and a frigate sealed up Egypt in the midst of all the boasted naval strength, developed by Mehemet Ali, who could not, who never did * move a step save as the English Minister wished. It is far otherwise in Panama, nothing would be easier for a Government at war with England, than to detach a strong body to occupy the isthmus and entrench themselves, so as to do us serious damage, call for a great expenditure of force for their reduction, and so derange,

* I have already shown that he was invited on by England, until he had furnished the occasion for the apparently gigantic operations taken against him, but which were from the beginning to the end, a piece acted.

and thereby, perchance, frustrate, the operations, carrying on elsewhere, for offence or defence.

But this leads me to another curious point; whilst Suez is neglected, how comes it that Panama is the object of such solicitude to the mercantile and political world? There you have ridges to cross, you have a distance several times greater than at Suez: if every difficulty be overcome, the cost is to be 4,000,000*l.** But cost is nothing in so grand an undertaking—the Governments rival each other in promoting an enterprise to unite the Atlantic and the Pacific! What will the canal do for you—bring you sooner to India than by the Cape? Sooner, even, to China? It will facilitate your intercourse with Chili, Peru, the Pacific coasts of North America, the Friendly, Sandwich, and other islands of the Pacific, New Zealand, and New Holland. It will be of great service to the United States, but not to be compared with Suez.

The following table of distances supersedes all reasoning:—

England to Calcutta *viâ*	Cape of Good Hope			11,700	miles.
Do.	Do.	Isthmus of Suez		7,920	„
Do.	Do.	Do.	Panama	17,280	„
Do.	Hong Kong *viâ*	Cape of Good Hope		13,140	„
Do.	Do.	Isthmus of Suez		9,660	„
Do.	Do.	Do.	Panama	14,340	„
New York to Calcutta *viâ*	Cape of Good Hope			12,360	„
Do.	Do.	Isthmus of Suez		9,800	„
Do.	Do.	Do.	Panama	14,340	„
Do.	Hong Kong *viâ*	Cape of Good Hope		13,740	„
Do	Do.	Isthmus of Suez		11,460	„
Do.	Do.	Do.	Panama	12,640	„

In fact, Suez is the canal for France, for Austria, for Turkey, for India, for the United States, for England: it is the canal for Europe, Asia, Africa, and America: it is the canal for the World, but it is not for Russia. What signifies that the World be all on one side, so that Russia be on the other? In itself, the canal of Panama is no more desirable to Russia than the canal of Suez, but it may be made use of as a *counter-project*. It has farther, an importance which

* The canal, to the making of which Prince Louis Napoleon was prepared to devote his life, was that of the Realejo, across Panama. The nephew and minister of the discoverer of the traces of that of Suez! The cost was to be 4,000,000*l.*; the distance 278 miles. European vessels were to pay 10*s.* a ton, Americans 20*s.*, and he calculated that the trade which would have passed in 1846 was 900,000 tons.

a word will render intelligible. As a speculation, it would be ruined by the Suez canal. Once then established or subscribed for, and every influence at the disposal of all the interests concerned, will be instantly and intently engaged in frustrating the other.

If the inducements which the enterprise offers to private capitalists are not judged to be sufficient, then let the matter rest; but if they be so, then I say, be deterred by no imaginary fears, and no whispered innuendoes. You will find no difficulty in treating with the Turkish government so soon as you address yourself to it directly; you will meet with no obstacles from Downing-street, if you neither seek its councils nor trust its aid. When you have accomplished this work, you will then have rendered incalculable service to your country and to humanity, for you will have done much to frustrate Russia's ulterior designs, and on one of their largest fields. Apprehend no serious obstruction from the influence of Russia at the Porte; you have recently seen great questions solved there in spite of her, and in opposition to her; on these occasions she was powerless only because Turkey stood by herself. The only rock upon which you are in danger of splitting,—I should rather say the only quagmire into which you run the risk of sinking, is *secret Diplomacy*, which at length England seems beginning to apprehend,—apprehending, to be amazed at—suspicious of, and ashamed at,—and, I trust in God, soon to be resolved to make an end of.

In the first speech he ever made—the Demosthenian oration, which, in a short hour, brought his fame from germ to maturity —Canning exclaimed, "Secrecy is Treason!" To you it is so; because England has no end to which publicity is not a means. To Russia and her projects, secrecy is life. A fair name and plain dealing cannot long consort with secrecy. In a word, whenever anything is done in secret, the interests of the Czar are served.

A late Minister of Foreign Affairs in France, a man, until he assumed office, respected for his character, admired for his powers, has prognosticated the onward march, on the one side,

of the United States, and on the other, of Russia, until they absorb or divide between them all that else remains upon the globe. I turn to those descendants of the British line with another feeling and in another hope. I call upon them to disprove the foul calumny, and I point out to them the occasion for doing so, while pursuing to the utmost bent the instincts of their own minds. If England will not sever the obstruction between the Eastern and the Western hemispheres, do you do it. You are about to receive with enthusiasm an exile of Tartar blood, who, in passing through England has dropped one sentence rich in future harvest. May that seed be sown in a more diligent manner, in a more vigorous soil. If you really feel sympathy for Hungary, do something useful for Hungary. Thwart her oppressor,—support her ally. It is Russia who has put down Hungary; her only friend is Turkey.

What in the old continent is worthy of the intervention of the new? It cannot be mingling in intrigues or wandering in speculations. She has eschewed secrecy in matters of State: she has exerted the right to choose her own form of government—to her a Republican at Vienna cannot be other than a Royalist at Washington. But there is something worthy of men to be done in Europe,and that is to resist violence and wrong,—the lawless yet crafty dealings of one State that seeks to domineer over all the others, with a view to their ultimate possession. One alone resists, and that state you may support by an intelligent use of Diplomacy, such as that of Venice of old—Diplomacy applied to commerce. Treat with Turkey to induce her to emancipate her export trade, and you will gain glory as well as profit—treat with her for the opening of the passage between the Eastern and Western hemispheres, and you will gain profit as well as glory.

Note I.

Extract from the evidence of Mr. Stevenson, M.P., before the Select Committee for Steam Communication with India.

He (the Pasha) was particularly careful to guard against the impression in the first instance that he wished the railway made to Suez: as I afterwards learned, the reason of that was, that the French interests are very much opposed to the establishment of a railway across the Isthmus, *believing, rightly or wrongly I do not know, that it is much better for France and all the countries lying on the Mediterranean to have a canal instead of a railway,* in order to make the Mediterranean the high road to India both for passengers and for commercial purposes: *therefore they have* for a long time been endeavouring to establish the feasibility of making a canal across the Isthmus. *What the French had done with reference to the canal was this: M. Linan,* the engineer to the Pasha, *is a Frenchman,* and has been resident in that country since the French were in Egypt in 1799 (?) The expedition of that year reported that the difference of level between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean was about thirty-three feet, &c. Linan's idea was to open a canal through the Desert, which was not very sandy; and I do not think there would be any difficulty with reference to the sand; I think we might keep the canal open; the difference of level would have given a constant current from the Red Sea into the Mediterranean of about three and a half miles an hour, without any locks at all; that was the advantage to be derived from having a constant fall. In that case, there would have been a sort of Bosphorus between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, as there is between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. *This idea I certainly was very much enamoured with at the time;* but, however, the result turned out to be, after we had spent this money in investigating it, that, instead of there being about thirty-three feet difference of level, there was no difference at all, *and therefore the whole thing fell to the ground,* at least in my mind. I must state, however, that the French engineer still thinks that a canal communication might be established, *not, however, without the introduction of very large locks, inasmuch* as the utility of any water communication there must be dependent upon the facility of sending through very large vessels; the question of small vessels would be of no importance at all (!). Therefore, after being on the ground, and after having walked over a great *part* of the Isthmus *from Alexandria to Suez,* I was satisfied that a canal would be enormously expensive, and I believe, inasmuch as there would be no current, it could not be kept open; consequently, my opinion is, that you could not maintain a canal, and that it is useless to attempt it. *The question, therefore, resolves itself into a railway;* and I told the Pasha what I am now telling the committee, that I was certainly, after having seen the spot, decidedly against a canal, and would not recommend any one to go into the matter. After I left Egypt, I heard from the Hon. Charles Murray. *I had a communication from him, in fact, which amounted to a decided intimation, or authority rather,* on the part of the Pasha to me, to commence the railway immediately; that I was to enter into contracts and proceed at once with it.

How many miles will that line be?—The distance from Alexandria to Cairo is

140 miles; from Cairo to Suez, if his Highness decides on going on, which I have no doubt he will do afterwards, but at present the arrangement is only meant to apply between Alexandria and Cairo; you leave the Delta, and from Cairo it becomes a question; but I think it is pretty well decided whether you should take the direct line across the desert, by the Indian mail line, or by the old canal of Sesostris, which passes round the end of the promontory, over which the old road passes. My own opinion is, that there would be no such difficulty in pursuing the direct course as to render the other, although easier of execution, and an absolute level when finished, the more desirable; I still think it would be preferable to take the short route, which will be about seventy miles.

I think you said *the French interest was hostile to a line between Alexandria and Suez; was it also hostile to a line between Alexandria and Cairo?—Quite so.*

Do you think the French interests would be sufficiently powerful to deter the Pasha from completing the line from Cairo to Suez?—I think not.

What is the highest level you have to make on the line from Alexandria to Cairo?—From Alexandria to Cairo it is as level as this table.

From Cairo to Suez?—From Cairo to Suez the elevation of the ridge is about 960 feet; it attains its highest level at about the Number 12 Station, which is about six or seven miles probably from Suez; the ascent up there would be about 60 or 70 feet a mile.

With regard to the proposal of Pelusium and the canal, would it be possible at any moderate expense to make a harbour there?—*I believe impossible;* we had a very elaborate survey made of it, and the water does not maintain a depth even at high water of above six feet for about five miles out, therefore excepting you could get a scour by this difference of level, you never could scour the mud away, because all the mud of the Delta, by the current existing in the Mediterranean, is swept away from the Alexandrian side to the east.

Would there be any great difficulty in providing facilities for shipping and unshipping goods at Suez?—None whatever; I examined the western coast of the Red Sea for two days down at Suez; the water is very shallow, and the vessels are obliged to lie about three miles off Suez; there is Res Ataka on the west side of the Red Sea, where you might get deep water, and I think the railway could be carried up almost to the jetty, which would be similar to the one I propose at Alexandria, but not at Suez.

Note II.

Humboldt on the Suez Canal.

"The History of the Survey of the Earth includes the narration of all the means by which nations have been drawn closer together, by which greater portions of the globe have become accessible, and the sphere of man's knowledge has been widened. One of the noblest of these means was the actual formation of a navigable route from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean by the Nile. At the point where the two Continents, which are scarcely connected together, admit the waters of the sea to the farthest extent between them, Sesostris (Ramses Miamim) according to the representations of Aristotle and Strabo, or at any rate Necho (Neku) commenced the digging of a canal, but was frightened by some oracular words of the priests, and again gave it up. Herodotus saw and described one which had been completed, opening with the Nile, a little above Bubastus; it was

the work of Darius Hystaspis, of the family of the Achæmenides. This canal, having fallen into disuse, was afterwards so completely re-constructed by Ptolemy Philadelphus, that it kept alive the trade of Ethiopia, Arabia, and India until the time of the Roman Empire, until Marcus Aurelius, and probably as late as Septimius Severus; and this for more than four centuries and a half, even though it was not navigable at every season of the year, in consequence of its artificial contrivances for enclosing the water. For the similar object of promoting commerce in the Red Sea, the houses at Myos Hormos and Berenice were carefully built, and connected with Coptus by means of a splendid artificial road."—*Cosmos*, vol. ii. p. 200.

Note III.

Panama Canal.

Convention between Great Britain and the United States, April 19, 1850.

ART 1.—Neither Court to obtain or maintain exclusive control, or occupy or erect fortifications, or form local alliances, &c.

ART. 2.—Not to be liable to blockade in case of war.

ART. 3.—To encourage and protect all enterprises for the opening of the canal.

ART. 4.—To exercise their influence with the local Government, to facilitate the enterprise, and obtain at each extremity a free port.

ART. 5.—When completed, to protect it against hostile attack.

ART. 6.—To invite all other Governments to join in this convention.

ART. 7.—To hasten by all means the execution of the work, by encouragement held out to parties proposing to undertake it.

ART. 8.—Contracting parties wish not only to effect a "particular object," but also to establish a "general principle," but a general principle limited to intercommunication *between the Atlantic and Pacific.*

The End.

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